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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
• The existence of non-negative ‘transactions costs’ within the economic 
system is an important but neglected economic issue.  The concern here 
is with the tendency to under-state, systematically, the crucial role of 
government and administration, and the related resource use, in most 
economic analyses of the provision of public goods.  
• This research centres on the concept of transactions costs, i.e., the 
organisational costs of economic systems, and especially those costs 
incurred in the public sector in relation to agri-environmental policies. 
Such costs exist whenever goods or services are exchanged between two 
parties, thus encompassing the costs in both private markets and in state-
run resource allocation.  
• Government mechanisms of resource allocation can have an important 
transactional role in the agri-environmental sphere through the 
substitution, through policy implementation, of administration costs for 
the much higher private market costs of property rights exchanges to 
facilitate socially desirable resource re-allocations.  
• Non-trivial policy-related transactions costs, i.e., administrative costs, 
stem largely from factors such as the heterogeneity of producers and the 
inevitable asymmetry of information between land-holders and public 
agencies. 
• There are both economic issues and financial issues raised by the 
administrative costs of policy, relating both to scheme design (to achieve 
the provision of appropriate levels of agri-environmental goods 
efficiently) and to the value-for-money to tax-payers of expenditures on 
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schemes.  The omission of organisational costs from the decision 
calculus may result in sub-optimal policies. 
• Voluntary, compensated, agri-environmental management agreements 
with private landowners have been widely implemented in the EU.  Such 
schemes require on-going transactions between participating farmers and 
the implementing agency. 
• Analysis of a new empirical data-set of the administrative costs of 
almost 40 agri-environmental schemes in eight EU member states 
suggests that the administrative costs of such schemes are a potentially 
substantial component of total public costs.  
• It is clear that administrative costs comprise significant, if neglected, 
elements of public expenditure for agri-environmental schemes vis-à-vis 
agricultural income support arrangements.  As a result, the gross costs of 
agri-environmental schemes are under-reported to a substantial degree, 
typically by around 20-30%. 
• In total, 6.9 billion ECU has been paid as premiums to farmers over the 
period of implementation of Regulation 2078/92 (Deblitz & Plankl 
1997), implying, given the data collected in this project, that a 
substantial additional amount of the order of 1-2 billion ECU, at least, 
has been spent on administration up to 1996/7. 
• There are important links between administrative costs and the time 
profile of scheme participation; different activities are needed in relation 
to participants at different stages of the scheme’s life.   
• Generally, the maintenance of scheme management agreements is much 
less expensive than agreement set-up, contributing to a fall in costs with 
time.  There may also be downwards pressure on costs over time from 
economies of scale and the economising effects of experience.   
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• The implications of transactions costs for policy design are considered. 
Of particular interest is the identification of factors related to high or low 
transactions costs for agri-environmental policies, and consideration of 
how scheme administration costs can be reduced below current levels 
while still achieving policy goals.   
• Targeted schemes may allow economies with regard to the 
compensation payments made, by tailoring these more precisely to 
opportunity costs on a site-specific basis, although consequently 
administrative resource demands will be higher.  Trade-offs between 
different components of scheme costs must be considered explicitly. 
• There are questions relating not just to the levels of administrative 
expenditures on agri-environmental schemes, but also to the mix of 
activities funded by such expenditures.  Trade-offs will in all likelihood 
be required: scope for economising in one area will be balanced by 
increased requirements in another. 
• Administrative structures are likely to evolve over time, for example, 
with regard to the amalgamation of small schemes, and the joint 
administration of agri-environmental and agricultural support payments, 
to economise on overhead costs.  
• However, it is far from straightforward to predict administrative-cost 
magnitudes, and their development over time: policy administration is a 
very dynamic area for evaluation, given technological developments, 
ever-growing experience, changing attitudes, and changing structural 
factors in the overall policy-making system. Furthermore, much will 
relate to scheme specifics; this study sought to highlight some more 
general points. 
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• More information is needed urgently on the private transactions costs of 
agri-environmental scheme entry, and the extent to which such costs 
might be constraints on the participation in schemes for some farmers; 
the trade-offs between organisational costs in the public and private 
spheres need attention. 
• In terms of overall expenditure, agri-environmental schemes are small at 
present, but they are set to expand.  The implications, therefore, are that 
even more resources will be needed for administration in the future, 
notably if reliance on voluntary, compensated, management agreements 
is extended. 
• Public sector budgets should be set in the light of information on the full 
public costs of such policies, particularly in the context of proposed 
changes in the mix of schemes under Agenda 2000: transactions costs 
may become of even greater importance in the future as agri-
environmental policy objectives and the mechanisms used to achieve 
them evolve. 
• If general environmental resource payments are introduced, 
administrative costs will increase substantially, given the need for 
project officer liaison with farmers in order to actually achieve 
environmental management of the desired type.   
• Finally, it is meaningless to assess scheme administration costs in 
abstract: they should be related to the achievement of policy objectives 
and improvements in overall social welfare.  The aim is not to minimise 
administrative costs per se, but to design agri-environmental schemes so 
as to maximise the value for money flowing from scheme expenditures. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Motivations  
 
This report summarises work completed under ‘Task 3’ of the STEWPOL 
project on ‘The Market Effects of Countryside Stewardship Policies’ 
(FAIR1/CT95-0709). The research goal was to assess countryside 
stewardship policy costs as broadly as possible, in order to take the cost 
analysis in scheme evaluations beyond merely any compensation payments 
made by the Exchequer to participants and towards the gross public costs of 
schemes.  Whereas only some agri-environmental schemes involve 
payments to farmers, all schemes, regardless of their type, cause 
administrative costs to be incurred by the implementing agency.  Research 
centred on the concept of transactions costs, i.e., the organisational costs of 
economic systems, and focuses particularly on those costs incurred in the 
public sector when introducing and implementing agri-environmental 
schemes.  
 
Transactions costs are an inescapable feature of real economic systems.  
Currently little is known about them in empirical terms, although they have 
been the focus of a substantial body of theoretical writing, for example, see 
Williamson (1985) and North (1986).  Generally, they are viewed as a 
spectrum of institutional costs.  Cheung (1987) provides a useful starting 
point with his definition of transactions costs as “all those costs that cannot 
be conceived to exist in a  Robinson Crusoe economy where neither 
property rights nor transactions nor any kind of economic organisation can 
be found”.  Another perspective on transactions costs is that they constitute 
those costs that arise not from the production of goods but from their 
transfer from one owner or user to another.   
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Non-negative ‘transactions costs’ or organisational costs may exist 
whenever resources are exchanged between two parties, thus encompassing 
costs in both private markets and in state-run resource allocation.  Although 
transactions costs are commonly perceived as ‘friction’ on the economic 
system, organisation can have an important positive role, for example, 
through the substitution, through government policy implementation, of  
administration costs for the much higher private market costs of exchanging 
some types of property rights, to facilitate socially desirable resource re-
allocations. Administrative resource allocation systems aim to increase 
overall welfare by providing a mechanism by which to resolve some types 
of resource use conflicts, for example, relating to the provision of public 
goods in the countryside.  Given this perspective, development of the notion 
of ‘transactions benefits’ is likely to be useful too1. 
 
The underlying concern is with the tendency to under-state, in most 
economic analysis of the provision of public goods, the crucial role of 
government and administration, and the resources allocated to this.  The 
term ‘intervention’ is commonly used with regard to administrative 
methods of resource allocation, with negative connotations.  It is often 
implied that costs should be minimised rather proceeding with the more 
positive view that such resource use should be optimised.  However, the 
negative view of government intervention can be counter-productive in 
policy analysis, for example, if the benefits of extra administrative activity 
are omitted from the overall calculus.  
 
                                                
1
 Thanks to Michael Bell (1998, pers.comm.) for suggesting this term. 
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In a world of scarce resources, organisational costs should be minimised 
whilst maintaining sufficient levels of activity to fulfil the objectives of the 
policy.  The economics of policy administration are of growing 
contemporary interest in the practical policy-making sphere: for example, 
the recent assessment of the Environmentally Sensitive Area scheme in 
England by the National Audit Office (1997), followed by a government 
Public Accounts Committee (1998) inquiry, concluded that the running 
costs should be reduced (with the implicit assumption that the levels of 
benefits from policy should be maintained).  Investigation and assessment 
of scheme administration is timely: agri-environmental policy is developing 
at present at a very rapid rate, from small institutional foundations in some 
countries.  Hence, it is useful (and important) to take an over-view now, 
assessing strengths and weaknesses, to guide future developments as this 
policy sphere really builds momentum.  Despite the fact that the 
programmes covering the measures accompanying the 1992 MacSharry 
reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) represent only 
approximately 3% of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) budget, the attention paid to them by politicians, the public 
and researchers is high and increasing.  It is likely that agri-environmental 
programmes such as those developed under Regulation 2078/92 will play 
an important role in future EU agricultural policy.  There are proposals to 
increase the budget for financing agri-environmental measures under 
Agenda 2000.   This report argues that future budgeting should consider the 
organisational costs of policy, in addition to any changes in the payments to 
be made to landowners.  It might also be possible to learn from the 
experience so far for countries just starting to develop their agri-
environmental policy, especially, perhaps, given Eastwards expansion of 
the EU 
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1.2 Aims  and Objectives 
 
The use of a transaction-cost approach to the analysis of environmental 
policy is novel; moreover there have been few empirical efforts to measure 
transaction costs, and it is very unusual to find policy evaluations in the 
literature which include them explicitly, despite widespread recognition of 
their importance. The administrative costs of schemes comprise a 
potentially substantial component of total public policy costs, but the levels, 
structure and incidence of such costs are typically undocumented.  In neo-
classical economic models, a common assumption is that information is 
available at zero cost to all actors in a market, i.e., transaction costs are non-
existent.  Theoretical conclusions with regard to practical policy 
development (for example, relating to the use of taxes or subsidies) often 
draw on such models2.  But what understanding of environmental policy 
implementation do we miss when we assume that information is costless?  
Whilst the existence of administrative costs does not imply government 
failure, there is certainly a problem of invisibility, and the omission of 
organisational costs from the decision calculus may result in sub-optimal 
policies.  Furthermore, if the higher costs for the agri-environmental 
programme cannot be explained and justified, there is a risk of inefficiency 
in management, bad design of policy instruments and a consequent mis-
allocation of public expenditure.  This may increase the constraints on the 
further development of the agri-environmental policy framework. 
 
The major goal of this research is to bring the administrative dimension of 
resource allocation much more to the fore, and particularly in the context of 
                                                
2
 NB While the model of market effects of countryside stewardship policies developed under Task 5 did 
not explicitly include administration and other transactions costs, such costs were implicitly included 
given the use of the Positive Mathematical Programming approach, based on actual data.  Such an 
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rural resource use and policy.  The strategy was to provide and interpret 
policy cost data to enable comparative policy analysis to be undertaken on 
the basis not only of the payments made to farmers and landowners but also 
including the administrative costs incurred by each policy.  The focus was 
placed on voluntary agri-environmental schemes based on management 
agreements between the State and private producers, which are the 
dominant policy approach across the EU at present.  Such schemes are 
particularly interesting in the transactional context as they amount to a 
‘quasi-market’ in agri-environmental goods.  In effect, such schemes 
involve the leasing of property rights to specified environmental resources 
by the State from farmers for a defined period.  Nearly all agri-
environmental schemes in EU member states at present involve transfer 
payments to farmers in return for prescribed actions. Such programmes 
often require detailed interactions with participants at different stages.   For 
example, given the likelihood of opportunism on the part of landowners, 
substantial resources are required for monitoring and evaluating 
programmes throughout the duration of any contract, which must be 
included in policy evaluation for debate on the cost-effectiveness of agri-
environmental measures to be meaningful.  
 
The aim was to explore the economics of activity within the administrative 
sphere to achieve agri-environmental goals, and to measure the magnitudes 
of organisational costs in relation to the implementation of countryside 
stewardship schemes.  Empirical assessment of these costs could provide a 
useful basis from which to assess the organisational implications of policy 
design in the future.  The associated financial costs of compensation were 
                                                                                                                                           
approach may, therefore, offer a useful advance on modelling the reality of economic responses to 
schemes. 
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also assessed, with consideration of the links between scheme 
administration costs, participation and compensation costs too. 
 
Three core research objectives were identified: 
• the estimation of the administrative costs of selected countryside 
stewardship policies, mostly based on voluntary, compensated 
management agreements 
• an assessment of these costs in relation to scheme participation levels, 
the amounts of compensation transferred and so on 
• the identification of factors that  explain administrative cost variation at 
scheme-level 
 
The identification of factors related to high or low administrative costs for 
agri-environmental policies could aid reductions in policy administrative 
costs while still allowing goals to be achieved.  In addition, it would be 
useful to identify transactional factors related to scheme design and 
implementation that might be causing policies to fail to meet their 
objectives.  For example, there may be barriers to participation in voluntary 
agri-environmental schemes if farmers have to bear substantial transactions 
costs when entering schemes, and the existence of such barriers may 
jeopardise the achievement of policy objectives.  So, the question, how can 
transactions costs be reduced, is a critical one in the agri-environmental 
sphere, particularly given the dominance at present of voluntary schemes. 
 
A cautionary note is needed with regard to the use of such analysis for 
actual policy-making guidance: the gross public costs of schemes are not 
equivalent to the social costs of schemes.  An important caveat to the 
discussion of administrative costs here is that it is unrewarding to discuss 
the organisational costs of economic systems, especially of government 
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mechanisms of resource allocation, in abstract: ultimately, they must be 
related to policy objectives and the extent of their achievement. The 
distinction between financial assessment and broader, economic analysis is 
crucial; ideally, we would like to know how the amounts spent on agri-
environmental schemes in terms of compensation and administration relate 
to improving environmental quality and social welfare, as compared to the 
‘policy-off’ situation.  However, full cost-benefit assessment is 
prohibitively complex. Overall economic efficiency analysis is impossible: 
we have no idea of the opportunity costs of government staff (for example, 
working in the health or education policy sectors).  Hence, the analysis in 
this report is at the level of the agri-environmental sector only, and the cost-
effectiveness within the sector of allocating resources in particular ways to 
achieve agri-environmental policy goals.   
 
The aim, therefore, was not to investigate whether the agri-environmental 
measures of interest lead to a socially optimal situation, given the 
complexity of such a task, but rather to contribute some groundwork 
towards such analyses. This research aims only to offer some guidance to 
the work needed to improve the understanding of policy operation and 
hence to assist future policy developments; linking administrative costs to 
policy benefits to assess optimality in any sense is beyond the remit of this 
study.  Eventually, the information gathered and analysed here might feed 
into an estimation of the full costs of such schemes, taking into account the 
net effect on costs to the government exchequer as well as the social 
opportunity cost of resource use (i.e., the cost of countryside stewardship 
schemes less the savings made in terms of agricultural support payments 
under the European commodity regimes, see Saunders 1996, Whitby et al. 
1998). 
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The economic impacts of scheme transactions costs will be a function of 
their magnitude.  Thus, an essential first step is to estimate the size of 
transactions costs.  There is potentially much to learn for administrations as 
they gain experience of scheme implementation.  A great deal will relate to 
scheme specifics; this study intends to highlight some more general points.  
Section 2 considers the role and scope of administrative activity in the agri-
environmental sphere, followed by an outline of the empirical transactions 
cost assessment in eight member states in Section 3. The findings are 
reviewed in Section 4, with some investigation of the qualitative and 
quantitative transactional-cost differences of different measures, of similar 
measures in different member states, and of the variation in costs over time 
for individual schemes.  In Section 5, the implications of the findings are 
discussed for practical European agri-environmental policy developments, 
for example, through the ‘greening’ of agricultural support payments in the 
Less Favoured Areas by applying forms of environmental conditionality.  
Section 6 considers the private transactions costs of agri-environmental 
scheme participation, and Section 7 considers how scheme transactions 
costs might be reduced.  The findings are discussed in Section 8, and the 
report is concluded in Section 9. 
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2. AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TRANSACTIONS 
 
2.1 The Administrative Requirements of Agri-Environmental Policy 
 
The current situation in the EU is one of the perceived under-supply of agri-
environmental goods.  It would be useful, therefore, to understand why 
disequilibrium between the supply and demand of agri-environmental 
goods persists, and then to ask how provision could be increased.  A 
starting point for agri-environmental policy analysis lies in the breakdown 
of classical contracting for agri-environmental goods.  An externality exists 
when the private economy lacks incentives to set up a market for a good 
(i.e., the costs of change exceed the anticipated gains), and when the non-
existence of this market results in a Pareto sub-optimal resource allocation.  
Transactions costs are fundamental to the existence of externalities, often 
presenting barriers to the efficient resolution of conflict through the market 
mechanism. 
 
The attributes of real world transactions, particularly relating to aspects 
such as information asymmetries and opportunism, are particularly 
important in the realm of agri-environmental or countryside goods, given 
characteristics such as the numbers of economic agents involved, the 
invisibility of goods, their non-separability, site-specificity, uncertainty and 
so on.  These characteristics pose significant hurdles to private market 
contracting with regard to agri-environmental goods and services, leaving 
resource use conflicts frequently unresolved.  Very high transactions costs 
between economic agents can explain why private markets do not exist for 
some goods, leaving resource use conflicts unresolved.  Hence the 
development of government efforts in many economies to reduce conflicts 
through reducing the barriers to exchange, for example, through the 
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development of new, institutionally-created markets for agri-environmental 
goods.  Government-created (or facilitated) markets are found increasingly 
in the agri-environmental sphere (especially under EU Regulation 2078/92), 
with the use of standardised contracts to reduce negotiation costs.   
However, the transactions costs that inhibited the efficient free-market 
provision of goods will also have implications for the cost-effectiveness of 
policy mechanisms to provide them, as the nature of the goods remain 
unchanged.  Given non-zero transactional costs, consideration of the 
organisational resource implications should be a core element of policy 
design if administrative activity if to successfully achieve policy objectives. 
 
A typology of policy-related costs provides the essential starting point for 
analysis of policy instruments.  The first important distinction is between 
organisational costs and policy compliance costs.  The latter might be 
measured by scheme compensation payments to producers, where these are 
made; compensation is usually assessed on the basis of agricultural 
opportunity costs and frequently reported as ‘policy costs’.  The other 
component, public organisational costs are rarely measured and reported, 
despite the fact that, given their magnitudes, they can have resource 
implications and significant implications for policy development.  
Assessment of the gross costs of agri-environmental policy also involves 
taking account of the costs that arise from the transfer from one owner or 
user to another of the property rights related to the production of these 
goods, i.e., the transactions costs. 
 
Policy-related transactions costs are found in both the public and the private 
sector: contracts (whether mandatory, as under regulatory policies, or 
voluntary) require two parties, both of which  will experience costs of 
participation (a mixture of costs related to search, negotiation, enforcement 
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and so on).  Direct, policy-induced transactions costs stem largely from two 
aspects of agri-environmental problems, namely the heterogeneity across 
producers, and the inevitable asymmetry of information between land-
holders and public agencies.  The second distinction, therefore, to bear in 
mind is that between the costs borne in the ‘private’ sector and in the 
‘public’ sector (administrative transactions costs).  Non-zero transactions 
costs will enter the farmer’s decision calculus in deciding whether to enter a 
contract (for example, related to acquiring information about a scheme), in 
addition to his assessment of the compliance costs (in terms of foregone 
agricultural production) of entering a conservation scheme.  Unless farmers 
are altruistic, private transactions costs must be covered by the 
compensation payments available, which must, of course, also cover the 
agricultural opportunity costs.  Figure 1 illustrates the different types of 
costs and their relationships to each other. Table 1 categorises the 
transactional costs incurred in the public and private sectors for voluntary 
agri-environmental schemes based on management agreements.  
 
Figure 1: Typology  of Public  and Private Policy Costs 
 
   
Private costs  Transaction
s costs 
Net compensation 
received 
Public costs Administrative 
costs 
      Compensation paid 
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Table 1: Categories of Transactional Costs Incurred in the 
Implementation of Voluntary Schemes Based on Compensated 
Management Agreements and Cost Incidence 
 
Main 
Category 
Sub-Category State agency costs Participant costs 
  Fixed Variable with 
no. of 
participants 
Fixed Variable, 
e.g., with 
hectares 
entered 
Information - surveying of the     
designated area 
√    
 - designation of area and 
designing management 
prescriptions 
√    
 - re-notification / re-design 
of prescriptions 
√    
Contracting - promotion of scheme          
to farmers 
√ √ √  
 - negotiation between 
organisation and farmer 
 √ √ √ 
 - administration of contract 
(making payments) 
 √ √ √ 
Policing - environmental   
monitoring and scheme 
evaluation 
√    
 - enforcement of farmer 
compliance 
 √ √ √ 
 
The inevitability of policy set-up costs, as well as on-going evaluation and 
development, means that agri-environmental schemes often incur 
substantial fixed administrative costs, both at the level of any given scheme 
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(such as the core personnel needed to direct and evaluate it) and at the level 
of participation within the scheme: for example, each land-owner must be 
sent an initial information pack on the objectives and terms of the scheme 
before negotiations over entry can start.  Variable costs such as compliance 
monitoring through farm visits also relate to the number of participants, 
with each one adding some level of extra administrative costs overall, and 
at the level of participants, perhaps to the number of environmental 
management components the land-manager wishes to include in his 
application.  The level of analysis is important:  some costs may be fixed at 
the level of the participant but variable at scheme-level.  Costs will be 
incurred through several different activities, such as record-keeping; farm 
mapping; conservation plan development; submitting scheme application 
forms; submitting annual payment claims for payment processing where 
compensation is available; and farm-visits for compliance monitoring. 
 
Despite the range of policy instruments that exist in theory, in practice in 
many European member states, multi-annual management agreements are 
the most-favoured mechanism for policy implementation, with land 
remaining under private control.  On-going costs are incurred in the 
administration of each agreement, in addition to the acquisition of 
information, negotiation and completion of the contract.  The use of the 
term ‘transactions costs’ in relation to agri-environmental policies is to 
portray the State as the purchaser of particular environmental goods and 
services and individual land-owners as the vendors.   Such schemes work 
by ‘collectivising’ transactions, i.e., by reducing the search costs of buyers 
and sellers, facilitating transactions and thus allowing improvements in the 
resource allocation to be made.  Particular interest lies in how new agri-
environmental markets (as the dominant form of policy intervention in 
practice, at present) are functioning.  Ideally, that mix of policies which 
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minimises total costs, i.e., both scheme compliance and organisation costs, 
should be selected (see Williamson 1985).  That is, both optimal pollution 
abatement (or agri-environmental goods provision) should be taken into 
account, as well as the optimal administrative (or ‘governance’) form; 
consideration of either component in isolation may risk the development of 
the policy framework in a sub-optimal direction.  Different state-farmer 
transactional structures are likely to have different economic implications, 
as well as different organisational cost implications, thus impinging on the 
achievement, and costs of achievement of policy objectives.  
 
If we knew on what transactions costs depend when the state ‘pays for’ 
production of agri-environmental public goods, and where and when they 
arise, it might be possible to improve the design of future policy measures.  
For example, if the characters of the goods to which contracts relate (such 
as bio-diversity, cultural heritage, and open landscape) affect transactions 
costs, these differences should be taken into account in policy design.  
Given the likelihood of opportunism of those receiving payments of 
controlled by a scheme (since their objectives are imperfectly aligned with  
those of the conservation agency which represents society more generally), 
a key question is the extent to which the objective monitoring of 
environmental goods provision is feasible.  The provision of some 
countryside goods is more visible than the provision of others, with 
implications for monitoring requirements by the ‘buyer’.  For example, 
landscape features such as stone-walls are far easier to observe than 
adherence to a maximum level of fertiliser inputs on land.  Consequently, 
schemes might be expected to differ to some degree in their demands for 
administrative inputs. 
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As a preliminary to the empirical analysis reported in this paper, the 
following qualitative comments might be made regarding each one of the 
set of broad policy approaches, i.e., suasion and advice, economic 
incentives, voluntary market-led approaches, regulation and public 
purchase.  Different types of policy approach are likely to have different 
transactional cost structures, as illustrated in Table 2.   
 
 
Table 2: Policy Approaches And Administrative Costs 
 
 Scheme  
Set-Up and Promotion 
Contracting Policing 
    
Suasion and Advice √   
Regulation √  √ 
Market mechanisms (e.g. taxes) √ (√)*  
Voluntary management 
agreements 
√ √ √ 
Public purchase of land √ √  
*
 For example, in the case of tradable permit schemes. 
 
 
2.1.1  Suasion and Advice 
 
There is a wide range of possible policy approaches, ranging from ‘hard’ 
regulation to ‘softer’ approaches such as advice-giving and suasion.  There 
is also a strengthening view that the softer approaches may be more cost-
effective in achieving agri-environmental objectives.  From the 
administrative-cost perspective, these approaches may also be more 
economical: for example, advisory approaches rely on the voluntary 
adoption of conservation management principles, so by definition, 
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enforcement is unnecessary.  However, if they are to be successful (in terms 
of achieving management change on a sufficient scale), substantial 
administrative expenditures will probably be needed with regard to 
promotional and educational activities to encourage participation, to 
achieve significant switching in production practices and hence to achieve 
policy objectives. 
 
2.1.2  Economic Incentives 
 
The administrative costs of economic incentive approaches, such as input 
tax collection costs, may be relatively low, so long as the tax base is clearly 
defined and transparent, although the scheme set-up costs may be 
substantial given the likely political opposition from some sectors to a 
change in property rights. 
 
2.1.3  Voluntary Market-Led Management Agreements 
 
State-farmer ‘markets’ through voluntary management agreements involve 
the compensated exchange of property rights for a defined period.  A 
number of administrative activities are required at different stages: 
identification of eligible landowners, perhaps on the basis of a designated 
area (such as an Environmentally Sensitive Area), scheme promotion, 
contract negotiation, agreement maintenance (such as processing annual 
claims for payments),  compliance monitoring and enforcement (given 
asymmetric information and opportunism) and further negotiation at the 
contract renewal stage.  Consequently, policies based on voluntary 
management agreements may be relatively expensive compared to other 
approaches, although the relative benefits brought forth for society must 
also be considered.  A problem for the efficient administrative management 
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for voluntary schemes lies in the difficulties of predicting changes in 
participation levels (particularly through new recruitment each year), which 
are important drivers of costs.  Despite the existence of substantial fixed 
components to the running costs of schemes, the magnitude of some 
components will vary with the level of participation, and particularly with 
the number of new entrants each year, given the expense of entering into 
management agreements with land-owners compared to their subsequent 
maintenance and payment-servicing. 
 
 
2.1.4  Regulation 
 
For regulation-based policies (or mechanisms such as a general duty of 
care), far more enforcement activity would be expected to be needed in the 
absence of penalties set at a sufficient level to have an adequate deterrent 
effect (see Russell 1990) or close alignment of landowner objectives with 
society in terms of conservation land management (in which case a laissez-
faire policy option would be appropriate).  Mandatory farm conservation 
plans offer scope for flexibility within a regulatory context, and, further, a 
more co-operative approach to conservation management.  However, the 
inclusion of  these as mandatory features of the agri-environmental policy 
framework would have not only similar monitoring and enforcement needs 
to a more general policy (such as mandatory adherence to Codes of Good 
Agricultural Practice), but also advisory and planning needs, which can 
only be fulfilled through project officer farm-visits.  Nevertheless, despite 
the relative administrative intensiveness of such a scheme, it could be a 
relatively cost-effective method of achieving broader environmental 
management improvements, given its potential educational and suasive 
aspects. 
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2.1.5  Public Purchase 
 
In addition to the capital costs of purchase, the search and negotiation costs 
of transferring property rights must be taken into account.  In addition, there 
will be the on-going management costs of the land acquired, which may be 
less than the costs of periodic interaction with landowners as required under 
voluntary management agreement schemes. 
 
Ideally, we would aim to investigate the expected transactional-cost 
differences across the range of approaches empirically, using the 
STEWPOL data-set, but data are still too scarce, with too few degrees of 
freedom for rigorous analysis at the present time.  Therefore, attention was 
restricted mainly to voluntary, compensated management agreements.  
Exploring transactions costs for a broader range of policy instruments is an 
important area for further work3.   The current European agri-environmental 
policy-making context will be examined next. 
 
2.2 The Agri-Environmental Policy-Making Context 
 
The European Commission Green Paper of 1985 on Perspectives for the 
Common Agricultural Policy suggested that environmental policies must set 
the framework within which agricultural production takes place.  That paper 
led to several Directives, culminating in Regulation 2078/92.  The 
reasoning behind Regulation 2078/92 was that the role of farmers was seen 
increasingly to be that of stewards of the environment and the countryside, 
and not just that of producers of agricultural commodities, hence it is 
                                                
3
 See, for example, McCann & Easter (1998). 
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reasonable to reward them as such.  Regulation 2078/92 led to the 
introduction of Community-aided programmes for the agri-environment in 
all member states.   Between 1993-1996, a total of 163 programmes were 
notified by the European Commission for adoption and reimbursement of 
some expenditures; 152 programmes were adopted by the end of 1996 
(Scheele 1996).  In total, 6.9 billion ECU was paid as premiums to farmers 
over the same period (Deblitz & Plankl 1997). 
 
The objectives of aid schemes broadly identified within Regulation 2078/92 
are outlined below: 
• to reduce substantially the use of fertilisers and/or plant protection 
products (or to maintain any reductions already made) 
• to introduce or continue with organic farming methods 
• to change, by means other than those referred to above, to more 
extensive forms of crops, including forage production or to maintain 
extensive production methods introduced earlier 
• to convert arable land into extensive grassland  
• to extensify livestock production through the reduction of sheep and 
cattle numbers per forage area 
• to use other farming practices compatible with the requirements of 
environmental and natural resource protection as well as the 
maintenance of the countryside and the landscape 
• to rear animals of local breeds in danger of extinction 
• to ensure the upkeep of abandoned farmland or woodlands 
• to set-aside farmland for at least twenty years with a view to its use for 
purposes connected to the environment 
• to manage land for public access and leisure activities 
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• measures to improve the training of farmers and farming practices 
compatible with the environment 
 
2.2.1 Agri-Environmental Policy Development in Member States 
 
Some member states have structured their agri-environmental policy around 
the framework provided by Regulation 2078/92, while others have adopted 
only a portion of it.  Some states have maintained their pre-existing 
programmes and adapted them where appropriate.  For example, in France, 
the OPL programme for local schemes succeeded ones introduced in 1989 
implementing regulation 797/85; the zones of application are essentially the 
ESAs (Boisson & Buller 1998).  Procedural and management structures of 
the OGAF-environnement programme were modelled on previous OGAF 
models concerned primarily with farm improvement. In Austria, when 
Regulation 2078/92 was introduced in 1995 (through the ÖPUL 
programme); many pre-existing local programmes, implemented by the 
Länder (such as the Nieder-Österreich eco-points scheme), were integrated 
into it.  The eight STEWPOL member states have only three of the 
objectives in common across their individual frameworks (organic farming, 
reducing emissions of pollutants, and landscape and nature protection).  
Measures for two other objectives have also been widely implemented: the 
extensification or non-intensification of crop production, and grassland 
system maintenance.  The eight countries joined the EU at different stages, 
which needs to be taken into account in any analysis, for example, as the 
implementation of Regulation 2078/92 is at different stages in different 
member states. 
 
Among most EU member states, most environmental ministries have been 
established only recently; the oldest have been in existence for less than 25 
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years and some (as in Italy and Spain), for less than ten (Wilkinson 1997). 
Environmental issues have been considered for some decades now in the 
development of agricultural policies in Sweden (Svedsäter 1996).  Some 
environmental provisions were included in policy programmes long before 
1985, particularly relating to farmland preservation measures to prevent 
abandonment, afforestation and non-agricultural development.  In contrast, 
in Greece, there was a considerable lack of experience and know-how 
relating to agri-environmental policy and scheme implementation, and the 
implementation of agri-environmental measures has been very low 
compared to other member states.  The first set of coherent agri-
environmental measures was implemented only in the wake of Regulation 
2078/92.  Besides the lack of knowledge in designing and applying such 
programmes, low political commitments to agri-environmental programmes 
and a lack of administrative resources  have been held responsible for the 
low application of Regulation 2078/92.  France was a relatively late 
participant in implementing Article 19 of Regulation 797/85, compared to 
the UK and Germany, and has had only limited experience with domestic 
agri-environmental measures.  There has been comparatively poor up-take 
of agri-environmental policy measures in the Southern member states, 
compared to generally high acceptance in the North. The stage of 
implementation at the regional level in Federal member states such as 
Germany also varies greatly4. 
 
We might expect administrative costs to be relatively less important for 
schemes which were in place some years previously, compared to schemes 
that have been introduced more recently (given that the set-up stages have 
passed; experience of running agri-environmental schemes will have 
                                                
4
 Some Länder had already implemented agri-environmental schemes under Regulation 797/85 
and 1766/87 when Regulation 2078//92 came into force. 
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accumulated, and so on).  This expectation will be tested using the case 
studies from each member state.  However, there is a difference between 
‘lean’ administration and ‘streamlined’ administration resulting from 
experience and fine-tuning, so caution in analysis is needed.  It may be the 
case the administration costs rise with policy experience, as policy 
infrastructure is improved in order to meet its objectives better (for 
example, as has been the case in the UK).  There are countervailing forces 
on costs to untangle. 
 
2.2.2  Agri-Environmental Policy Expenditure and Objectives in     
Member States 
 
As Table 3 shows, there is great variation in national-level agri-
environmental expenditure on compensation payments.  Different levels of 
EAGGF funding are available in different areas under Regulation 2078/92 
(75% re-imbursement of approved expenditure in Objective 1 areas and 
50% elsewhere). Compensatory payment levels are related to the estimated 
agricultural opportunity costs of using the land, and other largely 
immeasurable factors such as political ‘sweeteners’ (‘incentive’ premiums) 
permitted under the Regulation.  The disparities in spending are also 
obvious when presented on a per-hectare basis.  The problem for analysis 
lies in the absence of knowledge of the actual and intended environmental 
outputs of these expenditures. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Total Costs (Eligible for Co-Funding) of the Five-
Year Agri-Environmental Programmes Under Regulation 
2078/92 for STEWPOL Member States (Millions of ECU) 
 
 Total Total EAGGF % of Total 
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estimated 
cost,  
million ECU 
Estimated 
cost by 
UAA1, 
ECU/hectare. 
contribution,  
million ECU 
EAGGF 
budget 
Austria 10062 288.5 525.0 12.2 
Belgium 34 25.1 17.5 0.4 
France 1905 57.2 660.7 15.1 
German
y 
1738 96.0 982.3 22.5 
Greece 17 4.3 11.1 0.2 
Italy n/a n/a 513.4 11.8 
Sweden 330 98.7 222.7 5.1 
UK 378 23.1 169.9 3.9 
1
 utilised agricultural area. 2 based on initial estimates; the actual figure may be closer to 2789 M ECU if 
the high funding levels for the first year are maintained until 1999. 
Source: Boisson & Buller (1996); Deblitz & Plankl (1997). 
In 1996, expenditure in Austria, Finland and Germany dominated the 
programme: well over 70% of the overall budget was allocated to support 
programmes in these countries (Brouwer & Lowe 1998).  Germany alone 
accounted for a fifth of all EAGGF funds, and Germany, Italy, France and 
Austria together accounted for two-thirds of funds.  Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands together accounted for less than 
3% of the co-financing funds.  In terms of coverage, France, Germany and 
Austria have allocated significant areas of their total UAA to Regulation 
2078/92 programmes; Sweden and Finland also have high coverage.  In 
Finland, well over 80% of the total number of farms, and about 90% of the 
agricultural land is under agri-environmental programmes (the main 
objective of which is to reduce nutrient losses from agriculture) (Miettinen 
1998). France and Germany have the highest absolute levels, because of 
their large agricultural areas, and now their well-established agri-
environmental programmes (with the potential  to cover most of their 
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agricultural production).  Austria has high expenditure levels because of a 
commitment to consider the whole utilised agricultural area as an 
environmentally vulnerable area.  In Austria, the farmer-participation rate is 
around 70% of those eligible, and around 80% of the utilised agricultural 
area is covered; the high acceptance may be explained partly by the 
generally low requirements and relatively high premiums (Brouwer & 
Lowe, 1998:13).  The eight countries participating in this project account in 
total for 75.1% % of the available budget for Regulation 2078/92 
implementation.  Tables 4 and 5 give details of participation and financing 
for Regulation 2078/92 schemes. 
 
 
 
Table 4:    Financing and Participation for Programmes under    
Regulation 2078/92, 1993-1997 
 Financial provisions and 
uptake 1 
Uptake of Schemes 
 M ECU Share (%) ‘000 hectares % of total 
UAA2 
% of  
country  
area 
Austria 615 13.7 2,998 86.0 14.3 
Belgium 12 0.3 4 0.3 0.02 
Denmark 32 0.7 82 3.0 0.4 
Finland 412 9.2 1,862 69.3 8.9 
France 629 14.0 5,893 16.8 28.2 
Germany 1,004 22.3 5,240 30.3 25.0 
Greece 19 0.4 n/a n/a n/a 
Ireland 177 3.9 566 12.9 2.7 
Italy 733 16.3 1,254 7.3 6.0 
Luxembourg 6 0.1 n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands 49 1.1 34 1.7 0.2 
Portugal 147 3.3 520 13.0 2.5 
Spain 298 6.6 200 0.7 1.0 
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Sweden 223 5.0 1,067 31.9 5.1 
UK 140 3.1 1,202 6.8 5.7 
      
total / average 3,396 100.0 20,291 - - 
1
 EU co-financing only, from 1993 to October 1996, provisional uptake from October 1996 to October 1997.     
n/a = not available.  2 utilised agricultural area. 
Source: Deblitz & Plankl (1997). 
 
Table 5: EAGGF Guarantee Section, Expenditures (Million ECU) During 
the 1996 Budget Year on the Agri-Environment Programme 1  
 Objective 1 
regions, million 
ECU 
Other regions,  
million ECU 
Total,  
million ECU 
% of EU Total 
expenditures 
Austria 2 60.0 481.0 541.0 38.89 
Belgium 0.2 1.2 1.5 0.12 
Denmark - 5.8 5.8 0.42 
France 0.0 118.9 118.9 8.55 
Germany 100.9 130.8 231.7 16.65 
Greece 1.5 - 1.5 0.12 
Ireland 43.4 - 43.4 3.12 
Italy 21.6 20.0 41.5 2.98 
Luxembourg - 0.0 0.0 0 
Netherlands 0.4 7.2 7.6 0.55 
Portugal 40.0 - 40.0 2.88 
Finland - 256.6 256.6 18.44 
Spain 32.8 0.0 32.8 2.36 
Sweden - 43.4 43.4 3.12 
UK 1.6 23.9 25.5 1.83 
total 302.4 1086.7 1391.2 100.00 
1 The budget year is 16 October 1995-15 October 1996. 2 Agri-environmental expenditure for Austria in 1996 includes 
spending committed in 1995 (brought forward under special arrangement owing to a post-accession delay in approval 
and implementation of the programme).  Source: Brouwer & Lowe (1998). 
 
Different member states have different concerns, in terms of both 
environmental conservation and agricultural production support, and these 
differences might be expected to have implications for policy transactions 
costs.  The traditions of policy-making and styles of regulation differ, and 
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the integration of environmental objectives into the general policy 
framework takes time, proceeding at different paces in different member 
states, sectors and so on.  Brouwer & Lowe commented further that perhaps 
where the experience of both Austria and Finland differ from other member 
states is in the way in which agri-environmental programmes have been 
seen and promoted as income transfer mechanisms to compensate for farm 
income losses due to EU accession5.  The objectives of schemes are 
important to their design, and consequently to the level of costs of 
administrating their implementation.  For example, schemes orientated 
towards income-support will in general impose simpler restrictions on land-
holders for eligibility for payments.   
 
An important hypothesis is that schemes concerned largely with farm 
income support are less administratively burdensome than those concerned 
with providing agri-environmental goods.   It appears to be relatively easy 
to transfer funds to land-holders, but much more complex to ensure that 
environmental conditions are followed in return for compensation.  Some 
schemes, such as KULAP  in Germany and prime à l’herbe in France, 
implicitly have a stronger income orientation, and are characterised by 
broad approaches covering the whole territory.  There has been controversy 
with regard to some instruments, especially the basic premiums granted in 
some countries on a very broad basis (for example, France, Austria and 
Bavaria)6.  Critics have claimed that a substantial share of the available 
                                                
5
 However, the Regulation suggests that aid should only be granted for undertakings given by farmers 
which normally go beyond the mere implementation of good farming practice (in particular, by means of a 
substantial reduction in the use of inputs), without prejudice, under specific conditions, to the need to help 
farmers to continue farming in unfavourable areas, and to maintain environmental practices already 
introduced. 
 
6
 A fundamental problem is that the premiums paid for environmental schemes have to compete with  
the premiums given for environmental farming practices. 
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funds are spent without attaching environmental conditions to the premiums 
(i.e., there is little environmental additionality).  Defenders of such schemes 
have argued that they do at least raise general awareness amongst farmers 
of the need to manage the environment more carefully.  In Belgium, there 
are differences between the Flemish and Walloon regions: in the latter, 
farmers and their organisations seem to see the programmes as possibilities 
for keeping them in agriculture in marginal areas; in Flanders, due to the 
intensity of agriculture, the programmes are regarded more as threats to 
agricultural activities.  
 
2.2.3  Institutional Frameworks in Member States 
 
The institutional framework of policy implementation is also likely to be a 
significant factor affecting policy costs in any given country, and so 
deserves some attention.  There are a number of different levels of 
implementation of countryside stewardship policy: national, regional, sub-
regional and local.  An overview assessment of the eight STEWPOL 
countries shows significant differences, particularly related to the degree of 
decentralisation.  Austria, Belgium and Germany have federal structures; 
France, Greece and Sweden are highly centralised.  Italy and the UK are 
centralised states, but have passed on agricultural and environmental 
competencies to lower levels (i.e., to the twenty Italian regions and the four 
UK territories).  In the federal countries, most environmental issues such as 
landscape preservation, resource protection, and bio-diversity maintenance 
are under the competencies of the Länder or regions, which have their own 
budgets and can spend according to local priorities (with some degree of 
Federal supervision).  The UK might be regarded at present as the most 
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highly centralised in administrative matters, but it is under-going a process 
of regionalisation.  The relationships between governance in the four 
territories and national government are being re-shaped currently, with the 
non-English territories being given more autonomy.  Some responsibilities 
of the Ministry of Agriculture are being delegated  to the territories’ own 
agencies. 
 
The scope for co-funding from the EU or from Federal budgets for local 
schemes may also affect the absolute and relative magnitudes of 
transactions costs.  For example, in Germany, only some Regulation 
2078/92 measures are covered by national level ‘Common Task’ financing, 
leading to distortions with regard to the measures available and the support 
intensities in different Länder7.  The evidence collected in this study 
suggests that although such schemes may be costly in terms of the total 
compensatory payments made, they should have relatively lower 
administrative cost burdens (as they have some similarities with agricultural 
income support measures, a factor also facilitating integrated 
administration). 
 
The implementing authority may be important to the magnitudes of the 
transactions costs of schemes, and especially in terms of the degree of 
private sector involvement. The private sector might be involved in scheme 
administration as an attempt to economise on public sector administration 
costs. There are significant differences across EU member states in terms of 
the extent of private sector involvement in the running of agri-
environmental schemes through government sub-contracting. Private 
                                                
7
  For example, in Germany, for organic aid, the authority that sets the premium does not rely entirely on 
its own funds for financing, giving an incentive to set premiums high where co-financing by the EU and 
federal authorities is high (Umstätter & Dabbert 1996). 
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consultants and certification bodies play an important role in some schemes, 
particularly organic aid schemes.  There is a high degree of third party 
involvement (private contractors) in the implementation of the Austrian 
agri-environmental schemes, for work such as farm inspection and farmer 
negotiation over management agreements.  The Austrian research  
suggested that scheme administration might be kept ‘lean’ through 
purchasing services from private firms (for example, for compliance 
monitoring through farm inspections). If tendering for such responsibilities 
is competitive, costs would be expected to be minimised.  The German FUL 
programme also uses independent advisors, contracted by the implementing 
authority, to negotiate individual management agreements in co-operation 
with farmers.   
 
The type of public authority implementing a given scheme might also be of 
relevance to explaining the magnitude of transactions costs: for example, a 
nature-conservation agency might have better-informed officers with regard 
to conservation management practices compared to officials in an 
agricultural agency, potentially saving on the information costs of needed in 
running schemes for them to be environmentally effective. In the UK, it 
was suggested by LUC (1995) that external bodies such as the Farming & 
Wildlife Advisor Group could be used to reduce administrative costs for 
compliance monitoring and enforcing, through assisting farmers at the 
application stage to result in better plans and understanding of management 
requirements.  Such organisations may be better placed than government 
agencies to carry out some conservation management tasks, and so 
contribute to overall cost efficiency, rather than just cost displacement.  In 
Germany, for example, in some Länder, responsibility for landscape 
management and nature conservation lies with the agricultural 
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administration; in others, agri-environmental schemes are conducted by the 
environmental ministry. 
 
The traditions of policy-making and the existing structures are also 
important: for example, France has a highly specialised agricultural civil 
service corps.  Variation in the division of agricultural and environmental 
policy responsibilities are also likely to be important, given the increasing 
need for co-ordination and integration of these concerns.  For example, in 
France, more recently, agricultural and environmental objectives have 
started to develop in a mutually reinforcing way.  The characteristic 
separation of the two policy domains has to some degree broken down8, 
with implications for transactions with farmers, who would be more likely 
to prefer agricultural agencies to environmental ones, as well as possible 
implications regarding the administrative competencies. 
 
Whether or not a scheme is implemented at the national level or the local 
level may affect the level of transactions costs.  The Flemish Land 
Consolidation Scheme is run on a local basis; France also has a number of 
local schemes under the OPL programme; management prescriptions for 
local schemes are not standardised at the national level but differ according 
to local agri-environment contexts (the main thrust of the implementation of 
Regulation 2078/92 in France is at the regional and local levels).  A scheme 
implemented by an agency at the national level (such as prime à l’herbe) 
would have a broader base over which to spread its fixed costs and so 
benefit from economies of scale.  However, a local-level agency might be 
able to take advantage of administrative economies through greater local 
                                                
8
 Traditionally in France there has been a strict separation in spatial, policy and administrative terms, of 
agricultural enterprises and nature protection, and a general reluctance of the Ministry of Agriculture to 
adopt a broad, spatially-based policy for agri-environmental measures.  Farmers are encouraged to select 
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knowledge, closer contact with farmers for scheme promotion and so on.  
Assessment of the relative expenditures on administration will always be an 
empirical question. 
 
Differences in member states’ political and administrative systems cannot 
fail to have an impact on the comparative transactions costs of agri-
environmental schemes, for example, depending on whether or not the 
member state adheres to the federal system.  For example, in Austria, nine 
federal governments share responsibility for agricultural policies with the 
federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.  Federal competence for 
nature conservation is small compared with regulations made by the 
Länder; thus, nature conservation is regulated in different ways over the 
country.  In Belgium, agri-environmental measures have been applied with 
a high degree of decentralisation, and a large amount of responsibility for 
the three Regions.  Guidelines for local schemes are now formulated at the 
national level (for example, regarding minimum standards and maximum 
payment levels); scheme implementation is carried out by Länder-level 
agencies.  In Germany, agri-environmental scheme implementation varies 
greatly across the sixteen Länder.  Umstätter & Dabbert (1996:89-92) 
illustrate how programmes differ across the Länder for promotion of a 
reduction in use of yield-increasing inputs, extensification of grassland, and 
promotion of organic farming. 
It is also important to consider constraints on absolute costs.  Economic 
factors such as price levels and budgets in different countries must also be 
taken into account.  For example, the estimates for transactions costs in 
Greece might be expected to be lower in absolute terms given the lower 
wage costs of Greek civil servants. Budgets also differ substantially for 
                                                                                                                                           
from a range of different forms of aid, in an ‘à la carte’ approach rather than a coherent, comprehensive 
approach to countryside management. 
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both conservation payments and the administrative running of any scheme.  
Usually the environmental agency has a fixed amount of public money 
available for issuing conservation contracts, and the agency would try to 
maximise results within the overall budget.  A question is whether agencies 
are in fact this rational; it is necessary to know much more about public 
decision-making processes.  For example, in terms of monitoring (the most 
costly component of scheme administration costs) for the SchALVO 
scheme in Germany, the number of soil tests taken each autumn has been a 
result of political decisions, and the Ministry of Agriculture has been 
discussing a significant reduction in the number of controls carried out, due 
to their high costs.  Furthermore, due to budgetary restrictions, no 
additional applications to the MEKA scheme have been accepted since 
1996.  Similarly, budget cut-backs in Sweden meant that no new applicants 
are being accepted to some schemes now. 
 
Furthermore, in some member states, schemes are introduced as pilots at 
first, with the expectation that they will evolve over time.  Adjustments in 
scheme administration after some years of experience of its implementation 
are highly likely, and may have either positive or negative impacts on 
running costs.  For example, in Sweden, the results of compliance controls 
for the measure for preserving the ‘cultural landscape’ were considered so 
poor that the Swedish Board of Agriculture increased the target control 
percentage from 5% to 20% of participating farmers from 1997, raising the 
administrative costs of this measure (Eklund 1998).  Control  for the 
measure for preserving bio-diversity in natural pastures and old hay fields 
was also increased from 5% to 15% in 1997, while the control for the less 
complicated measure to preserve open landscape in woodlands was 
increased to only 10%.  
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2.3 Regulation 946/96 
In addition to the provisions of Regulation 2078/92, Regulation 746/96, summarised in 
Box 1, is of particular importance in the administrative context of this research as it 
stipulates instructions pertaining to the application and implementation of Regulation 
2078/92, in effect setting minimum standards for member states with regard to scheme 
administration.  For example, it describes the conditions to be attached to grant support 
in agri-environmental policy, instructions for control, and how repayments and sanctions 
are to be handled, aiming to harmonise structures at a basic level, across member states.  
Member states are also obliged to monitor and evaluate the operation of schemes.  In 
addition, Regulation 3508/92 dictates that the support system should be administrated 
and controlled in an efficient manner through an integrated system; Regulation 746/96 
indicates that this system should be used for agri-environmental administration where 
possible to save duplication of effort. 
 
Box 1: A Brief Summary of Regulation 746/96 
Regulation 746/96 clarifies the application of Regulation 2078/92 to promote agricultural 
production methods compatible with the requirements of environmental protection and 
countryside maintenance.  It deals with some general issues which arose following the 
adoption of Regulation 2078/92, and to ensure the effective administration, monitoring and 
control of agri-environmental schemes in all member states.  The provisions of Regulation 
746/96 were restricted to those matters which currently need to be regulated at Community 
level; exhaustive rules for the preparation and implementation of agri-environmental 
programmes are not required.  Regulatory provisions require that all agri-environmental 
measures be monitored and evaluated, in relation to their objectives, and that cross-checks 
with Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) data (set out in Regulation 
3508/92 as last amended by Regulation 3235/94) be made. The Regulation does not prejudice 
member states’ use of Regulation 2078/92 to determine the agri-environmental measures 
which are most appropriate to their situations and to define the conditions for granting aid. 
The broad base-line administrative scenario is given below. 
 
Payment Procedures (Article 14) 
Substantiated cases apart, aid is to be paid to beneficiaries at least once per year (and not 
more than four months after the end of the period for which it is made).  Annual payments, 
after the year of application, shall be made on the basis of an annual request for the aid. 
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Information and Publicity (Article 15). 
Member states shall ensure that beneficiaries are given adequate publicity in order to: (a) alert 
potential beneficiaries and farming organisations to the specific objectives of the agri-
environmental measures and the opportunities afforded and (b) alert beneficiaries and the 
general public to the role played by the Community in relation to the aid scheme. 
 
Monitoring and Evaluation (Article 16) 
Member states are responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of agri-environmental 
measures.  Monitoring must make it possible to determine how the undertakings have been 
implemented in practice and should facilitate (if necessary) the adjustment of the agri-
environmental measures during the implementation period.  Evaluation is to be based on the 
trends in and the characteristics of the area of application. 
 
Verification (Article 19) 
Initial applications to a scheme and successive applications for payment shall be verified for 
compliance with the conditions for the granting of aid.  The Commission’s intends that, where 
appropriate, Member States shall have recourse to the IACS system established by Regulation 
3508/92.  Verification should be carried out by means of administrative and on-the-spot 
checks.  Such checks are to be exhaustive and include inter alia cross-checks, where 
appropriate, with IACS data, on areas of land and livestock covered by the undertaking, to 
avoid double payments of aid in a given application year.  On the spot checks will apply to at 
least 5% of beneficiaries each year, covering all the different types of undertaking in the 
programmes. 
Reimbursement of Aid and Penalties (Article 20) 
In cases of wrongful payment, the farmer shall be required to reimburse the amount received 
plus interest for the period he has held the money.  Member states shall determine penalties 
for breaches of undertakings and or regulatory provisions and necessary steps to put the 
system into operation.  Furthermore, “such penalties shall be effective, shall be commensurate 
with their purpose and shall have adequate deterrent effect”. In setting penalties, member 
states must recognise the difficulty of checking compliance with certain undertakings.  The 
regulation also provides that farmers making false claims or grossly negligent shall be 
excluded from all aid under Regulation 2078/92 for two years.  This penalty may be 
additional to those under national rules. 
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3. EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS COST RESEARCH IN THE 
AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SPHERE 
 
To date, there have been very few empirical studies of transactions costs in 
the context of agricultural and environmental policy-making and operation.  
Given the challenges to measuring both private and public transactions 
costs, the aim of the research presented here was to carry out some 
preliminary assessment and outline the scope of further work with regard to 
policy transactions-costs.  The focus was placed first on the public sector, 
for which more cost information is available (although data are still very 
scarce).  In addition, there are relatively few public agencies involved in 
policy implementation for which to assess the generally hidden 
administrative costs, compared to the vast number of highly dispersed 
market agents (landowners) participating or potentially eligible and/or 
willing to participate in schemes.  However, it is important to stress that the 
research focus is on the direct organisational costs of schemes only.  This 
focus means concentration on the agencies which administer the schemes at 
first hand and excludes, for example, those which make the funds available 
for payment or establish relevant legislation.  In addition, as noted above (in 
relation to Figure 1), unless private agents are altruistic, they will cover the 
transactions costs they incur through scheme participation with the 
compensation payments received, i.e., transactions costs are ultimately 
funded by the public sector.  This further justifies the focus on the direct 
organisational costs of schemes as these costs are definitely not included in 
other commonly-measured components.  Hence their explicit measurement 
and inclusion in the calculation of the overall costs of schemes is necessary 
for comprehensive evaluation. 
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The research objective was to produce a comparative study of the public 
transactions costs of countryside stewardship schemes across eight 
European member states, based on a number of research questions, i.e.,  
 
1. What are the magnitudes of administrative costs in the agri-
environmental policy sphere, in absolute terms and relative to the other 
components of other cost components? 
 
2. How do administrative costs vary over schemes, within member states 
and over different member states? 
 
3. What causes variation in the magnitudes, and relative importance, of 
administrative costs? 
 
4. Can scheme organisational costs be reduced while still achieving policy 
goals? 
  
Several schemes were selected from each of the STEWPOL countries, 
totalling 37 altogether (see Table 6).  The schemes are summarised in 
Appendix 1, with full details found in the eight Country Reports contained 
in Appendix 2 of this document.  Each scheme was required to have at least 
one of the following objectives: 
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Table 6: Summary of Policies Investigated in STEWPOL Countries 
 Policies No. of case 
studies 
Austria • The Ecologically Valuable Areas Scheme in Niederösterreich 
• The Eco-points scheme in Niederösterreich 
• The ÖPUL Organic Farm Aid Scheme 
3 
Belgium  • Aid to organic farming (2078/92);  
• Subsidies for re-plantation and maintenance of pollard-willows 
Management agreements for land consolidation;  
• Schemes in the Walloon region;  
• Objective 5b scheme for hedges and trees (le Bocage Ardennais) 
• Walloon Food Quality Label 
6 
France • Prime à l’herbe. 
and Regulation 2078/92 Zonal measures:  
• PRM (rearing of threatened breeds),  
• RTA (conversion from arable to extensive grassland),  
• RLT (taking land out of agricultural production),  
• RIN (reduced use of agri-inputs, especially nitrates),  
• CAB (conversion to organic farming),  
• DCC (reduced livestock densities).   
• Local schemes under the OGAF-environnement programme  
8 
Germany • FUL-Programme (Regulation 2078/92 scheme) in Rheinland-
Palatinate (Parts I & II);  
• SchALVO (a ground-water protection programme in Baden-
Württemberg); 
• The MEKA-Programme (Regulation 2078/92), Baden-
Württemberg.  
3 
Greece • Organic agriculture,  
• Reduction of nitrification 
• Long-term set-aside 
3 
Italy • Regulation 2078/92 schemes in the Emilia Romagna region  
• Regulation 2078/92 schemes in the Trento Region 
2 
Sweden • Measure to Preserve Bio-diversity in Semi-Natural Grazing Land 
and Mown Meadows 
• Measure for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage in the 
Agricultural Landscape 
• Scheme for the Preservation of Open Arable Landscapes in the 
North of Sweden 
3 
UK • Management agreements for Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSIs) under the Wildlife & Countryside Act 1981 
• Access management Agreements under the National Parks & 
Access to the Countryside Act 1949,  
and seven Regulation 2078/92 schemes in England:  
• ESAs,  
• Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS),  
• Habitat Scheme,  
• Countryside Access Scheme,  
• Moorland Scheme,  
• Nitrate Sensitive Areas Scheme,  
• Organic Aid Scheme 
9 
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Each scheme was required to have at least one of the following objectives: 
• conservation of agricultural crops, rural landscapes and related typical 
elements 
• natural and semi-natural environmental conservation 
• wildlife and biodiversity conservation 
• soil conservation and protection from erosion 
• recreation and access to agricultural land 
• reduction of negative impacts of agriculture on landscapes and 
environments 
• support to local production and quality labels related to landscape 
protection or improvement 
• conversion of agricultural land into forest 
 
Thus, the set of case-study schemes was drawn from the wider set of rural 
policies which aim at the reduction of the negative impacts of agriculture or 
the stimulation of positive impacts of agriculture on the countryside. The 
STEWPOL case studies encompassed some of the diversity of countryside 
stewardship policies across EU member states, for example, in terms of 
their objectives and scale.  Most schemes have been implemented on a 
voluntary basis, i.e., it is the landowner’s individual decision to participate 
or not. Almost all of the selected schemes were of the type under which 
management agreements are made between land-holders and the State, 
through which land-holders receive compensation for the income foregone 
by adhering to particular management practices.  One area of interest to 
explore is the relationship between the relative administrative costs of 
schemes and their property rights basis. A high degree of pragmatism was 
involved in the case-study design:  schemes were selected for which data 
were, or could be made, available, as well as on the basis of differences in 
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design with a view to providing complementary information. Table 7 gives 
a matrix of the case-study schemes examined here, categorised according to 
their type. 
 
Comparisons across schemes are not easy given the number of design 
dimensions which differ.  In developing programmes under Regulation 
2078/92, member states were allowed a significant amount of flexibility to 
reflect the diversity of their environmental conditions, priorities, 
agricultural structures and so on.  Even schemes of the same name (such as 
organic aid) are far from uniform in their structure.  Another important 
caveat for analysis is that different schemes were introduced at different 
times, under different economic (and social) conditions.  Restricting policy 
analysis to comparison of the estimated administrative costs of similar types 
of schemes has its advantages, namely of increasing the numbers of degrees 
of freedom available, which is important given a small data-set.  However, 
it is an important next step to consider the organisation of different types of 
scheme, particularly in the context of future policy developments away 
from the existing model and its property rights assumptions.  
 
Administrative cost data and information on scheme participation were 
gathered by STEWPOL researchers in each member state, with some 
latitude but within the general framework typology set out in Table 1, and 
over as many years as possible (with a range of one to eight years, 
constrained by record-keeping and the time since scheme establishment); 
see Table 8 for a summary of methods.  A major source of public 
transactions costs is the cost of agency staff and their overhead costs. 
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Table 7: Scheme Type [MA = Management Agreement] 
 Regulation 2078/92 
voluntary, 
compensated MA 
Non- 2078/92 
voluntary, 
compensated MA 
Compulsory 
compensate
d MA 
Advisory 
scheme 
Market 
mechanism 9 
AUSTRIA      
Ecolog Valuable Areas √     
Eco-points √     
Organic Aid √    √ 
Mineral fertiliser tax     √ 
BELGIUM      
organic aid √    √ 
pollard willows  √    
Land Consolidation  √    
Walloon Regulation 
2078/92 programme 
√     
Bocage l’ardennais    √  
Food labelling     √ 
FRANCE      
Prime à l’herbe √     
RTA √     
RLT √     
PRM √     
DCC √     
CAB √    √ 
RIN √     
OPL √     
GERMANY      
FUL  √     
SchALVO   √   
MEKA √     
GREECE      
Reduction of Nitrates  √     
Organic aid √    √ 
Long-term set-aside √     
ITALY      
Emila-Romagna √     
                                                
9
 i.e. farmers face a higher price for outputs or a higher price for inputs, to create incentives to produce in 
environmentally preferable ways. 
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Trento √     
SWEDEN      
Open landscape √     
Bio-diversity √     
Cultural Heritage √     
Advisory schemes    √  
UK      
Access agreements  √    
SSSI agreements  √ √   
ESAs √     
CSS √     
NSAs √     
Habitat Scheme √     
Moorland Scheme √     
Organic Aid √    √ 
Countryside Access √     
 
Table 8: Summary of Data Collection Methods 
 
 Notes on methods used 
 
Belgium  Qualitative data on policy structure, based on legislative texts etc.; interviews with 
bureaucrats to compile costs based on estimation of the full-time staff equivalent 
demands of each scheme. 
 
France Official administrative resource use data from public agencies; dis-aggregation of 
national-level costs across schemes with the assistance of Ministry of Agriculture 
officials (according to a policy-weighting system developed for this purpose).  
Evaluation in terms of labour inputs for each stage of the processes involved in 
implementing, monitoring and controlling the various measures (partial estimation of 
administrative costs). 
 
Austria Interviews with public officials to assess staff costs 
 
Greece Interviews with administrators and farmers at national and regional levels.  
Data relating to staff time converted to monetary values using the operating costs of 
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the respective authorities (salaries, travel and other expenses) and a shadow income for 
farmers. 
   
UK Published and unpublished official data on administrative expenditures (from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food), based on time-recording and budgeted 
payments to agencies for management.  Interviews with National Park officials to 
assess the costs of access management schemes. 
 
Sweden Unpublished cost data from the Swedish Agricultural Agency and examination of 
available time-accountancy system reports; telephone interviews with farmers who are 
participating in environmental support schemes to assess private costs. 
 
Germany Interviews with agencies involved in the administration of the Regulation 2078/92 
schemes to estimate labour costs and additional overhead costs; some information on 
MEKA was available from an earlier study 
 
Italy Interviews with officials to estimate time inputs and staff costs for each scheme. 
 
 
However, as there is little documentation of such costs, specific methods 
had to be developed to quantify them. ‘Direct’ measurement approaches 
were taken in most member-state analyses, based on a detailed history of 
events relating to each scheme’s development and operation (at the level of 
the individual management-agreement), and followed by estimation of the 
total time per year needed to carry out the necessary activities.  The validity 
of the administrative cost estimates for schemes in most country reports 
hinges on the assumption that a standard value can be applied to each staff-
day which will then lead to an appropriate estimate of the administrative 
costs.  The use of standard labour costs per hour is a blunt method of 
estimation, but it recognises the inherent imprecision in organisational-cost 
data; differentiation might otherwise give an impression of greater rigour 
than is feasible. 
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Table 9: Components for Scheme-Level Administrative Cost 
Estimations 
 
Policy Transactions Cost Elements notable  omissions 
AUSTRIA   
 • General focus on scheme implementation (i.e., 
activities such as the processing of applications 
for entry, farm visits linked to this process, 
contracting and making payments, some 
activities relating to programme design and 
public relations activities) 
• costs of government contractors included 
 
Ecologically-
Valuable Areas 
Scheme in 
Niederösterreich 
• data processing and contracting 
• programme design and public relations activities 
• farmer contracting (farm surveys etc., carried 
out by self-employed ecologists, paid on a per-
plot basis plus travel expenses) 
• data collection and payments processing by 
AMA 
Overhead costs and 
consumables for the two 
officials in the nature 
conservation agency and the 
costs of control incurred by 
AMA  
Eco-points 
Scheme in 
Niederösterreich 
• contracting and administration costs of 
agreements, data collection, processing claims 
Costs incurred in the project 
design phase, and of the 
adjustments required 
 • and yearly reports from farmers, making 
payments. Consumables included (46% of total 
transactions costs, 123% of staff costs) 
• data collection and payments processing by 
AMA 
 
 
 
following accession to the 
EU; overheads of the 
Agricultural District 
Agency; control costs 
Organic Farm 
Scheme  (an 
ÖPUL scheme) 
• administrative costs (of auditing certifying firms; 
co-ordination of the scheme and information 
dissemination) 
• private costs of inspection and certification 
• data collection and payments processing by 
AMA 
Cost of conducting 
research specific to 
organic agriculture; costs 
of design of the 
programme (per-EU-
accession) 
BELGIUM   
Organic Aid • Preliminary study for policy set-up  
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• Drafting the wording in the proposal of the 
programme 
• Application submission, examination and 
approval 
• Extension (assistance for submitting an 
application) [BLIK & ECOCERT agencies] 
• Field inspections (control) 
 
Pollard-Willows • Drafting the wording in the proposal of the 
programme, consultation 
• Application submission, examination and 
approval 
• Field inspections (control) 
 
Flemish Region 
Management 
Agreements 
• Policy set-up: global management reports for 
each project 
• Information and promotion of the programme 
(farm visits, setting up  model contracts) 
• Application submission, examination and 
approval 
• Field controls 
• Annual evaluation report 
 
Walloon 2078 • Preliminary study to draft the first proposal for 
the agri-environmental programme 
• Study to determine the best channels of 
information 
for farmers 
• Consultation with farmers’ unions etc. on the 
draft of the programme 
• Promotion of the scheme via non-profit 
organisations 
• Contracting (General Dept of Agriculture): 
promotion, assistance of application preparation 
and submission, field inspections, accountancy 
• Field inspections for control 
 
FRANCE  
(for all case-study 
schemes) 
• Programme development, designation, co-
ordination  for regional implementation10 
• Farmer negotiation and contracting, promotion 
to farmers; application assessment, contract 
handling, payment and control 
 
Labour inputs at the EU 
level 
transactions costs borne by 
farmers 
The Evaluation required by 
the EU and made by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 
1997 at the regional and 
national levels  
GERMANY   
                                                
10
 Activities relating to setting up policies at the national and regional levels and getting approval from the EU etc. 
have been taken into account, although the labour input provided by the CNASEA at the national level for setting up 
payments and control is probably under-estimated.   
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FUL group I • Overall  programme co-ordination and 
development (MWVLW)  development of 
detailed requirements and regulations (LPP) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
• Programme evaluation and advisory activities 
• Management agreement negotiation and 
monitoring 
• General control (county-level administration) 
• Administration and processing of claims, 
promotion to farmers (district-level 
administration) 
 
  
 
FUL group II • Overall  programme co-ordination and 
development (MWVLW) 
• Overall co-ordination of  Group II costs (MUF) 
• Selection of eligible plots (on the basis of 
biotope mapping etc.) 
• Management agreement negotiation and 
monitoring 
• General control (county-level administration) 
• administration and processing of claims, 
promotion to farmers (district-level 
administration) 
 
SchALVO • Advising farmers, administration of application 
forms 
• Designation of new water protection areas  
• monitoring and control: comparative field 
experiments, soil analyses on farms (by water 
protection advisors) 
 
Costs of numerous research 
and investigation  
programmes carried out 
within the implementation 
period of SchALVO 
No information about the 
cost of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s co-ordination 
and development 
programme 
MEKA • application examination, approval and 
processing 
• some costs of policy development (incomplete; 
over DM 1m though) 
 
 
 
 
Consultation costs in policy 
development 
GREECE   
(for all 3 case- • submission of the programme to the EU for Payments to farmers to 
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study schemes) approval 
• definition and details for applying the 
programme in Greece (laying down procedures, 
assisting regional authorities in applying the 
programme) 
• Application of the programme at regional level 
(administration and control of beneficiaries, 
making payments...) 
• Quantitative assessment of the programme in 
each prefecture, report submitted annually to the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 
 
private consultants 
(calculated separately) 
Travel expenses, 
consumables and 
depreciation (around 20-
25% of the wage costs at the 
Ministry of Agriculture)  
 
 
 
SWEDEN   
for all case study 
schemes 
• Staff costs and overheads, based on official 
records and examination of time-accounting 
systems where possible, with regard to scheme 
implementation 
Scheme design (pre-
implementation)  costs 
  
• costs of implementing policy incurred by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture, The National Environmental 
Protection Board, the Swedish Board of 
Antiquities and the County Administration 
Boards. 
• private (farmer) transactions costs of scheme 
participation (of gathering information, 
planning, applying to the scheme for entry, 
controls: expenditure on advice from 
consultants, mapping, telephone calls, 
opportunity costs of the  individual’s working 
time etc.) 
 
UK   
for all case-study 
schemes 
• based on payments to agencies / regional MAFF 
branches, and includes costs of head-quarters 
policy review (e.g. based on socio-economic 
surveys) and re-design and co-ordination costs; 
regional service centre contract management, 
involving farm visits and inspections as well as 
payment-claim processing; environmental 
monitoring11  
 
 
                                                
11
 For example, in the 22 English ESAs, £13.3m was spent on running the scheme in 1995/6, making it 
one of the most expensive schemes administered by MAFF.  Eight million pounds was spent on 
management (farmer contracting and so on), and a surprisingly large £5.3m was spent on environmental 
monitoring, which is an amount far in excess of such expenditure elsewhere. 
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Given the methodological heterogeneity of the member state case studies, it 
is vital that the comparability of different estimations is assessed, for valid 
cross-country (and cross-scheme) comparisons to be made.  Different 
countries have included different components in their administrative cost 
estimations (see Table 9), and when making comparisons across schemes, it 
is necessary to assess the extent to which differences in costs can be 
explained by methodological disparities.  Some studies were initially 
confined to contracting-related public costs, i.e. to evaluation of the costs of 
concluding and operating management agreements, excluding policy 
development costs.  Other studies included the broader costs, such as initial 
surveying of the areas to be covered by the scheme, re-design of the scheme 
following evaluation studies and so on.  For example, the Greek and the 
Belgian estimates include components related to the set-up costs of policies, 
such as the costs of officials involved in achieving European Commission 
approval for schemes under Regulation 2078/92, whereas France and the 
UK do not.  
  
The UK data on administrative costs for the Regulation 2078/92 schemes 
include significant expenditure on environmental monitoring, which was 
omitted for most other case studies (reasonably, perhaps, in this context, 
since general environmental monitoring does not relate directly to farmer-
state transacting).   
 
Future work using the data-set assembled here could be carried out to 
improve the analysis: one option is to compare cost estimates on the basis 
of pure ‘operations’ costs to reduce the bias in comparisons, for example, 
by removing scheme development costs (such as the costs of seeking 
approval for financial support from the European Commission) and 
environmental monitoring costs from the analysis.  However, some 
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inconsistencies will still remain: for example, the Austrian estimates 
omitted the costs of the organisation responsible for controlling policy 
compliance.  Similarly, some countries omit overhead costs.  For example, 
Greece did not include travel costs or overheads, nor expenses for 
consumables or depreciation.  Such costs could be included on the basis of 
what seems reasonable based on other countries estimates, perhaps, 
followed by a re-run of comparisons using these synthesised cost figures. 
 
 
There are several other important issues relating to data handling and 
manipulation.  Annual administrative costs were estimated for the case-
studies over different time-scales with the implication that some costs 
(especially relating to the fixed costs of set up) should perhaps be indexed 
and/or annuitised, for meaningful comparative use.    Alternatively, the set-
up costs could be omitted from consideration, allowing a focus on the 
annual operating costs only.  In addition, strictly, constant values rather 
than current values for parameters such as compensatory and administrative 
costs should be used for meaningful time-series analysis and comparisons 
of costs in different years.  However, adjustment of the case study estimates 
may or may not be necessary, depending on the methodology used.  
Generally, in this research, administrative costs were estimated by 
multiplying the time required by typical staff wage rates, using a constant 
wage level for the entire period of study.  If uniform salary rates are applied 
over the study period, there is no need for indexation of the administrative 
cost estimates for cross-year comparisons.  For Austria, constant wage rates 
with an assumed yearly increase of 2% were applied; for Germany, constant 
wage rates estimates related to 1993, but given low inflation levels over the 
following years, and that the resulting administrative cost figures were 
considered rough estimates only, no adjustment was deemed necessary. 
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Other estimates were obtained from official sources, and insofar as they are 
actual costs, should be indexed. 
 
Similarly, assumptions made about the compensatory premiums paid to 
scheme participants must be made transparent: the actual amounts paid 
were used for all case-studies in this research, i.e. current levels, suggesting 
that values should be indexed to correct for inflation, but if premiums per 
unit apply at uniform levels across time, rather than rising with inflation, 
there is perhaps no need to index these.  The choice of index is important, 
and different series may be more appropriate for different types of costs.  
For example, administrative cost series may be indexed most appropriately 
using a GDP deflator, while it might be better to adjust compensatory 
premiums using a producer price series. 
 
Total scheme compensatory payments generally rise with time; because the 
participation rate increases in the years following scheme implementation, 
but also because of a lag between payment applications (and conservation 
management actions) and actual payment transfer.  For example, in 
Belgium, there were delays in making payments to participants in the 
pollard-willows scheme: applications made in 1994 were not financed until 
1995.  Under most schemes, payments are made in arrears.  This time-lag 
implies that indicators such as scheme administrative cost as a percentage 
of total scheme costs or of scheme compensatory payments will be 
distorted. However, this problem must be balanced against that of 
incompleteness of the administrative cost estimates (compared to the more 
concrete figure for compensatory payments).  In the absence of any 
rigorous method of removing lags, no adjustments were made. 
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As can be seen in Table 10, typical administrative wage rates vary 
substantially across the case-study countries, giving rise to problems for 
comparative economic analysis.  Such variation might not matter if the cost 
differences reflected differences in the calibre of the administrative staff 
and their inputs. To the extent that wage costs reflect the degree of training 
and competence of officials, expenditure may be a reasonably good 
indicator although it cannot be relied upon to reflect accurately the quality 
of organisational inputs.  However, there is no way of gauging whether or 
not staff quality is in fact reflected in costs; there are many economic and 
political factors affecting wage rates.  We would not expect administrative 
staff to be paid the same in all states, as wage rates are at least in part 
determined institutionally at the state level  (which may be influenced by 
some EU policies).  An alternative methodological approach is to assess 
levels of administrative resource use and variations in this using time rather 
than cost.  This approach would enable assessment and comparison of 
scheme administrative resource use in terms of hours per hectare, per 
application, per ECU12 of compensation paid and so on. As can be seen in 
Table 10, typical administrative wage rates vary. 
 
Only the French, German and Greek case studies detailed the time 
requirements estimated for the administration of each scheme, so the hours 
spent on particular schemes in other member states had to be deduced from 
the estimates of overall administrative costs, given typical administrative 
wage rates in each country for each year.  Care was taken to account for 
overhead elements when using salary rates to transform overall 
administrative cost estimates into staff time inputs.  The estimates must be 
interpreted with some caution, given the rough-and-ready nature of the 
                                                
12
 Table 11  gives the exchange rates used to convert national currencies into ECU. 
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analysis and the inevitable data gaps: for example, not all cost components 
in the overall administrative-cost estimation for any given scheme related to 
hourly time inputs; some costs related to piece-work.  For example, in 
Austria, farm inspections and data collection activities are performed by 
self-employed ecologists; as there was no information on the time required 
for these activities, the ecologists were assumed to have identical wage-
rates to other staff involved in implementing the scheme. 
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Table 10: Wage Rates and Over-heads Rate Assumptions Compared 
 
 Wages Overheads Salary, 
ECU / year 
Austria The cost of a man-year was based on the average 
personnel cost at Austrian universities; this figure 
was viewed as an upper bound for personnel costs 
in the Austrian general administration.  A yearly 
increase of 2% was assumed, and a uniform 
exchange rate of 13.85 ATS/ECU. 
 
No overheads were 
included. 
42,587 
Belgium A typical salary rate of 2,000,000 BF per annum 
was assumed (for 240 days’ work) 
Overheads were 
included (as a separate 
item) at 20% of salary 
costs. 
51,880 
France Typically 364 ECU / day, giving 45.5 ECU per 
hour 
Assume overheads 
were not included in 
the standard salary 
rate 
80,080 
Germany13 Salary class: 
 
Staff cost per 
year, DM 
 
Costs per 
hour, DM 
Total costs 
per year, 
DM 
Over-
heads as 
% salary 
cost 14 
 
 Sub-clerical 
Clerical 
Executive 
Administrative 
70,300 
96,100 
123,100 
159,500 
51.1 
68.1 
86.1 
109.1 
79,100 
105,420 
133,280 
168,890 
11.9 
9.0 
7.1 
5.6 
37,517 
51,286 
65,695 
85,121 
 
Greece 
(1996/7) 
Regional level: Dr 400,000 per month = 4,800,000 
per man-year (the mean scientific and 
administrative gross salary, exclusive of any travel, 
consumables, materials and depreciation) 
National level: Dr 350,000 per month = 2,200,000 
per man-year 
 
Not included 
systematically but was 
estimated at around 
20-25% of wage costs 
15,170 
Italy 4,000,000 ITL per man-month Overheads and travel 
included at 25% of 
personnel costs 
22,543  
Sweden Typical salary rate of 170 SEK /hour assumed, i.e., 
300,000 SEK per annum. 
Overheads included as 
a separate item at 75% 
of salaries 
32,148 
UK No information available relating to the staff costs 
on which the published figures were based 15. 
 
Travel and subsistence 
costs included 
systematically 
[37,016]
16
 
                                                
13
 Strictly, estimates apply to 1993, but inflation was very low over the period studies, so no adjustment was made to 
the cost levels. 
14
 The costs of premises were included as  a standard lump-sum amount of DM 2.60 per hour; material costs were 
included as a standard lump-sum cost of DM 3.50 per hour. 
15
 The staff costs used by MAFF for the UK were calculated in a notional way by dividing the total actual payments to 
agencies by their total staff levels; as a result, unit costs vary from year to year. 
16
 In a parallel study, staff costs at English Nature (as a comparable organisation) (for 1996) were taken as 
£30,686 gross, plus a standard 60% overhead rate, giving £25.57 per hour for a forty hour week (48 weeks 
worked per year). 
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Table 11: Exchange Rates Used in the Analysis (National Currency:  
ECU) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Belgium  42.4250 42.2226 41.5939 39.6565 38.5519 39.2986 
Denmark 7.8565 7.9086 7.8093 7.5433 7.3280 7.3593 
Germany 2.0521 2.0508 2.0203 1.9245 1.8738 1.9095 
Greece 201.4099 225.2252 247.0356 288.026 302.989 305.546 
Spain 129.4163 128.4687 132.5205 158.918 163.000 160.748 
France 6.9141 6.9733 6.8484 6.5826 6.5251 6.4930 
Ireland 0.7678 0.7678 0.7607 0.7936 0.8155 0.7934 
Italy 1522.0700 1533.7423 1594.896 1915.06 2130.14 1958.96 
Luxembourg 42.4250 42.2226 41.5939 39.6565 38.5519 39.2986 
The Netherlands 2.3121 2.3110 2.2748 2.1583 2.0989 2.1397 
Portugal 181.0938 178.6033 174.7030 196.896 196.105 195.761 
UK 0.7140 0.7010 0.7437 0.7759 0.8288 0.8138 
Austria    13.5393 13.1824 13.4345 
Finland    6.1908 5.7086 5.8282 
Sweden    9.1631 9.3319 8.5147 
From: European Commission (1995); Toepfer International (1996). 
 
There were two principal stages to the comparative analysis: first, an 
assessment of scheme administration (and other organisational) costs at the 
level of the member-state, and then second, an assessment of the costs and 
variations in these at the European-level of analysis (i.e., across the eight 
member states).  Parameters such as the administrative costs per hectare 
entered into the scheme and the administrative costs per management 
agreement made provided a basis for exploration of how administrative 
resource use varies over schemes, over time and so on.  Two quantitative 
indicators of the importance of organisational costs were also developed, 
namely administrative costs as a percentage of the compensation costs 
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incurred under the scheme; and administrative costs as a percentage of total 
scheme costs (i.e., including both participant compensation and 
administrative expenditures).  Some caution is required with regard to the 
administrative cost indicators, such as their ratios to compensation 
expenditures, as the latter depend on the resources available and the degree 
of incentive included in any premium, as well as the actual foregone 
agricultural incomes.  Furthermore, they do not represent any measure of 
the environmental benefits achieved under the scheme, so in no sense can 
they be considered to represent scheme efficiency. 
 
In summary, several points should be noted with regard to the analytical 
limitations: 
 
• This research is the first time that administrative cost measurement has 
been attempted for agri-environmental schemes in many member states, 
necessitating the development of new methodologies.  Few published 
data were available. 
• It is still premature to evaluate the administration of agri-environmental 
policies, particularly given the experimental nature of many of them.  
Some have had explicit pilot phases, and most have varied over time 
with regard to their conservation prescriptions and in some cases with 
regard to their administrative frameworks. 
• Significant challenges have arisen with regard to data collection: the 
costs of specific administrative tasks are generally not precisely 
measured in practice, and where costs are available, they are often 
highly aggregated 
• There are important issues of transactions cost definition, and great care 
is needed at the empirical data collection stage to ensure consistency in 
estimations (i.e., that similar costs are measured and included).  The 
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estimates are undoubtedly subjective to a degree, as individual 
researchers were given some discretion with regard to what they wished 
to consider as ‘transactions costs’.  While allowing the breadth of scope 
of the study to be maintained, this gives rise to unavoidable issues of 
standardisation. 
• The main analytical challenges arise from the great diversity of sources 
of data and the heterogeneity of schemes, their objectives, their contexts 
and so on. 
• Accountancy problems must also be borne in mind: assuming that most 
participants are profit-maximising, the private transactions costs of 
entering schemes are likely to be hidden in the compensation payments, 
giving a downwards bias in absolute cost levels (both public and private 
costs, per hectare etc.) and to their importance relative to overall scheme 
costs. 
• There are problems in relying on either staff time or wage-cost 
estimates: these give no real information regarding the quality of 
administrative activity (for example, fewer high-grade staff may have a 
more beneficial effect in policy terms than more lower-grade staff). 
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4. OBSERVATIONS FROM THE COUNTRY REPORTS 
 
4.1 Administration of Agricultural Support Schemes and Agri-
Environmental Schemes 
 
Measurement of the generally-hidden organisational costs of schemes can 
give some idea of the amount by which the (direct) public costs of 
countryside stewardship policy are being under-estimated, for example, in 
academic policy evaluation studies or in official reports on scheme 
expenditures.  An important contribution of this research is the presentation 
of a more appropriate set of estimates of the gross public costs of case study 
schemes across the EU.  While there are still substantial knowledge gaps 
with regard to the benefit side of agri-environmental schemes, there are 
knowledge gaps of similar importance on the cost side too.  The aim was to 
improve knowledge and understanding with regard to the latter.  The 
implications of the empirical research presented here is that if policy costs 
are higher than originally thought (or officially presented) because of the 
costs of policy organisation, we need to ensure that benefits are still higher 
than the new estimates, if policy intervention is to be cost-effective. 
 
Appendix 1 contains summary tables of the schemes, their participation, 
and their costs for each member state.  The raw data on administrative costs 
for each scheme are presented and interpreted in the eight  individual 
country reports found in Appendix 2. This section relates to the 
comparative studies based on the country-level transactions cost 
estimations.  The two main quantitative measures of analytical interest were 
the financial administrative costs (using parameters such as the ECU per 
hectare entered under a given scheme), and the resource usage in terms of 
time inputs (such as the number of administrative hours used per agreement 
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made under each scheme).  Particular attention was focused on the time-
profile of administrative costs (in terms of ECU per hectare, per agreement 
and per unit compensation paid to participants). 
 
Although data are very limited, agri-environmental schemes appear 
generally to be more costly to administer, relative to other types of policy 
such as the commodity regimes for farm income support. Fragmentary 
evidence from the UK, Germany and Sweden supports this hypothesis (see 
Table 12). It is relatively easy to transfer funds to land-owners, but much 
more difficult to ensure that environmental conditions are followed in 
return. Countryside stewardship schemes tend to be more complex in terms 
of the transactions required, often including farmer-specific arrangements 
and more face-to-face dealings with farmers at all stages than other policy 
types. There is often a need for substantial professional input from project 
officers (in terms of promoting the scheme, achieving management 
agreements, helping farmers adjust their practices as required and so on) to 
ensure agri-environmental scheme success, given the sometimes complex 
changes in management needed.  The implications of the comparative 
administrative cost analysis for agricultural support and agri-environmental 
policy suggests that administrative costs may become even more important 
in the future as a public expenditure cost heading as policy objectives shift 
more towards conservation, especially in the Agenda 2000 context, and the 
greater use of direct payments and management agreements. 
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Table 12: The Transactions Costs of Agricultural Support Payment 
Schemes 
 
  Administration as a % of  
total public scheme costs 
Germany (1993) arable  
livestock 
4 
20 
UK (1996) all crops and set-
aside 
beef 
sheep 
1.5 
5 
2.5 
Sweden (1997) arable  
livestock 
3 
4 
Sources: Lampe (1994); Kumm & Drake (1998); data from MAFF/IBAP (1997).  NB  The 
data for Germany relate to the first year of the scheme; costs were thought to fall in 
subsequent years. 
 
At present, broadly similar mechanisms are used in the eight member states, 
under Regulation 2078/92, to achieve each agri-environmental objective 
(i.e., voluntary, compensated management agreements). Table 13 shows the 
case study schemes categorised roughly by their main objectives.  Hence, 
given that the agri-environmental objectives vary (different goods and 
services are intended to be provided under each scheme), different 
administrative costs should be experienced; this is a hypothesis to be tested 
by further work, given the limitations of the data-set available at present.  
However, a problem is that schemes are not always implemented in practice  
the way in which they perhaps should be according to transactions-cost 
economic theory (e.g., see Williamson 1985), given asymmetry of 
information between farmers and the State and the likelihood of 
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Table 13: Main Objectives of Case Study Schemes 
 
 conservation organic 
farming 
landscape rare 
breeds 
water 
pollution 
grazing 
densities 
AUSTRIA       
Ecologically Valuable 
Areas 
√  √    
Eco-points √  √    
Organic Aid  √     
BELGIUM       
organic aid  √     
pollard willows   √    
Huise LCS   √    
Nazareth LCS   √    
Walloon 2078 √      
Bocage l’ardennais   √    
FRANCE       
Prime  à l’herbe      √ 
RTA √      
RLT √      
PRM    √   
DCC      √ 
CAB  √     
RIN     √  
OPL √  √    
GERMANY       
FUL I √      
FUL II √      
SchALVO     √  
MEKA √      
GREECE       
Reduction of Nitrates      √  
Organic aid  √     
Long-term set-aside √      
ITALY       
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Emilia Romagna √  √    
Trento √  √    
SWEDEN       
Open landscape   √    
Bio-diversity √      
Cultural Heritage   √    
UK       
SSSIs √      
ESAs √  √   √ 
CSS √  √  √  
NSAs       
Habitat Scheme √      
Moorland Scheme √     √ 
Organic Aid  √     
Countryside Access       
 
opportunism on the part of scheme participants.  There are other factors 
affecting organisational structures, such as the budgets made available for 
agri-environmental policy and political decisions, for example, with regard 
to the level of monitoring to be carried out. 
 
4.2 Absolute Administrative Cost Levels 
 
The total administrative costs of schemes vary greatly, depending at least 
partly on participation levels.  In Belgium, around 20,000 ECU were spent 
per annum on the organic aid scheme17, compared to per annum costs of 
600,000 - 1,500,000 ECU on the French arable conversion scheme (RTA), 
and 900,000-1,400,000 ECU for a livestock extensification scheme (DCC). 
Over 30,000,000 ECU were spent overall on the local (OPL) schemes, in 
                                                
17
 These low costs were attributed to the requirement that participants register with independent 
certification bodies, thus, in effect, transferring organisational costs from the public sector to the 
private sector. 
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Year Three of its implementation in France.  While abstracted from scheme 
scale, these figures show that potentially very large amounts are spent 
annually on administration: scheme organisation is a non-trivial cost 
component and should feature in scheme value-for-money evaluations. 
 
The distinction between fixed costs and variable costs is important.  Most 
organisational costs incurred at the national level are likely to be of the 
fixed type (such as general policy design and development costs and the 
costs of co-ordinating regional initiatives) while costs at the regional level 
are characterised to a greater degree by variable costs related to farmer 
participation levels.  In France, at the local level, variable costs represent 
around 50% to 90% of total annual organisational costs, depending on 
scheme take-up (and hence the relative balance between fixed and variable 
costs). In France, the local schemes under the OPL programme were the 
most demanding, proportionately, in terms of the resources needed for set-
up.  Around 25% of total costs related to policy development, and 20% of 
costs were attributed to preliminary scheme studies.   
 
For most schemes, some core staff will be employed in each year, 
regardless of the level of participation (perhaps for policy evaluation and 
development).  Staff inputs for some aspects of scheme delivery may be 
more flexible and ‘demand-led’.  In Austria, self-employed ecologists are 
used on a per-plot basis for farm inspections, so such transactional costs are 
more flexible and variable (i.e., linked more directly to scheme participation 
levels).  The UK Countryside Stewardship Scheme illustrated how public-
sector staffing decisions were made each year to fine-tune the running of 
the scheme in its pilot phase (LUC 1995). However, for most schemes it is 
very difficult to separate out fixed costs and variable cost components, as 
the activities are carried out by the same agency. 
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The relative shares of the different administrative cost components 
(information, monitoring, and general administration such as processing 
payments) also vary across time, across country and across measures.  In 
terms of the disaggregation of administrative costs into components  
monitoring costs, for example, account for around 18% of total scheme 
administrative costs in Greece, but vary from 5% for organic aid to 35% for 
long-term set-aside. These estimates might have been expected to be the 
other way around (a higher percentage of total transactions costs accounted 
for by monitoring for organic aid, but a large proportion of the cost has 
been passed on to farmers through the certification requirements.  Farmer-
contracting and activities such as routine payment processing seem to 
account for most administrative resource use for many schemes18. 
 
The way in which the total administrative costs of any particular agri-
environmental scheme are spread over different types of activities depends 
on the nature of the scheme and the general administrative framework of 
the state.  For example, in Belgium, under the Land Consolidation Scheme, 
the frequency of controls (and thence their cost) depends on the type of 
contract: landscape features are monitored once a year; adherence to 
mowing restrictions might be monitored before and after the earliest 
mowing date permitted.  Under the German SchALVO scheme, monitoring 
is costly compared to schemes for the conservation of ‘typical landscape 
elements’ (such as hedges and stone walls which are highly visible), as 
intensive soil-nitrogen monitoring is needed. However, there are significant 
problems in comparing ‘like with like’ in terms of administrative costs 
                                                
18
 Although for the SchALVO scheme in Germany, advising farmers (mainly through seminars and 
workshops rather than at an individual level) takes around 30% of advisors’ time; processing applications  
accounts for far less time.  Monitoring (through soil tests) is the most significant scheme cost. 
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across different schemes and different member states: the quality of 
administrative time inputs as well as the numbers of staff hours for any 
particular activity are important factors; for example, monitoring efforts 
may cost less in one country but be more appropriate to the task, with 
higher productivity (for example, in terms of environmental effectiveness).  
This is an unavoidable methodological problem; far more detailed work on 
the structure of policy-implementing organisations and their contexts is 
needed. 
Given the different scales of schemes, comparisons of the absolute 
administrative expenditures are insufficient. Scheme scale varies a great 
deal, in terms of cumulative hectares entered under each one, or in terms of 
other indicators such as the number of contracts made or the amount of 
compensation paid each year, see Tables 14 and 15.  Some schemes are 
very small: for example, the two Land Consolidation projects in Belgium 
had total land entries respectively of seven hectares and twenty one 
hectares.  Other schemes are very large, such as the French OPL schemes, 
covering over 400,000 hectares; similarly, over 400,000 hectares are under 
conservation contracts in the English ESAs.  In Austria, 280,000 hectares 
have been entered into the organic aid scheme, and in Germany, over 
1,400,000 hectares have been entered into the MEKA scheme.  The 
numbers of participants vary too, from two in the Nazareth Land 
Consolidation project in Belgium, to thousands (over 8,000 in the English 
ESAs, around 20,000 in the Austrian organic aid scheme, and over 50,000 
in MEKA). To avoid assessing scheme administrative costs in abstract, they 
should be standardised by variables such as scheme participation levels. 
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4.3 Annual Administrative Costs per Hectare and per Agreement Made 
 
An intractable problem for analysis at present is the dynamic nature of the 
agri-environmental policy sphere.  The case study schemes have 
experienced different changes in prescriptions and payments over the 
course of their implementation, and have been implemented within different 
economic and institutional systems at different times.  It is, therefore, very 
difficult to identify a single representative figure of  
 
Table 14: Hectares Entered into Each Scheme in Each Year 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
    6782 7816 9526 
Eco-points     4800 9921 17683 
Organic Aid     259588 272062 280000 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    2219 2690 3591  
pollard willows    - - -  
Huise LCS  21 21 21 21 21  
Nazareth LCS     7.2 7.2  
Walloon Reg.2078   - - - 1234 11542 
Bocage l’ardennais   - - - -  
Porc fermier    - - -  
Blanc bleu fermier    - - -  
Poulet de Chair     - - -  
FRANCE        
Prime à l’herbe   5800000 5854200 5573500 5393500  
RTA    3411 3554 8524  
RLT    141 185 225  
PRM    6087 6992 10223  
DCC    9614 17509 25281  
CAB    18850 20324 32331  
RIN    19739 20080 44639  
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OPL    135226 108835 157873  
GERMANY        
FUL I   38760 n/a n/a 61073  
FUL II   2250 n/a n/a 3647  
SchALVO 172070 219802  280025 289933 302920  
MEKA  1061000 1379000 1147000 1261000 1404000  
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       5000  
Organic aid      4000  
Long-term set-aside      8500  
ITALY        
Emilia-Romagna    4675 29649 48988  
Trento    17467 46538 38635  
SWEDEN        
Open landscape     481699 695992 731551 
Bio-diversity      164528 180993 
Cultural Heritage       618585 
Advisory schemes       - 
UK        
ESAs   129358 266458 346391 409962  
CSS   56248 75675 87319 92585  
NSAs     13194 19611  
Habitat Scheme   0 2700 5100 -  
Moorland Scheme     - -  
Organic Aid    - 4673   
Countryside Access     993 -  
Access Agreements      <30,000  
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Table 15: Number of Participants in Each Scheme in Each Year 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
    5565 5798 5881 
Eco-points     319 582 985 
Organic Aid     18542 19433 20000 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    95 109 143  
pollard willows    154 218 271  
Huise LCS  22 22 22 22 22  
Nazareth LCS     2 2  
Walloon Reg.2078   - - - 123 1014 
Bocage l’ardennais   - - - 10  
Labels    153 294 932  
FRANCE        
Prime à l’herbe   117461 117606 107568 99691  
RTA    608 656 1520  
RLT    34 36 54  
PRM    734 821 1445  
DCC    574 579 975  
CAB    732 783 1520  
RIN    771 784 1797  
OPL    5886 11811 19596  
GERMANY        
FUL I   197 - - 1186  
FUL II   747 - - 1210  
SchALVO 22748 25513  27617 27690 27933  
MEKA  50000 555050 - - 58816  
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       1360  
Organic aid      837  
Long-term set-aside      26  
ITALY        
Emilia-Romagna    1233 3154 4645  
Trento    2571 2844 2885  
SWEDEN        
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Open landscape     25416 39678 45238 
Bio-diversity      13984 16119 
Cultural Heritage       12109 
Advisory schemes       - 
UK        
ESAs   3265 4514 6141 7463  
CSS   2358 3647 4752 5284  
NSAs          241 359  
Habitat Scheme   0 192 301 -  
Moorland Scheme     - 15  
Organic Aid    - - 101  
Countryside Access     77 -  
Access Agreements      <30  
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administrative cost across the period studied for each scheme that can be 
used in a comparative way over the data-set.  Averaging the values of 
administrative cost parameters over the time-series of each scheme would 
fail to take into account properly the differences of scheme life-stage, but 
may be useful for preliminary analysis. 
 
As an attempt to summarise the time series data collected in the member 
state case studies, average annual figures for annual administrative costsper 
hectare and per scheme-participant were calculated for the case-study 
schemes in total in each member state across the period of study for each 
scheme; see Table 16.  The administrative costs for each scheme were 
weighted according to its value for each given denominator, rather than 
simply taking the arithmetic average, in order to take scheme scale into 
account (for example, in terms of the area covered). 
 
Average annual administrative costs per hectare ranged from 9-75 ECU.  
Untangling the reasons for such variation is complex.  Agri-environmental 
schemes in Belgium have been implemented on a relatively small scale, for 
example, compared to Sweden, which may account for some of the 
observed cost difference (given the existence of substantial fixed costs).  
Very low costs were observed for the Italian case studies, which may reflect 
the fairly simple administrative structure in place. 
 
Average annual administrative costs per participant ranged from 140-2,446 
ECU, with average levels typically at around 200-300 ECU per participant.  
Very high costs per participant were observed for the UK case studies, 
perhaps  reflecting  the  number  of  schemes  in  place  and  thus  the  large 
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Table 16: Weighted Average Annual Administrative Costs for Case-    
Study  Agri-environmental Schemes in Each Member State 
 
 Average annual administration 
costs, ECU per hectare 
Average annual administration costs, 
ECU per participant 
Austria 20.5 216.9 
Belgium 58.6 388.6 
France 75.6 1522.0 
Germany 10.2 177.5 
Greece 59.7 470.1 
Italy 13.1 140.0 
Sweden 9.1 190.4 
UK 48.0 2445.5 
 
proportion of overall administrative spending in the agri-environmental 
sphere related to administrative overheads.  Merging the smallest schemes 
(with low take-up) could allow a substantial fall in average per-unit costs.  
however, the UK agri-environmental agencies also spend a considerable 
amount on environmental monitoring, the costs of which activity were 
generally not measured for the other country case-studies; as a result, the 
cost estimates for the UK were inflated relative to costs elsewhere. 
 
An hypothesis linked to the fixed cost / variable cost distinction in overall 
scheme administrative costs was that annual administrative costs per 
hectare entered into the scheme and per agreement made should fall with 
time over the period since scheme implementation.  There are several 
reasons underlying this hypothesis: for example, the marginal increase in 
scheme participation generally falls with time, and thus, a few years after 
implementation, most administrative work will relate to maintenance of 
existing management agreements, rather than the more resource-intensive 
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work of setting-up new agreements.  In addition, experience in the years 
following implementation should allow efficiency to be improved. 
 
Chart 1: Annual Administrative Costs (ECU) per Hectare Entered into 
Schemes, Over Time 
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Chart 1 shows administrative costs per hectare for the case study schemes 
related to the number of years since each was first implemented.  There is a 
notable downward trend as time progresses.  Generally, per-hectare costs 
are below 300 ECU per hectare, although there are a couple of significant 
outliers.  A similar trend is shown in Chart 2 for per-participant 
administrative costs, as would be expected (although the hectarage entered 
into a scheme and the number of participants is not perfectly correlated). 
Costs per agreement were much higher, but similarly variable.  Most 
schemes had per-unit costs of under 5,000 ECU per agreement made, 
particularly after the first year of the scheme’s implementation.  There is a 
wider range of per-participant costs than for per-hectare costs over time.  
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However, analysis across time is limited in that few data were available for 
costs in the fourth year and beyond; most countries could supply data only 
for the first three years of schemes, at most. 
 
The annual time inputs for schemes were estimated either directly through 
interviews of calculated from the total cost estimates using typical staff 
salary rates.  The staff-hours required per hectare entered into any given 
scheme range widely in each year, from very low to very high (generally in 
the set-up phase).  For example, the Belgian organic aid scheme used 
around 0.3 hours per hectare, compared to around 160 hours per hectare in 
the set-up phase of the Nazareth Land Consolidation project.  Typically, 
most schemes had time usage of less than 20 hours per hectare, and less 
than 200 hours per agreement made.  Scheme characteristics are likely to 
affect the time requirements, although the sample of schemes was really too 
small to be able to assess this on a systematic basis. 
 
Chart 2:  Annual Administrative Costs (ECU) per Hectare Entered 
into  Schemes, Over Time 
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The annual staff-time inputs per agreement showed a similar amount of 
variability, for example, from around one hour per agreement under the 
French arable conversion scheme to 400-600 per agreement for the long-
term set-aside scheme.   In Austria, the Ecologically Valuable Areas 
scheme took around 2 hours per agreement, compared to 10 hours for the 
organic aid scheme, and 50-60 for the eco-points scheme.  Charts 3 and 4 
show the administrative time requirements per hectare and per participant, 
for the case study schemes, plotted against time since scheme 
implementation.  Again, both the range of estimates and their downward 
trend with time in the years following scheme implementation should be 
noted. 
 
Chart 3: Annual Administrative Time Requirements (staff hours) per 
Hectare Entered in Schemes, Over Time 
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Chart 4:  Annual Administrative Time Requirements (staff hours) per 
Participant in Schemes, Over Time 
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4.4 Administration as a Proportion of Total Scheme Costs and of 
Compensation Paid 
 
The relative importance in each year of administrative costs to overall 
scheme costs funded from the public exchequer varies from a very low 
percentage (1-3%) to a very high one, at the limit accounting for all scheme 
expenditure (for schemes under which no compensatory payments are 
made, such as the Belgian Bocage Ardennais scheme) (see Chart 5).  Some 
schemes had very high ratios due to their low participation levels (such as 
the Moorland and Habitat schemes in the UK).  A large proportion of the 
administrative costs of such schemes are fixed costs relating to policy 
monitoring and evaluation.  Generally, the percentages in each year (the 
relative importance of administrative costs to overall scheme expenditure) 
were observed to fall with time following scheme implementation, from a 
range of 1-90% to around 1-50% (typically 10-20%), after the first few 
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years of the scheme.  This observation is explained by factors such as the 
rise in compensatory payments as scheme participation grows (to dwarf 
administrative costs eventually), and the potential gains in efficiency 
following the fine-tuning of schemes as experience grows.   
 
The ratio of administration expenditure to scheme compensation payments 
in each year is of some interest, as it indicates by how much, typically, the 
public exchequer costs of schemes are being under-reported, for example, 
in government policy evaluation documents.  All scheme costs, whether 
compensatory payments or administrative costs, are borne by the tax-payer 
and therefore represent opportunity costs in terms of the options to achieve 
welfare improvements through other forms of policy expenditure. 
 
Chart 5: Administrative Costs as a Proportion of Overall Public 
Expenditure on Schemes in Each Year 
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Significant variability in the relative importance of administration to 
compensation was observed across the case-study schemes, and across the 
time span of each case study.  Chart 6 shows how this ratio falls with time; 
some schemes had extremely high ratios in their early years, and more 
persistently for some schemes, linked to very low participation rates. The 
ratio was very low for some schemes, for example, at 2-3% for the Belgian 
organic aid scheme, but much larger in other cases. The UK Countryside 
Access scheme had a ratio of 350% in 1996/7; this scheme had exhibited 
problems of lower participation rates than expected (so the fixed costs of 
the scheme were relatively important as a component of overall scheme 
expenditure). The UK organic aid scheme exhibited administrative costs of 
over 1,000% of the compensation payments made, given the small scale of 
the scheme and the largely fixed costs of running it.  In Germany, the FUL 
scheme (Part I) had a ratio of around 4% in year 5; FUL (Part II) had a ratio 
of around 120%. 
 
Average annual administrative costs per 100 ECU of compensation were 
calculated for each country (weighting each scheme observation by its 
relative importance in terms of total sample compensation payments); see 
Table 17.  Administrative expenditures as a proportion of scheme 
compensation costs varied from 6-87%.  The average for Austria, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Sweden was around 10% of compensation costs, with a 
much higher figure for Belgium, France and the UK.   The Belgian data-set 
included information for a scheme for which no compensation payments 
were made, thus inflating the figures; it also has a very small agri-
environmental sector over which to spread fixed administrative costs.  
France has an extensive and deeply entrenched administrative 
infrastructure, which may explain its relatively high expenditure.  As 
mentioned above, the UK figures included the costs of environmental 
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monitoring rather than just those costs relating to farmer-state transactions 
and the data-set also included figures for some very small-scale but high-
overhead schemes. 
 
Chart 6:  Administrative Costs as a Proportion of Compensation 
Payments for  Schemes in Each Year 
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Table 17: Typical Ratios of Administration Costs to Compensation for 
Each Member State 
 
 Administration Costs, ECU per 100 ECU 
Paid as Compensation 
Austria 8.8 
Belgium 63.4 
France 87.1 
Germany 12.3 
Greece 8.6 
Italy 6.6 
Sweden 11.3 
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UK 47.9 
 
The costs of administration in each year were compared with compensation 
costs in each year, given the interest here in the context of actual 
expenditure on schemes; however, a refinement to the analysis might be the 
cumulative assessment of the relative importance of administration to 
compensation over the period of study.  This could allow investigation of 
whether there is a trade-off between scheme set-up costs and on-going 
running costs (if there is, we might expect to see fairly similar cumulative 
ratios of administration to total costs).  Cumulative ratios would allow both 
fixed and variable costs to be taken into account for overall scheme-level 
comparisons.  Alternatively, set up costs could be annuitised over time. 
 
4.5 Economies of Scale in Scheme Administration 
 
A problem with regard to Tables 16 and 17 is that the differences in the 
average figures across the member states are not necessarily due to country-
specific factors but also to influences such as scheme scale, given the 
differences in this (as shown in Tables 14 and 15).  In order to investigate 
the importance of scale, the case study schemes were grouped into ‘large’, 
‘medium’ and ‘small’ groups.  The per-unit administrative costs were then 
investigated across these groupings.  Tables 18 and 19 suggest that there is 
some relationship between scale and costs, with some indication of a 
downwards trend in costs from the small schemes to the large schemes, 
although the number of anomalies suggests that other factors are also at 
work. 
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The relationship between scheme participation, in terms of the cumulative 
hectares entered into a scheme, and the cumulative number of participants 
(numbers  of  management  agreements),  were  also  charted  respectively  
 
Table 18:  Annual Administrative Costs, ECU per Hectare Entered into 
Each Scheme, for Small, Medium and Large Size Groups 
(Based on Area Under Each Scheme )  
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
SMALL         
organic aid BE    8.3 8.9 5.8 - 
pollard willows BE    - - - - 
Huise LCS BE  1174.7 35.7 37.5 38.5 37.8 - 
Nazareth LCS BE     3592.1 9.1 - 
Bocage l’ardennais BE   - - - - - 
RLT FR    243.1 188.9 230.0  
FUL II GE   446.9 n/a n/a 295.3  
Reduction of Nitrates  GR      77.9  
Long-term set-aside GR      20.8  
Habitat Scheme UK    284.9 195.6 112.7  
Moorland Scheme UK    - - -  
Organic Aid UK    - 50.9 30.7  
Countryside Access UK     321.9 214.6  
NSAs UK    200.6 109.0 79.8  
         
MEDIUM         
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
AU     61.3 32.0 31.4 
Eco-points AU     109.7 71.4 61.6 
Walloon Reg. 2078 BE   - - 89.1 27,2 25.1 
RTA FR    180.0 180.2 170.8  
PRM FR    81.1 76.1 89.8  
DCC FR    92.5 47.9 54.3  
CAB FR    51.9 50.1 55.9  
RIN FR    39.5 38.1 38.6  
FUL I GE   15.1 n/a n/a 6.9  
Organic aid GR      119.8  
Emilia Romagna IT    91.4 13.0 8.5  
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Trento IT    23.8 8.0 10.5  
Access agreements UK      21.2  
SSSI management 
agreements (1988/9) 
UK 16.2 (per hectare covered by a management agreement) 
1.4 (administrative costs spread over the total area designated)  
         
LARGE         
Organic Aid AU     17.1 17.9 18.3 
Prime à l’herbe FR             1.2 (for the period 1993-1996)  
OPL FR    78.4 82.1 80.0  
SchALVO GE  43.7 50.6 36.4 32.5 31.1  
MEKA GE  0.1 0.9 n/a n/a 0.8  
Open landscape SW       7.9 
Bio-diversity SW       19.0 
Cultural Heritage SW       7.7 
Advisory Schemes  SW       3.6 
ESAs UK  128.0 61.6 37.2 30.6 22.7  
CSS UK  53.3 37.3     
SMALL: < around 5,000 hectares typically; MEDIUM: 5,000-100,000 hectares; LARGE: >100,000 hectares 
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against average annual administration costs per unit.  Charts 719 and 820 
plotted the observed annual scheme administrative costs, per-hectare and 
per participant, against scheme scale, in terms of hectarage entered and 
number of participants, respectively.  The charts give some support to a 
hypothesis that economies of scale exist in agri-environmental scheme 
administration. For example, in Germany, MEKA high compensatory 
payments.  The FUL scheme (Part II measures) was most expensive scheme 
to operate in Germany; its high costs were had the lowest administrative 
costs, relative to total public expenditure on a scheme, and in terms of 
absolute expenditure, which was attributed to its very high acceptance rate, 
with a large area under the policy and the attributed to low participation (a 
small area is covered by the scheme) and the fact that payments are targeted 
on selected plots.   
 
However, it is very difficult to separate out the scale-economy factor from 
other factors such as growth in experience in running schemes and fine-
tuning.  The MEKA scheme has a relatively simple application procedure, 
which was further streamlined in 1993 when the administration of payments 
under it was integrated with the agricultural support payment system.  At 
present there is simply insufficient data on scheme organisation costs 
following the set-up stages for further investigation into scale economies to 
be possible.  Furthermore, in principle, it is possible that some 
diseconomies of scale will appear as schemes develop, although no 
evidence of this was found in the present data-set.  This subject deserves 
more investigation in future, as scheme participation continues to rise. 
                                                
19
 Excluding the UK moorland scheme, for which costs were 44,000 ECU per participant in its second 
year. 
 
20
 Excluding the UK moorland scheme, for which costs were 44,000 ECU per participant in its second 
year. 
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Table 19:  Annual Administrative Costs, ECU per Agreement Made for 
Small, Medium and Large Scheme Groups (Based on the 
Number of Participants in Each Scheme) 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
SMALL         
Eco-points AU     1,650.6 1,217.0 1,103.
6 
organic aid BE    194.8 219.5 146.3  
pollard willows BE    136.9 118.2 90.5  
Huise LCS BE  1,121.3 34.1 35.8 36.8 36.1  
Nazareth LCS BE     13,003.3 33.1  
Walloon Reg.2078 BE   - - 894.2 310.1 204.7 
Bocage l’ardennais BE   - - 3,260.7 3,709.8  
Porc fermier BE    1,664.8 1,645.0 5,073.0  
Blanc bleu fermier BE    1,179.0 990.00 263.74  
Poulet de Chair  BE    6,390.5 9,187.2 9,119.2  
RTA FR    1,010.0 976.2 957.7  
RLT FR    1,008.0 970.6 958.3  
PRM FR    672.7 647.9 635.8  
DCC FR    1,548.5 1,449.8 1,409.0  
CAB FR    1,337.7 1,300.3 1,189.2  
RIN FR    1,012.5 976.3 957.7  
FUL I GE   2,975.9 n/a n/a 353.6  
FUL II GE   1,345.0 n/a n/a 890.0  
Organic aid GR      572.5  
Long-term set-aside GR      6,784.8  
NSAs UK    10,984.4 5,952.2 2,958.1  
Habitat Scheme UK    5,195.6 2,882.2   
Moorland Scheme UK     - 43,999.9  
Organic Aid UK    - 2,353.4   
Countryside Access UK     4,151.0 2,756.4  
Access Agreements UK      1,6823.6  
         
MEDIUM         
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
AU     74.7 42.2 50.7 
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OPL FR    1,800.7 1,791.2 1,641.9  
Reduction of Nitrates  GR      286.4  
Emilia-Romagna IT    346.6 121.8 89.9  
Trento IT    161.8 131.7 141.0  
ESAs UK  5,071.7 3,637.7 2,097.7 1,683.0 1,198.4  
CSS UK  1,270.4 774.3     
         
LARGE         
Organic Aid AU     293.3 250.3 255.9 
Prime à l’herbe FR    57.0 (for the period 1993-1996)  
SchALVO GE 435.9 369.2  336.9 339.4   
MEKA GE  2.3 21.4 n/a n/a 17.9  
Open landscape SW       128.0 
Bio-diversity SW       212.9 
Cultural Heritage SW       393.3 
Advisory schemes SW       133.3 
Small:< 5,000 participants, typically; medium: 5,000-10,000 participants; large: >10,000 participants. 
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Chart 7: Annual Administrative Costs (ECU) per Participant and 
Scheme Scale (Cumulative Participation Levels) in Each Year  
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Chart 8: Annual Administrative Costs (ECU) per Hectare and Scheme 
Scale (Cumulative Hectares Entered into Schemes  in Each 
Year  
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4.6  Variability of Administrative Expenditure Across Scheme Type  
 
The observed administrative resource uses varied significantly across the 
case study schemes, although explaining such variation stretches the 
analytical possibilities of the data-set here; for example, a methodological 
requirement for meaningful comparative analysis across schemes is the 
rigorous standardisation of cost components.  Recorded administrative costs 
varied across member states for similar types of schemes, but there was 
simply insufficient data available to untangle the multivarious factors 
affecting their magnitude of administrative costs.  It was also impossible to 
make any conclusions with regard to the relative efficiencies of different 
administrations, in the absence of environmental benefit data.  Several 
aspects of general policy design linked to high administration costs could. 
be identified tentatively (Kumm & Drake 1998): for example, the general 
application of the scheme (all farmers are eligible to participate); 
complicated regulations and entry options (the harder are regulations and 
options for farmers to understand, the more  assistance is likely to be 
 90 
required from the implementing authority); and continuous changes and 
modifications such as introduction of new sub-measures.  The Swedish 
agri-environmental schemes have been changed many times between 1995-
1996, in terms of the routines for handling registration, definition of 
landscapes.  As a result, administrative costs have not fallen with time as 
was expected. 
 
In Belgium, the annual administrative costs appeared to be lower where 
there are fairly well-established procedures executed by Ministry officials 
(Coppens et al. 1997).  There may be a link between the number of 
management options in a scheme and administrative costs.  For example, 
the Walloon 2078/92 scheme in Belgium and ESA scheme in the UK are 
examples of measures with various tiers of management prescriptions to 
which participating farmers choose to adhere.  The more tiers or options 
there are, the more negotiation is likely before management agreements can 
be signed.  Other schemes, such as organic aid schemes generally involve a 
simpler, ‘all or nothing’ choice for entry.  Administrative costs may also be 
a function of the type of area over which the scheme is applied: for 
example, schemes targeted on designated nature conservation areas may 
have lower running costs as conservation may already be a feature of 
management; there may also be local economies of scale related to project 
officer activity.  In Sweden, it appeared that administrative costs were 
higher where the scheme was open to all landholders rather than targeted on 
some types of land only.  However, it was impossible to untangle other 
factors, such as the rigour of the management agreement requirements. 
 
Whether or not whole farm (rather than plot-level) participation is required 
may be important.  For example, for the FUL programme in Germany, 
Group I measures relate to the whole farm, and the higher administrative 
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cost Group II measures relate to plots.  However, a caveat to comparison is 
that participation in Group I was observed to account for two-thirds of total 
FUL applications (and around 95 % of the area in 1996), so economies of 
scale may be at work.  Whether participation in the scheme is of a voluntary 
or mandatory nature would also be expected to be of importance.  For 
example, in Germany, farmers are obliged by law to follow the practices 
outlined in the SchALVO scheme, so nearly all of them apply for 
compensation. The ratio of administrative costs to compensation would be 
expected to be smaller than for similar schemes of a voluntary nature given 
the absence of a need for promotion of the scheme and the potential for 
economies of scale, standard forms and fixed procedures to handle the large 
numbers of applicants21. 
 
4.7  Trade-Offs Between Compensation And Administrative Costs 
 
Some understanding is needed of the main characteristics of farming 
systems, the pressures on the environment and the policy framework in 
each STEWPOL country, in order to shed light on the objectives pursued by 
the authorities, the mix between vertical and horizontal measures, their 
degree of negotiability and the level of public administrative (transactions) 
costs incurred in relation to scheme implementation.  For example, in the 
UK, some schemes are based on individually negotiated management 
agreements (particularly access management agreements under the 1949 
National Parks & Access to the Countryside Act and management 
agreements for Sites of Special Scientific Interest under the 1981 Wildlife 
& Countryside Act).  The use of this instrument answers specific 
conservation needs but it is also facilitated by the high average farm size 
                                                
21
 However, the SchALVO scheme had high administrative costs given the need for very time-consuming 
and expensive soil analysis and its intensive advisory service (Röhm et al. 1998). 
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(72 hectares) in the UK (Coppens & van Huylenbroeck 1999), i.e., the 
relatively low numbers of landowners with whom negotiations might be 
necessary (overall, or in any one area, or to provide any particular goods 
such as traditional hay barns or other landscape features).  On the other 
hand, countries with numerous holdings and very small areas, like Italy and 
Greece, have in first instance designed more policies that are applied 
indistinctly or according to readily available information (geographical 
zoning or typical yield levels) than negotiable policies (ibid.).    
 
An hypothesis was that administrative costs (and perhaps transactions costs 
more broadly) will be higher for schemes with management agreements 
negotiated on a  site-specific basis than for schemes based on a fixed menu 
of management options and payments (i.e., ‘vertical’ rather than 
‘horizontal’ schemes), although the sample size was too small for such 
hypotheses to be tested rigorously.  For example, in Germany, within the 
Länder, there is only limited differentiation of support according to natural 
and sectional conditions; future evolution of the framework may entail 
adapting schemes more to zonal requirements.  Targeting is thought to be 
extremely important to the environmental effectiveness of schemes.  For 
example, under the Countryside Stewardship Scheme in England, Ministry 
of Agriculture officials use their discretionary powers to ensure that only 
those proposals which are likely to deliver environmental ‘value for money’ 
are accepted, thus saving on dead-weight compensatory payments.  
Submitted applications are scored according to the extent to which they 
meet scheme objectives and scheme participation (with payments) is not 
automatic, unlike for many other schemes, once the eligibility requirements 
have been met. 
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Schemes with a selection element might be expected to be more expensive 
to run, but with the advantage of saving on low-value dead-weight 
compensation payments.  Thus, schemes with a high ratio of administration 
to compensation expenditures are not necessarily inefficient, in relative 
terms, if they are clearly targeted on environmental improvements.  The 
stringency of conservation management requirements may affect scheme 
transactions costs.  If the requirements for compliance are slight (such as 
evidenced by the relatively few real changes in management required of 
many farmers under the ESA schemes in the UK or under the Swedish 
programmes (Kumm & Drake 1998)), we might expect lower overall 
transactions costs (as less negotiation, compliance checking and so on 
would be necessary).  A positive link between the size of compensatory 
payments and administrative costs would be expected: higher payments 
should be made for adherence to more stringent management prescriptions, 
entailing greater incentives to cheat for profit-maximising farmers, ceteris 
paribus, hence greater enforcement activity would be needed.  Research 
comparing ESA and SSSI management agreements in England supports this 
trade-off hypothesis, with management agreements in ESAs estimated to be 
cheaper to implement than in SSSIs (Whitby & Saunders 1996).  Given that 
the menu of management options and premiums is fixed, the main areas for 
negotiation are which package should be chosen for the agreement, how 
much land should be entered (where there is no requirement to enter the 
whole farm) and later on, whether or not scheme requirements have been 
met. 
 
4.8  Zooming in on Scheme Type: the Organic Aid Case Studies 
 
A challenge for cross-country analysis of administrative costs is that the 
case-study schemes chosen from each member state vary in their details and 
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implementation, which would be expected to impact upon the resources 
needed for scheme organisation.  One approach to this analytical challenge 
is to select sub-sets of schemes of a similar nature, and to examine their 
costs relative to each other in more depth (in an attempt to remove one 
dimension of variability in these costs).  Organic aid is a useful case study, 
as data relating to this initiative was available for five countries22.  Details 
of participation levels and administrative costs are shown in Table 20.  
Even though the scheme is similar (but not identical) across the member 
states, there are still significant differences.  Scale varies greatly, from a 
few thousand hectares in Belgium, Greece and the UK to several hundred 
thousand hectares in Austria.  The variation in the relative importance to 
overall expenditure of administration might be linked to such scale factors, 
although Belgium exhibits a low ratio despite its small-scale (around 2-3%, 
compared to 7% in Austria).  The costs per hectare fit better with the scale-
economy hypothesis, given observations of around 1 ECU per hectare in 
Austria, and around 50 ECU in France, and 120 ECU in Greece, although 
Belgium is still anomalous (at around 6 ECU per hectare).  
 
Table 20 prompts a number of questions: for example, why are the per-
hectare costs so low in Belgium?  Why are they so high (and constant) in 
France? Why are per-hectare costs so high in Greece - are their levels due 
to the fact that the data related to the first year of the scheme, thus 
incorporating significant set-up costs in addition to running costs, and low 
participation levels?  An examination of the precise details in each country 
and the comparability of the rigour of the management prescriptions placed 
on scheme participants is needed to answer these questions. There are 
                                                
22
 Further work could involve analysis of the administrative costs for schemes grouped according to multi-
criteria analysis, thus permitting Task 3 to build on Task 8. 
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undoubtedly other, probably organisational, factors to take into account 
when explaining administrative resource use than just the scale of 
participation in any given scheme. 
 
Tables 21 and 22 summarise the absolute levels of administrative costs per 
hectare, and per agreement; Tables 23 and 24 summarise the time inputs per 
hectare and per participant for schemes.  Tables 25 and 26 summarise 
administrative costs as ratios to total scheme costs and scheme 
compensation payments. 
 
Table 20: Organic Aid Schemes Compared, by Member States and by 
Years Since Implementation 
 
 year administrative 
costs as a % of 
total costs 
hectares number of 
agreements 
administrative 
costs, ECU per 
hectare 
administrative 
costs, ECU per 
agreement 
Belgium 1 3.68 2,219 95 8.3 194.8 
 2 3.58 2,690 109 8.9 219.5 
 3 2.39 3,591 143 5.8 146.3 
 
France 1 28.35 18,850 732 51.9 1,337.7 
 2 27.61 20,324 783 50.1 1,300.3 
 3 29.79 32,331 1417 55.9 1,275.4 
 
Austria 1 7.37 259,588 18,543 1.3 18.2 
 2 7.35 272,062 19,433 1.3 18.6 
 3 7.33 280,000 20,000 1.4 19.0 
 
UK 1 91.13 0 0 - - 
 2 42.55 4,673 101 51.6 2,389.3 
 3 30.21 7,875 170 30.7 1,424.0 
 
Greece 1 10.60 4,000 837 119.8 572.5 
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4.9 Summary of the Empirical Observations 
 
To summarise the observations from the agri-environmental case studies in 
each member state, it appears that the time since scheme implementation is 
important to the size of administrative costs for many management-
agreement based schemes, in both absolute and relative terms.  The relative 
shares of administrative costs of total scheme expenditure depend on the 
stage reached in the scheme’s life-cycle, particularly in terms of 
participation; generally, administrative costs decline relative to the overall 
costs of the scheme.  There are two main reasons for this.  One reason is 
that the rate of change in participation becomes negative over time, and 
costs fall each year as fewer new agreements are established.  A key factor 
to take into account is changes in administrative function over time, and the 
differences in costs (per unit) associated with different functions executed.  
High-cost agreement set-up activities are replaced by lower-cost agreement 
maintenance activities (at least up to the year of agreement termination or 
re-negotiation and renewal). The Walloon Regulation 2078/92 programme 
in Belgium, for example, saw a dramatic rise in administrative costs in 
1996, which was attributed to a sudden increase in scheme take-up by 
farmers and thus increased workload in terms of preliminary controls, 
information for applicants, assistance with management plans and so on.  In 
the UK, for example, typically, in the early years for ESAs, project officer 
effort tends to be high as comparatively more effort needs to be devoted to 
promotion and considering new applications than to maintaining existing 
agreements. 
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 Table 21: Annual Administrative Costs, ECU per Hectare Entered into 
Each Scheme 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
    61.3 32.0 31.4 
Eco-points     109.7 71.4 61.6 
Organic Aid     17.1 17.9 18.3 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    8.3 8.9 5.8 - 
pollard willows    - - - - 
Huise LCS  1174.7 35.7 37.5 38.5 37.8 - 
Nazareth LCS     3592.1 9.1 - 
Walloon Reg. 2078   - - 89.1 27,2 25.1 
Bocage l’ardennais   - - - - - 
FRANCE        
Prime à l’herbe             1.2 (for the period 1993-1996)  
RTA    180.0 180.2 170.8  
RLT    243.1 188.9 230.0  
PRM    81.1 76.1 89.8  
DCC    92.5 47.9 54.3  
CAB    51.9 50.1 55.9  
RIN    39.5 38.1 38.6  
OPL    78.4 82.1 80.0  
GERMANY        
FUL I   15.1 n/a n/a 6.9  
FUL II   446.9 n/a n/a 295.3  
SchALVO  43.7 50.6 36.4 32.5 31.1  
MEKA  0.1 0.9 n/a n/a 0.8  
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       77.9  
Organic aid      119.8  
Long-term set-aside      20.8  
ITALY        
Emilia Romagna    91.4 13.0 8.5  
Trento    23.8 8.0 10.5  
SWEDEN        
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Open landscape       7.9 
Bio-diversity       19.0 
Cultural Heritage       7.7 
Advisory Schemes        3.6 
UK        
ESAs  128.0 61.6 37.2 30.6 22.7  
CSS  53.3 37.3     
NSAs    200.6 109.0 79.8  
Habitat Scheme    284.9 195.6 112.7  
Moorland Scheme    - - -  
Organic Aid    - 50.9 30.7  
Countryside Access     321.9 214.6  
Access agreements      21.2  
SSSI management 
agreements (1988/9) 
16.2 (per hectare covered by a management agreement) 
1.4 (administrative costs spread over the total area designated)  
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Table 22:  Annual Administrative Costs, ECU per Agreement Made 
Under Each Scheme 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
    74.7 42.2 50.7 
Eco-points     1,650.6 1,217.0 1,103.6 
Organic Aid     293.3 250.3 255.9 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    194.8 219.5 146.3  
pollard willows    136.9 118.2 90.5  
Huise LCS  1,121.3 34.1 35.8 36.8 36.1  
Nazareth LCS     13,003.3 33.1  
Walloon Reg.2078   - - 894.2 310.1 204.7 
Bocage l’ardennais   - - 3,260.7 3,709.8  
Porc fermier    1,664.8 1,645.0 5,073.0  
Blanc bleu fermier    1,179.0 990.00 263.74  
Poulet de Chair     6,390.5 9,187.2 9,119.2  
FRANCE        
Prime à l’herbe    57.0 (for the period 1993-1996)  
RTA    1,010.0 976.2 957.7  
RLT    1,008.0 970.6 958.3  
PRM    672.7 647.9 635.8  
DCC    1,548.5 1,449.8 1,409.0  
CAB    1,337.7 1,300.3 1,189.2  
RIN    1,012.5 976.3 957.7  
OPL    1,800.7 1,791.2 1,641.9  
GERMANY        
FUL I   2,975.9 n/a n/a 353.6  
FUL II   1,345.0 n/a n/a 890.0  
SchALVO 435.9 369.2  336.9 339.4   
MEKA  2.3 21.4 n/a n/a 17.9  
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       286.4  
Organic aid      572.5  
Long-term set-aside      6,784.8  
ITALY        
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Emilia-Romagna    346.6 121.8 89.9  
Trento    161.8 131.7 141.0  
SWEDEN        
Open landscape       128.0 
Bio-diversity       212.9 
Cultural Heritage       393.3 
Advisory schemes       133.3 
UK        
ESAs  5,071.7 3,637.7 2,097.7 1,683.0 1,198.4  
CSS  1,270.4 774.3     
NSAs    10,984.4 5,952.2 2,958.1  
Habitat Scheme    5,195.6 2,882.2   
Moorland Scheme     - 43,999.9  
Organic Aid    - 2,353.4   
Countryside Access     4,151.0 2,756.4  
Access Agreements      1,6823.6  
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Table 23:  Annual Administrative Time Requirements, Hours per 
Hectare Entered into the Scheme 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically     2.7 1.4 1.3 
Eco-points     4.9 3.1 2.7 
Organic Aid     0.8 0.8 0.8 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    0.4 0.4 0.3  
pollard willows    - - -  
Huise LCS  57.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7  
Nazareth LCS     159.5 0.4  
Walloon Reg.2078   - - 4.0 1.2 1.1 
Bocage l’ardennais   - - - -  
FRANCE        
RTA    0.2 0.2 0.1  
RLT    95.5 75.3 140.0  
PRM    1.8 1.7 1.9  
DCC    2.0 1.0 1.2  
CAB    1.1 1.1 1.2  
RIN    0.9 0.8 0.8  
OPL    1.7 1.8 1.7  
GERMANY        
FUL I   0.3 - - 0.2  
FUL II   15.5 - - 28.0  
SchALVO 0.6 0.5 - 0.5 0.4   
MEKA 0.0 0.0   0.0   
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       6.0  
Organic aid      15.0  
Long-term set-aside      2.7  
ITALY        
Emilia-Romagna    77.2 12.2 7.4  
Trento    - 7.6 9.1  
SWEDEN        
Open landscape      0.4  
Bio-diversity      0.9  
Cultural Heritage      0.4  
UK        
ESAs 3.5 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7  
CSS 1.5 1.1 - - - 6.1  
NSAs    6.1 3.5 2.5  
Habitat Scheme    8.3 5.9 3.7  
Moorland Scheme    - - -  
Organic Aid    - - 1.6  
Countryside Access     9.8 7.0  
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Table 24:   Annual Administrative Time Requirements, Hours per 
Participant in the Scheme 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
    3.3 1.9 2.2 
Eco-points     2.2 73.9 53.5 
Organic Aid     10.7 10.1 11.0 
 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    8.9 9.7 6.6  
pollard willows    6.3 5.3 4.1  
Huise LCS  54.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6  
Nazareth LCS     577.5 1.5  
Walloon 2078   - - 39.7 14.0 9.3 
Bocage l’ardennais   - - 147.6 167.9  
 
FRANCE        
RTA    1.2 1.2 0.7  
RLT    396.2 386.9 583.4  
PRM    14.8 14.1 13.8  
DCC    34.0 31.7 30.5  
CAB    29.6 28.3 25.7  
RIN    22.2 21.2 20.7  
OPL    39.5 39.0 35.5  
 
GERMANY        
FUL I   49.3 - - 10.3  
FUL II   46.7 - - 84.4  
SchALVO 5.2 4.8 - 2.7 2.8   
MEKA 0.1 0.7   0.6   
 
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       21.9  
Organic aid      71.7  
Long-term set-aside      880.0  
ITALY        
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Emilia-Romagna    292.9 114.5 77.7  
Trento    - 123.6 121.9  
 
SWEDEN        
Open landscape      6.4  
Bio-diversity      10.7  
Cultural Heritage      19.7  
 
UK        
ESAs 139.0 105.8 63.7 54.6 38.1 -  
CSS 34.8 22.5 - - - -  
NSAs    333.3 192.9 94.1  
Habitat Scheme    - 157.7 93.4  
Moorland Scheme    - - 1426.2  
Organic Aid    - - 76.3  
Countryside Access     126.0 89.3  
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Table 25:  Administrative Costs as a Percentage of Total Scheme 
Expenditure in Each Year 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically Valuable 
Areas 
    17.0 9.5 9.2 
Eco-points     24.4 16.6 14.4 
Organic Aid     7.4 7.4 7.3 
BELGIUM        
organic aid  100.0 100.0 3.7 3.4 2.4  
pollard willows    100.0 77.1 39.9  
Huise LCS  76.7 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0  
Nazareth LCS     96.2 6.2  
Walloon Reg.2078   100.0 100.0 69.4 41.7 32.7 
Bocage l’ardennais    100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
FRANCE        
Prime à l’herbe          1-3% (for the period 1993-1996)  
RTA    35.2 34.7 34.9  
RLT    35.3 29.4 28.3  
PRM    59.4 55.0 60.6  
DCC    29.0 27.4 25.8  
CAB    28.4 27.6 29.8  
RIN    19.3 18.6 19.4  
OPL    66.9 53.3 53.3  
GERMANY        
FUL I   7.9 n/a n/a 3.6  
FUL II   65.4 n/a n/a 54.2  
SchALVO 24.5 19.1 n/a 16.2 15.2   
MEKA  0.2 1.8 n/a n/a 1.1  
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       6.4  
Organic aid      10.6  
Long-term set-aside      7.0  
ITALY        
Emilia-Romagna    15.4 3.8 5.2  
Trento    8.5 6.2 5.5  
SWEDEN        
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Open landscape       7.7 
Bio-diversity       11.9 
Cultural Heritage       14.2 
UK        
ESAs  51.6 42.5 33.2 26.3 19.8  
CSS 97.3 34.7 19.5   27.5  
NSAs    57.3 32.8 19.2  
Habitat Scheme    100.0 44.9 33.3  
Moorland Scheme     100.0 73.6  
Organic Aid    100.0 88.5 42.2  
Countryside Access     83.2 77.9  
Access agreements      71.9  
SSSI agreements 
(1988/9) 
24.3 
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Table 26:  Administrative Costs as a Percentage of Compensation 
Payments in Each Year 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
AUSTRIA        
Ecologically 
Valuable Areas 
    20.5 10.5 10.1 
Eco-points     32.3 19.9 16.9 
Organic Aid     8.0 7.9 7.9 
BELGIUM        
organic aid    3.8 3.6 2.5  
pollard willows    - 335.6 66.4  
Huise LCS  328.6 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8  
Nazareth LCS     2,536.9 6.6  
Walloon Reg. 2078   - - 226.6 71.7 48.6 
Bocage l’ardennais    - - - - 
FRANCE        
Prime à l’herbe    1% (for the period 1993-1996)  
RTA    54.4 53.1 53.6  
RLT    54.6 41.7 39.4  
PRM    146.3 122.1 153.7  
DCC    40.8 37.7 34.7  
CAB    39.6 38.1 43.4  
RIN    23.9 22.8 24.0  
OPL    202.6 114.2 113.9  
GERMANY        
FUL I   8.6 n/a n/a 3.7  
FUL II   189.4 n/a n/a 118.4  
SchALVO  27.0 32.4 23.6 19.3 18.00  
MEKA  2.0 1.9 n/a n/a 1.1  
GREECE        
Reduction of Nitrates       6.8  
Organic aid      11.9  
Long-term set-aside      7.5  
ITALY        
Emila-Romagna    18.1 3.9 5.5  
Trento    9.3 6.6 5.8  
SWEDEN        
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Open landscape       8.3 
Bio-diversity       13.5 
Cultural Heritage       16.5 
UK        
ESAs  106.5 74.0 49.7 35.8 24.6  
CSS 393.1 53.2 24.3   37.9  
NSAs    134.4 48.9 23.7  
Habitat Scheme    - 81.5 50.0  
Moorland Scheme     - 279.3  
Organic Aid     769.2 73.0  
Countryside Access     496.0 353.3  
Access Agreements       255.7  
SSSI agreements 
(1988/9) 
32.1% 
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As participation rises, there is also some potential for economies of scale 
given the (largely fixed) overhead costs of organisation at scheme-level.  
Participation also has an obvious impact on the variable costs of a scheme 
over its life cycle; costs  reflect, to some extent, the flow of applications and 
new entrants (processing costs) as well as the cumulative numbers of 
agreements in existence under the scheme, for which payments must be 
made and conditions enforced.  The initial period is characterised by the 
organisation of administrative systems, preparation of regional 
programmes, designating target areas and so on.  As schemes develop, 
generally monitoring and running costs become quite significant in absolute 
terms, but their importance to overall gross scheme expenditure is dwarfed 
by the increasing expenditure on payments to farmers. 
 
The set-up costs at the level of the participant should be considered as an 
investment, and the life-span of the ‘asset’ (the natural capital to be 
protected and maintained or enhanced through participation of the farmer in 
the scheme, and perhaps information relating to conservation activities) 
should be considered in relation to these costs.   For example, although the 
intention of many schemes is for management agreements to run for ten-
years, it is possible to opt out and terminate them after the first five years.  
Agreements should be maintained for a period long enough to gain true 
benefits from the costs of setting them up. 
 
It is also important to consider the trade-offs between short-term and long-
term transactions costs and the length of management agreements.  Agri-
environmental contracts between farmers and the State are a popular 
instrument at present in Regulation 2078/92 frameworks across the EU, and 
have the advantage that they are relatively easy to implement once 
management options and payment levels have been agreed.  However, a 
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major disadvantage is that land is not protected (from continuing intensive 
agricultural practices) or managed positively beyond the end of the contract 
period.  There may also be important trade-offs between transactions costs 
and long-term environmental benefits: instruments leading to payments to 
provide environmental benefits over a longer period (or perhaps in 
perpetuity) would be expected to  be significantly more difficult to 
establish, as they require more constraints on, or commitment from, land-
holders.  Evidence for this might be taken from the comparison of 
management agreements under the ESA scheme and for SSSIs in the UK 
(see Whitby & Saunders 1996), although there are, of course, other factors 
affecting transactions costs.  However, higher initial transactions costs may 
be offset by lower longer-term transactions costs, compared to schemes 
relying on short-term agreements and requiring potentially-costly re-
negotiation.  Again, this is an empirical issue and more work is needed. 
 
There may be also be an ‘experience’ factor, related to the administrative 
learning curve and economies made over time from fine-tuning procedures 
which contributes to the decline over time of annual administration costs.  
Schemes also evolve as experience grows following their initial 
implementation and evaluation.  Administrative inefficiencies are to be 
expected in the early phases; staff need to be recruited and trained; the fine 
details of processes and procedures for making payments, enforcing 
compliance etc. need to be worked out.  The imperfect divisibility of labour 
and the difficulties of predicting up-take and the lack of scale savings in the 
early days also contribute to significant administrative expenditure as a 
proportion of all scheme costs.  Administrative costs might be expected to 
fall over time following organisational and technological innovations.  For 
example, in the Belgian Land Consolidation Scheme, some tasks are to be 
simplified through the establishment of a geographical data-base for the 
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whole Flemish region.  Computers and geographical information systems 
should allow faster cross-referencing and automation of some tasks such as 
making annual payments.  On the other hand, there will be non-trivial set-
up (investment) costs of introducing such systems. However, given the 
small size and scope of the data set available here, it is impossible to 
untangle the contribution made by experience (an intangible but potentially 
important factor) and changes in administrative functions as the scheme 
develops and participation rises. 
 
Cost components can rise in their absolute and relative importance, as well 
as fall.  For example, as environmental policy develops, its supporting 
administrative infrastructure would be expected to develop too, perhaps 
with greater levels of environmental monitoring or greater advisory 
provision for landowners.  Such improvements come at a cost.  Thus, policy 
evolution may explain why member states with fairly well-developed policy 
frameworks nevertheless incur high costs of administration compared to 
member states with much newer (but less elaborate) policy frameworks (for 
example, case studies in the UK compared to Greece).  It would be useful to 
identify the factors affecting the direction and magnitude of movements, 
such as changes in participation over time. 
 
Administrative cost trends over time would also be expected to show 
discontinuities, for example, due to the re-negotiation and renewal of 
management agreements as they end (generally after five or ten years); thus 
a sudden rise in administrative expenditures might be expected at the 
renewal stage as the costs of re-negotiating contracts are generally likely to 
exceed routine costs such as processing of annual payments.  Scheme costs 
for the Walloon 2078/92 programme in Belgium have also risen due to an 
increase in demonstration projects, which are the principal way of 
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promoting the Regulation 2078/92 scheme (Coppens et al. 1997).  As 
schemes adjust, the overall costs of more recent years may cover a range of 
activities from scheme development to compliance monitoring and re-
negotiation of contracts with farmers.  In addition, new management 
options might be introduced, leading to changes in existing agreements or 
encouraging the participation of more land-owners outside the scheme23. 
 
Clearly, administrative costs comprise significant, but generally hidden, 
components of public expenditure in the agri-environmental sphere.  A 
number of general factors pertinent to the magnitudes of administrative 
costs are summarised below: 
 
• the degree of scheme transparency and the ease with which 
environmental management requirements are understood by farmers, 
without needing recourse to expert, professional advice on conservation 
management.  However, greater attention to conservation details 
(perhaps on a site-specific basis), while incurring greater administrative 
cost, may enhance the value for money of any scheme, especially in the 
longer-term given the educating and suasive role of project officer 
involvement. 
• the observability of compliance with the environmental management 
requirements (linked to the nature of the agri-environmental goods to be 
provided) 
• scheme objectives and the degree to which these are pursued (i.e., the 
difference made to scheme administrative costs by objectives of simply 
giving farmers compensatory payments, which is very easy, and making 
                                                
23
 For example, the designated areas of some English Environmentally Sensitive Areas were extended 
after the first few years; new management options (e.g., with regard to access) were also introduced in 
some cases. 
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sure that they actually change their management practices to generate 
environmental benefits). 
• the number of agencies involved in the administration of schemes, and 
the extent to which a ‘one-stop shop’ for scheme participation is possible 
• the regularity of interactions between the agency and participants, for 
example, in relation to the annual filing of claims for payment under 
voluntary schemes, and the number of visits for monitoring and 
compliance enforcement 
• the potential  for economies of scale, given the substantial fixed costs of 
scheme set-up and fixed operational overheads (particularly for scheme 
evaluation and development) 
• the time since scheme implementation, linked both to the activities 
required for scheme administration and the likelihood of fine-tuning and 
efficiency improvements from the experience gained by the 
implementing agency in the earlier stages  
• the technology available for monitoring and administration (for example, 
related to the use of Geographic Information Systems linked to 
databases to avoid any duplication of payments under different but 
related schemes) 
• farmer attitudes and understanding (affecting the level of monitoring and 
enforcement activities needed) 
• member-state specifics of administrative cultures and structures, as well 
as the stage of development of the agri-environmental policy framework 
• possibly greater regionalism and therefore flexibility in drawing up 
delivery mechanisms 
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Furthermore, idiosyncracies at the level of the implementing authority may 
contribute to the level of scheme administration costs; these need to be 
examined in far more detail than was possible in this study.  Administrative 
costs have been observed to be widely variable at the local level even for a 
particular scheme.  The NAO (1997) analysis of ESA administration in 
England found that the time taken by different MAFF Regional Service 
Centres to process applications and claims was highly variable, and asked 
why this might be.   For example, cost variation could possibly be related to 
the varying complexity of management agreements in different regions, 
given different agricultural systems and varying potential for conservation 
improvements.  Factors such as staff turn-over and the need to train and 
recruit new staff, staff sickness and so on should be considered; it is 
essential to be aware of ‘noise’; in practice, no administration can be 100% 
efficient at all times.  Further work should assess the geographical aspects 
of the nature and magnitude of transactions costs, linked to the type of 
agricultural production typical of any given area (intensive arable, or 
livestock, for example).   Geographical factors are also important in terms 
of access to applicants for advisors, leading to issues such as whether or not 
it is better to decentralise administration. 
 
4.10 Estimating the Overall Annual Administrative Costs of Regulation 
2078/92 Implementation in STEWPOL Member States 
 
The majority of schemes for which information on expenditure and uptake 
has been collected through this project are Regulation 2078/92 schemes.  
The approach here has been to assess typical annual administrative costs per 
hectare, per participant and per ECU paid as compensation under these 
schemes.  An estimate of the overall amount spent on administration for 
Regulation 2078/92 schemes could be obtained by multiplying the 
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published figures for overall agri-environmental scheme expenditure (given 
earlier in Table 4) by the proportion of total scheme expenditure accounted 
for by administration, as estimated from the case studies.  
 
Farm structure is also important in terms of estimated overall scheme 
administrative costs, as structure will affect the number of farmers with 
whom environmental transactions might be required; see Table 27.  The 
trend between 1970-1995 was for a marked decrease in the number of farms 
and a correlated rise in their average size.  The decrease in terms of farm 
numbers has been substantial in all countries and in particular in Belgium, 
France, Germany and Sweden.  It is also in these countries that the increase 
in farm size has been important: the mean size of farms has doubled in 
France and more than doubled in Germany during the 1970-1995 period; 
slowest change was in the UK, with only a 10% rise over the period 
(Coppens & van Huylenbroeck 1999).  Table 28 gives the estimated annual 
overall administrative costs of Regulation 2078/92. 
 
Table 27: Agricultural Areas and Farm Structure 
 Utilised agricultural 
area, 1995, 
‘000 hectares 
No. of farms,  
 
 
‘000, 1995 
Average farm 
size,  
 
hectares 
Total estimated compensation cost 
of five year Reg. 2078/92 
programmes,  
million ECU 
Austria 3.430 259 21 10063 
Belgium 1.368 73 19 34     
France 30.056 735 41 1905 
Germany 17.344 588 31 1738 
Greece 3.9411 8622 42 17 
Italy 14.685 2478 6  n/a 
Sweden 3.259 87 37 330 
UK 18.294 234 73 378 
1
 no. in 1992. 2 figures for 1990. 3 based on initial estimates; the actual figure may be closer to 2789 M 
ECU if the high funding levels for the first year are maintained until 1999. 
Source: Coppens & van Huylenbroeck (1999); Boisson & Buller (1996); Deblitz & Plankl (1997). 
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Table 28:  Estimated Annual Overall Costs (Million ECU) of the 
Regulation 2078/92 Framework for STEWPOL Countries, 
Based on Cost Data for the Case-Study Schemes 
 
 Average ratio of administrative 
costs to compensation costs for 
case study schemes in each 
country) (%) 
Annual Estimated 
Costs of Regulation 
2078/921 
 
Estimated Annual 
Administrative Cost of 
Supporting the Implementation 
of Regulation 2078/92,  
Austria 8.8 201.2 
[possibly 557.8] 
17.8 
[possibly up to 49.3] 
Belgium 63.4 2.6 4.3 
France 87.1 381.0 331.8 
Germany 12.3 347.6 42.8 
Greece 8.6 3.4 0.3 
Italy 6.6 not available - 
Sweden 11.3 660.0 7.5 
UK 47.9 75.6 36.2 
1
 Estimated using data on five-year expenditures in Table 26 above. 
 
Table 28 indicates that the annual public expenditure on administering agri-
environmental schemes is considerable, though varying significantly across 
member states according to the scale of agri-environmental scheme 
implementation to date.  There are, of course, qualifications to the accuracy 
of these figures, given the nature of the survey-sample data on which the 
administrative cost ratios were based, as well as factors such as the 
dynamics of administration and the scope to reduce these costs as 
experience builds. 
  
 116 
5.  DEVELOPING AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
5.1  Policy, Property Rights and Transactions Costs 
 
Given the high, though variable, levels of transactions costs  in agri-
environmental policies, the administrative implications of possible policy 
shifts need assessment.  Bromley & Hodge (1990) considered that existing 
property rights structures mean that landowners must be induced with 
financial concessions to use land in socially-desirable ways.  In the current 
European agri-environmental policy context, policy development may 
involve taking the existing framework further or changing its emphasis, for 
example, with regard to the mix of instruments, and also by shifting the 
policy basis from voluntary, compensated management agreements to a 
requirement of basic maintenance of the rural fabric, through, perhaps, a 
Code of Good Conservation Practice for farmers, or the introduction of a 
general duty of care linked to the income support framework.  A possibility 
is the development of parallel components of the policy framework, through 
an increase in the regulatory floor, mirrored by an increased emphasis on 
positive management.  For example, following the Nitrate Sensitive Areas 
scheme with compensatory payments available, Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
have now been introduced, with mandatory limits on nitrogenous inputs to 
land, i.e., based on a regulatory approach. 
 
The consequent changes in administrative needs are hard to predict 
accurately, although some basic expectations can be identified.  Greater 
enforcement would undoubtedly be needed with increased regulation on 
land management, in addition to the administration and enforcement of 
positive payments.  Additional advisory capacity might be required to 
maintain or enhance landowners’ abilities to comply with the scheme, and 
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foster their co-operation to as high a degree as possible.  At the same time, 
less ‘search’ or negotiation activity would be involved if schemes were no 
longer implemented on a voluntary basis, so the administrative cost increase 
related to enforcement may be balanced out to some degree (if not 
completely).  The administrative requirements of a mandatory agri-
environmental management baseline would also be more predictable for 
budgeting purposes (a problem faced by administering agencies within the 
current system), as they would not be tied to participation.   
 
As a further policy development, it may also be possible to develop broader 
landscape management schemes, instead of just focusing on individual 
contracts with farmers, (see MacFarlane & Smith 1998), or schemes aiming 
at broader agreements with local administrations and nature conservation 
non-governmental organisations, especially for monitoring and control. 
Given at least some joint production of, for example, stonewalls and 
landscape, co-ordinated action by all land-owners in the area may be 
needed, ideally, although so far little has been achieved in this area of 
policy-making.  The development of farmer networks could be promoted, to 
attempt to achieve conservation improvements from peer-pressure and 
better information (through knowledge-sharing) on conservation land 
management, before moving to collective management agreements (for 
example, with a premium to encourage participation).  Collective 
management agreements, for example, for schemes of the type exemplified 
by the existing Environmentally Sensitive Area model, will in all likelihood 
entail greater administrative costs than individual management agreements, 
but hopefully at a lower cost than those for common land, as all 
participants’ objectives are aligned (under a voluntary scheme at least)24. 
                                                
24
 Falconer & Whitby (1999) found some evidence that in the English ESAs, extra administrative costs 
arose from the need to co-ordinate farmers’ participation in relation to  common land entry for ESAs. 
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However, it is essential to weigh the benefits of collective approaches to 
environmental goods provision against the extra administrative costs of co-
ordination. 
 
Table 29: The Administrative Burdens of Environmental Taxes in 
Sweden 
 
 Administrative 
costs as a % of 
turn-over 
Taxable 
subjects 
Turnover, SEK 
m 
scrapped cars <2 130 109 
Petrol very low 6 18000 
domestic air-travel 0.2 16 170 
carbon dioxide very low not known 17000 
nitrous oxides <1 300 600 
sulphur dioxide <1 240 290 
lead batteries 1 100 40 
NiCa and Hg batteries low > 170 8 
Nitrogen (and phosphorous) fertilisers 0.4 17 130 
Source: Drake (1998, pers.comm.).  Pesticide taxes were considered to have a higher administrative 
burden than nitrogenous fertiliser, but still a under 2% of turnover). 
The extended use of the market mechanism could be considered: one 
argument in favour of environmental levies is that the market is left intact 
as a transactions mechanism, although this would not avoid the need for any 
bureaucratic apparatus.  For example, the UK Nitrate Sensitive Area 
schemes could perhaps be replaced by taxes on nitrogenous fertilisers, to 
achieve the same goals at possibly lower public cost. Administrative cost 
estimates from Austria and Sweden suggest that the costs of implementing a 
tax on nitrogen fertiliser are very low, often amounting to less than 1% of 
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tax revenue turnover (see Table 29).  Once implemented, the relatively low 
administrative demands of taxation may be attractive relative to other 
approaches such as voluntary compensated management agreements, but 
the non-trivial political costs involved in the set-up stage of a tax, related to 
the fundamental shift in property rights, cannot be ignored. 
 
Conceptually, policy-related administrative costs may be linked to property 
rights assignments (or presumptions), and in particular, to the extent to 
which any given economic agent is in a position of relative power.  Where 
schemes are voluntary, the question of who initiates negotiations is an 
important one (Bromley 1990); transactions costs may have an economic 
effect through suppressing the number agri-environmental transactions that 
may be made, thus hindering progress towards broadening the levels of 
agri-environmental management in the countryside.  Under voluntary agri-
environmental schemes, the conservation agency is in a less powerful 
position vis-à-vis landowners, to the extent that estimated demand exceeds 
supply for agri-environmental goods at present.  Hence, the agency will 
bear most of the transactions costs of the exchange (of agri-environmental 
goods and services for compensation), incurred both on its own side and on 
the side of the landowner.  This is due to the fact that, in the absence of 
altruism, a rational profit-maximising landowner will only participate in the 
scheme to the extent that all the costs of participation, including the 
transactions costs, are covered by the compensation payment.  Higher 
public administration costs would be expected where producers retain the 
rights to produce on their land (and demand compensation), compared to 
compulsory schemes where property rights are taken from landowners.  It 
appears that the definition of the baseline environmental requirements is of 
some importance to the distribution of administrative costs between the 
‘regulator’ and the ‘regulated’.   
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In the context of the Commission’s Agenda 2000 proposals, the issue at 
present is, how could a new model for rural support measures be developed, 
to maximise the environmental and rural economic benefits of policy 
reforms? Environmental policy in agriculture needs an appropriate 
combination of inducement by means of financial support and regulation.  
In the UK, the MAFF Advisory Group (Anon 1999) identified at least two 
routes: first, utilisation of some or all of the present public funding 
committed to the CAP for purposes of supporting a wider environmental 
strategy, including the attachment of environmental conditions to CAP 
direct payments; and second, separation of environmental from economic 
objectives, to deliver support for environmental management in the 
countryside via targeted and hence selective programmes, i.e., divorced 
from the generality of CAP programmes.  A combination of these two 
routes should be considered too: for example, continuing CAP direct 
payments would carry some (relatively) light environmental conditions 
going beyond basic regulatory requirements, supported and complemented 
by targeted environmental programmes to achieve specific, locally-
determined goals.  It is clear from the data collected through this research 
that the application more generally of environmental management 
conditions to agricultural production, especially when in return for 
payments of some form, will require non-trivial administrative activity, and 
particularly relating to compliance monitoring and enforcement.  There are 
likely to be major resource implications in the public sector, and also for 
scheme participants. 
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5.2 Greening The Less Favoured Area (LFA) Allowances 
 
As an example, consider the ‘greening’ of the current system of Less 
Favoured Area (LFA) payments. There appears to be a consensus, at least 
within the UK Countryside Agencies25, that there is scope for combining 
Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances (HLCAs) and agri-environmental 
payment schemes through setting the equivalent of the Environmentally 
Sensitive Area (ESA) basic conservation management tier  as an 
environmental standard for all farms in LFAs.  The new instrument would 
probably be in the form of an area payment, with agri-environmental 
management conditions attached, i.e., very similar to the mechanism used 
to provide agri-environmental goods and services in the ESAs at present. 
 
The UK Countryside Agencies concluded that any proposals which 
advocate a re-drawing of sub-area boundaries within LFAs would be met by 
arguments about administrative complexity  (and therefore cost) and 
difficulty of application on the ground.  In particular, given the variability 
in LFAs in the UK, a method of demarcation between areas is needed 
which is objective and transparent is needed.  Demarcation might be based 
on farm income criteria and/or environmental resource (natural heritage) 
criteria, leading to the suggestion that policy should build on existing 
structures: significant amounts have already been spent on surveying, 
consultation and designation of areas such as LFAs and ESAs.  Given the 
gradual rather than fundamental change in policy objectives, such 
boundaries are still likely to be appropriate for use, in future policy 
implementation, at least to some degree.  An important issue relates to how 
                                                
25
 i.e. English Nature, the Countryside Commission, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside 
Council for Wales. 
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such payments would fit with existing ESAs (and particularly the six ESAs 
in Scotland, all of which are within the Scottish Severely Disadvantaged 
Area (SDA)).  It may be possible to ease the introduction of such an 
integrated scheme by building on the existing ESA and LFA designations. 
Current differences could be maintained by designating the whole LFA area 
into a single ESA with different tiers of management and payments 
depending on its pre-existing status.  For example, higher levels of 
payments might be available in the existing ESAs, to reflect the higher 
natural heritage value attached to conservation land management within 
these areas, and lower payments in areas outside.  It is crucial though to 
first assess whether in fact there any relationships between SDA and DA 
designation and natural heritage value.  If so, these designations could also 
be used as a basis for the spatial differentiation of payments.   
 
The possibility of building on existing policy designations means that 
differentiation of scheme payments with regard to income and natural 
heritage need not be prohibitively administratively complex and costly.  
Nevertheless, LFA administration costs would be expected to rise relative 
to current costs, towards those costs of ESAs, related primarily to the needs 
of farmers for more conservation advice; the greater role for project 
officers; the geographical characteristics of LFAs, particularly the spatial 
diffuseness of farmers and their relative remoteness, increasing the costs of 
farm visits for agreement negotiation and subsequent compliance 
monitoring. Given the administrative needs of agri-environmental schemes, 
and the similarity in the HLCA proposal to the dominant ones (particularly 
to ESAs), a substantial increase in the administrative resource requirements 
(particularly relating to geographically-dispersed agency project officers) is 
virtually inevitable.   
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The current administrative cost levels in the Scottish ESAs (while currently 
unknown) may be a good guide to the costs of greening LFAs.  Falconer & 
Whitby (1999) found ESAs implemented within LFAs in England to be 
significantly more costly to administer, in terms of overall expenditure (by 
an extra £100,000 per ESA per year). A potential hurdle to ‘greening’ the 
LFA scheme is the requirement for environmental audits, raising the private 
transactions costs to participants.   Scheme popularity with farmers will be 
low if they are required to bear the costs of participation with no extra 
compensation; however, the scheme would be administratively costly if 
environmental auditing by the agency implementing the scheme (through 
the use of project officers) is broadened as a requirement to all LFA farmers 
rather than just those within environmentally-designated areas such as 
ESAs who wish to participate in the agri-environmental scheme.  However, 
there may also be scope to economise on costs through the development 
and operation of a ‘one stop shop’ for scheme entry. 
 
5.3  Estimating the Administrative Costs of a General Environmental 
Resource Payment 
 
Multiplying per-unit administrative cost figures by the utilised agricultural 
area and multiplying typical per agreement costs by the total number of 
farmers in each country (given in Table 27) could allow rough estimation 
idea of the overall expenditure on administration required to support a much 
more general implementation of agri-environmental schemes based on a 
voluntary, compensated management agreement approach.  Such a scenario 
is worth investigating, for example, if environmental conditionality was to 
be introduced for agricultural income support payments; the approach 
allows estimation of the administrative costs of introducing an 
Environmental Resource Payment (as, for example, suggested by the UK 
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Countryside Agencies as part of the Agenda 2000 policy reforms).  
However, there are clearly numerous caveats with regard to validity of this 
approach: for example, it is important to consider the range of schemes in 
each country and similarities or differences in their administrative 
structures, stage of implementation and so on.  
 
Table 30: Estimates of the Annual Administrative Costs (Million ECU) 
of Extending the Voluntary, Compensated Management 
Agreement Approach to Agri-environmental Policy or of 
Applying Environmental Conditionality to Support Payments 
 
 Based on Aggregating Up to Total 
Utilised Agricultural Area, 
million ECU 
Based on Aggregating Up to Total 
Number of Agricultural Holdings,  
million ECU 
Austria 703.5 56.2 
Belgium 80.1 28.4 
France 2,271.0 1,118.6 
Germany 176.5 104.3 
Greece 235.4 405.2 
Italy 191.6 346.9 
Sweden 29.8 16.6 
UK 877.6 572.2 
 
Table 30 shows the estimated costs of extending agri-environmental 
payments more broadly, perhaps in the form of an ‘environmental resource 
payment’ for agricultural producers.  Factors such as the potential for even 
greater economies of scale under such a scenario must be borne in mind, 
although perhaps tempered by the costs of transacting with more ‘difficult’ 
farmers (perhaps with less positive attitudes towards conservation 
management than those farmers already participating in the existing 
schemes). Limitations to these simple calculations relate, for example, to 
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the fact that the per-hectare estimates were applied uniformly across the 
whole utilised agricultural area, with no allowance made for the type of 
land (for example, grazed or arable), although land type would be expected 
to be highly relevant to the form of agri-environmental scheme applied and 
hence to its administrative costs (linked to the policy objectives and aspects 
such as ease of monitoring of compliance to management prescriptions). 
 
The size of the predicted aggregate annual administrative costs vary 
substantially across the eight member states, from 16-30 million ECU in 
Sweden to 1,100-2,300 million ECU for France, reflecting the differences 
in the scale of agricultural production in each country, as well as factors 
such as differences in the general administrative or constitutional structure 
in member states.  As stressed already in this report, these figures say 
nothing with regard to the relative efficiency of policy implementation in 
each member state; far more information is needed for such an assessment 
to be possible.  On average, it appears that the annual administrative cost of 
extending agri-environmental management agreements (or introducing 
environmental conditionality into the agricultural income support payment 
framework) could be several hundred million ECU per country, 
representing a substantial increase on present estimated administrative 
expenditures.  However, savings from adjustments in the system (for 
example, to improve the integration of agricultural support and agri-
environmental policy) could offset this expenditure demand; the time 
profile of costs is likely to vary, generally falling with time and experience 
(on both sides of the transaction).  It is also worth noting that measures such 
as general environmental conditionality or environmental resource 
payments would be unlikely to be introduced instantly; however, they will 
probably not be as slow to grow as agri-environmental policy has been so 
far, given a stronger foundation for implementation. 
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6. PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND VOLUNTARY AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES 
 
While assessing the effects on production26 is undoubtedly important when 
evaluating policies, it is insufficient to forecast what would happen simply 
if farmers entered into agri-environmental schemes where they are 
voluntary (as is the basis for most agri-environmental policy in the EU at 
present, under Regulation 2078/92).  In addition, some assessment is 
needed of whether farmers or land-owners would enter any given scheme, 
and if they do, what other costs they incur in addition to the opportunity 
costs of agricultural production, particularly relating to the process of 
participation, and the impact of the existence of these costs on their 
decision.  It would be useful to understand more about what motivates or 
constrains participation in schemes for which the landowner is eligible. 
Information is required on the behavioural responses of the farmer agents 
involved; the rate of participation, and the characteristics of participant 
farmers are important determinants of policy success for voluntary agri-
environmental schemes, affecting both the policy impact in environmental 
terms, and determines the budgets required (Crabtree et al. 1998).   
 
Given the newness of many agri-environmental frameworks still, policy-
makers have only limited experience of farmers’ responses to voluntary 
agri-environmental schemes.  In addition, the population of potential 
participants is diverse.  The private transactions costs borne by both 
potential and actual scheme entrants may be an important constraint on 
participation, but as such they have received relatively little attention to 
                                                
26
 And thence on the natural heritage. 
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date.  The size of costs will have effect in combination with many other 
factors, particularly farmer attitudes to conservation.  The existence of these 
costs may also have important (re)distributive effects: for example, sizeable 
fixed costs related to participation may discourage smaller farmers from 
entering schemes.  Such an effect would be of great concern if these farms 
were thought to have the potential to make greater contributions in terms of 
supporting natural heritage (and contributing to the achievement of other 
social objectives). 
 
The research reported so far in this paper has focused on the public sector 
transactions costs; data relating to the levels of transactions costs borne by 
land-holders were available only for schemes in Sweden and Greece (the 
organic aid scheme).  Swedish research found that the transactions costs 
incurred by participating farmers are non-trivial, accounting for around 
10% of the compensation payments received.  At the farm level, it was 
noted that transactions costs as a share of the actual compensation received 
are considerably larger for farms which have received less financial support 
than for those which have received more, ranging from 5% for those 
farmers receiving over 30,000 SEK to  40% for those farmers receiving 
under 5,000 SEK (Kumm & Drake 1998).  A substantial component of the 
transactional costs of scheme participation is fixed.  
 
Transactions costs are a barrier to efficient resolution between farmers and 
agencies on behalf of society.  Swedish farmers have criticised the 
compensation scheme for valuable natural and cultural environments as 
leading to high transactions costs; Lovang (1997) found that in some cases, 
the complicated system has dissuaded farmers from seeking support, failing 
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to lead to land management in the best interests of society. It was found that 
transactions costs as a percentage of compensation were are highest for the 
programme for natural and cultural environments with high value, which 
underlines the high complexity of the programme; it was also the 
programme with the highest compensation payments (ibid., p4).  The 
Swedish study also found that private transactions costs have risen over 
recent years following changes in the structure of schemes: farmers are now 
required to formulate their own applications, while earlier they only needed 
to sign the contract which they had agreed upon together with the County 
Administration Board (Kumm & Drake 1998).  There has been a change in 
the basis of entry into schemes: previously, the government agency would 
approach suitable landowners; now, the onus is on interested landowners to 
come forward and apply for payments.  A survey of 255 farmers’ attitudes 
to countryside stewardship policies in Northern England in 1998 (under 
Task 4 of the STEWPOL project, see Bergström & Drake 1999) found that 
60% of respondents felt that the rules and requirements of schemes were 
not easy to understand, and 85% considered that the regulations of schemes 
were not adequately detailed.  46% felt that the information about schemes 
was inadequate.  Around 50% felt that the application procedures for 
schemes were too bureaucratic. 
 
All schemes will require participants to incur some level of private 
transactions costs.  For example, to be eligible for payments under the 
French organic aid scheme, a farmer must first belong to an agreed control 
body.  In Belgium, costs are incurred through certification requirements, 
under the organic aid scheme and the food labelling scheme.  Similarly, in 
Greece, to be eligible for entry into the organic aid scheme, applicants have 
to submit a contract with an organic production certificate and a cultivation 
plan; both of these documents are drawn up by independent bodies.  The 
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cost of employing a consultant was estimated at around 1-2 % of the 
subsidy (Skuras 1998).  In Austria, only farms registered with the food 
authority may enter the organic aid scheme; farmers must include an 
auditing report when they apply to the AMA for entry.  The implication is 
that in terms of policy development, it is necessary either to rely on farmer 
altruism, or to increase compensation payments to take account of these 
transactions costs if participation is to be at the levels expected, based on 
foregone agricultural incomes.  For example, scheme targets have not been 
met in Sweden: only 60-70% of the land identified as having a high 
environmental value has received compensation under the scheme to 
promote bio-diversity in pastures; furthermore, the equivalent proportion 
under the previous Swedish system was substantially higher at 80-90%.  
One explanation for this difference is that farmers chose not to participate 
in the present programme because they perceived it to be difficult to enter 
into and withdraw from this system (Dahlström & Johansson (1997), cited 
by Kumm & Drake 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, farmers may gain some level of utility from scheme 
participation, which may compensate for the extra costs of management 
agreement negotiation and so on; farmer attitudes are likely to be an 
important determinant of the economic implications of farmer transactions 
costs.  The case where part of the public transactions cost goes to providing 
a transacting service (as in access agreements in the UK but probably other 
situations too, for example, providing information/extension services) 
should also be considered as important for substitution arguments and an 
alternative to altruism arguments.  The notion of ‘transaction benefits’ is 
important. 
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The effect of private transactions costs should, therefore, be considered in 
more detail, and particularly with regard to how costs vary by the type of 
farm business; by the type of farmer (in terms, for example, of education, 
attitudes, previous experience of agri-environmental schemes); and by type 
of scheme.  The underlying issue is how scheme transactions costs could be 
reduced to improve scheme uptake and therefore meet policy objectives.  
Such research is especially relevant where the policy measure is voluntary 
and only attracts a low number of participants.  Transactional economies of 
scale and scope should be considered too: for example, a landowner who 
participates in policy A may also be likely to participate in policy B if the 
marginal transactional costs of so doing are reduced (particularly given 
fixed costs such as farm mapping and conservation auditing).  Farmer 
networking could be important to the overall running costs of the scheme 
too, for example, if scheme participation is promoted by friends and 
neighbours, which may also have a positive impact in terms of allowing 
reductions in the public costs of scheme promotion (and possibly 
compliance monitoring and enforcement costs, given peer observation). 
 
If a scheme is complicated for participating farmers, it is also likely to be 
complicated for the administering agency, with the implication that the 
scheme will be accompanied by relatively high transactions costs.  The 
agency would need to double-check forms, approve details and so on; the 
Swedish study observed that the time needed for handling applications 
depends at least in part on how well the farmer has filled in his application 
(Kumm & Drake 1998).  Different types of land-owners are likely to enter 
into different agri-environmental schemes, and their participation may incur 
different levels of transactions costs: for example, grazing schemes may be 
more complex, involving more administrative involvement for livestock 
farmers than for arable farmers.  Furthermore, both private and public 
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transactions costs may be linked to the farming structure.  For example, in 
Sweden, the amalgamation of farms resulted in many villages in one or two 
large farms and a couple of part-time farms, compared with ten to fifteen 
full-time farms a few decades ago (Eklund 1998, pers.comm.).  This re-
structuring may well assist in reducing policy-related transactions costs as 
not only are there fewer land-owners with whom to negotiate, but each 
land-owner also controls a larger area, assisting the more comprehensive 
management of it. 
 
There may be scope for transferring the incidence of organisational cost 
between agencies and farmers for some activities, such as mapping, yearly 
monitoring and so on.  For example, under the eco-points scheme in 
Nieder-Österreich, calculation of the points of the initial farming situation is 
done by a private-sector ecologist in collaboration with the farmer, who 
must make the calculations by himself and file a report in the following 
years (which involves completing highly detailed forms).  This system 
keeps down the public transactions costs of yearly up-dates, but increases 
private transactions costs.  In Greece, the high costs of independent 
organisations and consultants are paid by farmers and thus do not enter the 
public transactions cost estimates.  However, as discussed above, this is 
largely a matter of accounting: the public exchequer is still very likely to 
bear these costs or to see a reduction in  participation rates where 
compensation payments are insufficient to cover such costs.  Under the 
SSSI scheme in the UK, farmers may claim reimbursement of some of the 
transacting costs they incur, to avoid the costs of the process becoming a 
deterrent to entering into negotiations. The relationship between public and 
private transactions costs needs further investigation, and is likely to be 
linked to the property rights structure embodied in a scheme. 
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7.  GENERAL OPTIONS FOR ECONOMISING ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
 
There has been criticism of the levels of administrative costs incurred in 
agri-environmental scheme implementation, for example, particularly by 
NAO (1997) in the UK27.  Some improvements might be made, such as the 
calls in Sweden at present for simplified application forms which are valid 
for multiple years to avoid the complicated annual  application process.  
The Swedish Board of Agriculture (1997) found that its environmental 
programme was difficult to manage due to its high complexity, and found 
that its simplification would reduce administration costs and increase 
accessibility for farmers.  Kumm & Drake (1998) suggested that just one 
official might be responsible for a comprehensive inspection of a particular 
participating farm, in contrast to the present case where, for farms which 
receive support from a variety of programmes, different officials may make 
inspections on different occasions. 
 
We might expect organisational efficiency to improve steadily over time, as 
experience grows; however, this may not always be the case.  Pessimists 
would predict that efficiency would fall as bureaucrats learn to carry out 
their tasks with less effort but remain successful in retaining their jobs.  It 
may be useful to make comparisons with previous policy implementation 
systems.  Changes in scheme administration may actually lead to a 
worsening of the situation: for example, the Swedish research suggested 
that policies cost more, at least to farmers, now than they had previously 
(Kumm & Drake 1998).  Around 40% of land-owners in the survey group 
                                                
27
 See also the subsequent hearing of the Public Accounts Committee (1998). 
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had management agreements in one of the two agricultural landscape 
conservation programmes prior to EU accession; in comparison, 80% felt 
that the present programme involved higher transactions costs, and that 
from the perspective of environmental conservation, both systems were 
considered to be equal (ibid.)28.  Results from a telephone survey of land-
owners in Sweden also suggested that environmental agreements have only 
limited effects on environmental quality, at least in the short-run (60% of 
land-owners who participated in interviews in 1992 managed their land in 
the same way that they would have without the agreement) (Kumm 1992). 
 
There will in all likelihood be an increase in the relative importance of 
administrative costs overall with greater reliance on the use of 
management-agreement approaches in the future to provide agri-
environmental goals, compared to the present system dominated by market 
and income supports.  Given constraints on public expenditure, any 
opportunities to economise on scheme implementation costs while still 
allowing the achievement of policy goals should be taken.  However, the 
agri-environmental context is very dynamic and improvements need really 
to be scheme- and time-specific, given the heterogeneity of existing 
implementation structures for agri-environmental policies and the need to 
work within these.  Furthermore, agri-environmental policies are only one 
component of the much larger economic system.  In addition, it is important 
to remember that the distinction between administrative requirements (for 
efficiency) [normative] and administrative resource use [positive] is an 
important one.  In the absence of highly case-specific work, it is impossible 
                                                                                                                                           
 
28
 In fact, farmers receiving support for preserving bio-diversity in pastures tended to feel that the earlier 
system led to better environmental conservation practices while land-owners receiving support for 
valuable natural and cultural environments felt that the present system contributed to better protective 
measures. 
 
 134 
to gauge how, and by how much, administrative inputs could be reduced.  
Still, there are a number of avenues for exploration. 
 
7.1 Economising on Monitoring Costs 
 
The resourcing required for effective monitoring and enforcement is a key 
issue where land management requirements are made mandatory or 
conditional for payments, because of asymmetric information; opportunism 
and bounded rationality (for example, given lack of knowledge on the part 
of landholders about conservation management and the most cost-effective 
changes in practices to achieve objectives).  The characteristics of the agri-
environmental goods and services to be provided, and of the economic 
agents who can provide them, are of crucial importance.  Given 
opportunism,  observability is the key to the efficacy of monitoring, and 
thus enforcement, of agri-environmental schemes.  It may be possible to 
economise on monitoring costs through the introduction of significant 
penalties for non-compliance where they might have a useful deterrent 
effect (see, for example, Russell 1990).  Generally, the only sanction for 
non-compliance with prescriptions for most schemes at present is a 
suspension of compensatory payments; few schemes include penalties in 
farmer contracts (but see, for example, the provisions of the pilot Arable 
Stewardship scheme in the UK29).  Both attitudes and penalties are very 
important to the costs of achieving environmental goals, where there are 
incentives for farmers to cheat by failing to comply with management 
prescriptions.   
 
                                                
29
 Under this scheme, landowners found to be in breach of the management requirements may be required 
to pay a penalty of up to a mere 10% of the payment made, but significantly, could be prohibited from 
entering into a new agreement under any agri-environmental scheme for up to two years. 
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The importance of these two factors gives rise to two possibilities for 
economising on compliance monitoring-related transactions costs: either 
introduce penalties (at appropriate levels, related to the benefits of non-
compliance and the probability of detection of non-compliance) so the 
expected costs of non-compliance become higher and exceed the 
compliance/non-compliance break-even level), or seek to change farmer 
attitudes to become more pro-conservation, reducing the likelihood for any 
particular farmer of non-compliance. In the UK, recommendations have 
also been made by the NAO (1997) with regard to risk targeting, according 
to factors such as the length of time the land-owner has held the agreement 
and information on compliance from project officers and the public.  
However, close scrutiny of the trade-offs between closer targeting of project 
officer attention and the costs of this (acquiring information etc.) must be 
made.  Depending on the strength of positive attitudes towards agri-
environmental schemes and their objectives, an increased degree of self-
regulation may be a way to economise on some publicly-borne transactions 
costs. 
 
7.2 The Wider Picture: Agri-Environmental Scheme Co-Ordination 
 
Agri-environmental policies in all member states are multi-faceted, with 
multiple objectives and multiple measures to achieve them.  An important 
question relates to the scope for ‘cross-achievement’, i.e., maximisation of 
the positive secondary effects of any given scheme, as one way to minimise 
overall policy-implementation costs (Spash & Falconer 1996).  In this 
context, an issue is whether there are too many schemes with similar 
objectives, and a consequent waste of public resources.  For example, in 
Sweden, the modest response for one conservation scheme could be 
partially explained by the fact that grazing land is also included in the 
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programme for open arable landscapes and it is not possible to receive both 
supports (Kumm & Drake 1998).   
 
Programmes have a large number of diverse goals, such as the conservation 
of species, their natural habitats, biotypes and ecologically valuable areas, 
in addition to farmer income support, reduction of food surpluses and 
landscape preservation.  These goals are not always fully compatible and 
trying to reach them with a single political measure leads to a situation 
whereby ecological goals are not realised to their greatest extent.  To attain 
long-term conservation objectives, it is important to use a variety of 
different measures; the costs of co-ordinating these into a coherent, 
comprehensive framework need consideration. In Germany, a great variety 
of nature conservation measures have also been introduced at the county, 
district and community levels; these programmes are typically adapted to 
local conditions to a greater extent than are the regional programmes 
(Zeddies & Doluschitz 1996:94).  In all cases, farmers participate 
voluntarily.  Double promotion of the same measure by regional and 
municipal funds is not allowed; however, this is hardly avoidable given that 
so many programmes exist on different administrative levels (ibid.). 
 
Problems of co-ordination between agencies can increase transactions costs.  
In Germany, the interaction of different administrative levels (EU, country 
and federal state) in implementing and financing the EU regulations, as well 
as the variety of additional programmes on regional, district and community 
level, has lead to an over-lapping of promotion programmes and 
complicated their comparison and assessment. Rohm et al. (1998) noted 
that vertical co-ordination and co-operation between the various levels (EU, 
Federal and Land) and horizontal co-operation between different sectoral 
ministries has proved to be problematic.  Rohm et al. identified as an urgent 
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need the development of institutional structures and procedures that enable 
rapid feedback within the system of policy administration.  In terms of 
achieving appropriate divisions of labour within the implementing agencies, 
it is necessary to assess the links that exist between various organisational 
tasks, for example, and to consider whether  it is better to have policy-
specific bodies or task-specific bodies.   
 
There might be an important transactions-cost economising role for an 
umbrella organisation in taking an over-view of the policy framework.  It is 
important to make intelligent use of available expertise, which implies 
establishing partnerships involving non-government agencies (farmer 
unions, nature conservation agencies etc.).  In Greece, the running of the 
organic aid programme is very complicated as different levels of 
administration are involved, at the national and the regional levels, as well 
as heavy involvement of private certification agencies and consultants who 
assist farmers in their applications (Skuras 1998).  Italy has also 
experienced serious co-ordination problems, despite recent attempts to 
solve the issue by introducing mechanisms for co-ordinating institutions 
involved in the same sector of intervention (Povellato 1996).  Problems 
have arisen over the past two decades with regard to the confused situation 
resulting from the administrative and legislative decentralisation of the state 
to the regions, i.e., delegation to regional administrations and other local 
authorities, of responsibilities for implementing schemes for agriculture, 
environmental protection, land use planning and so on although the state 
retains the task of overall strategy formation and co-ordinating regional 
efforts. 
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7.3 Policy Development Through Rationalisation of the Existing 
Framework 
 
Integrating small or similar schemes may reduce transactions costs, and, in 
particular, reduce fixed overhead costs.  For example, in the UK, the 
Countryside Commission operated the Countryside Stewardship Scheme 
and the Hedgerow Incentive Scheme together from 1994, after the first year 
of the former, using a single team of professional and administrative staff in 
each region, co-ordinated by a central policy unit.  In the UK, LUC (1995) 
found that economies of scale resulting from the co-ordinated 
administration of the two schemes resulted in lower costs than would have 
been the case if the two schemes had operated separately.  In Scotland, 
there is a proposal to merge ESAs and the Countryside Premium Scheme to 
economise on over-head expenses (Scotland already operates a form of one-
stop shop for agri-environmental schemes). One-stop-shops for farmers 
could be a rational administrative development, to reduce overheads, the 
confusion faced by some potential participants, and the search costs of 
landowners trying to find the ‘best deal’. Better scheme co-ordination 
should also allow joint products (both adverse and beneficial) to be taken 
into account, building on complementarities and minimising conflicts or 
duplication30. Movements are being made towards a one-stop shop in each 
territory in the UK, for example, with the amalgamation of small-scale 
schemes in multi-objective schemes like Countryside Stewardship in 
England and Tir Gofal in Wales.  Such approaches, replacing several 
schemes by an umbrella scheme, economise on the fixed costs of entry for 
                                                
30
 In Belgium, the Bocage Ardennais scheme exists in parallel with Regulation 2078/92 programmes for 
the maintenance of hedges and woodland strips as well as incentives for afforestation, hedge plantation 
and wind-breaks, which have the same aims although slightly different approaches. 
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farmers (and (thus) administrators) (economies of scope), as well as 
potentially benefiting from economies of scale. 
 
Related to the rationalisation of the policy framework are the concepts of 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ participation in agri-environmental schemes.  
That is, either land-owners may participate in several different schemes to 
provide different goods, or they may  participate in a single, integrated 
scheme, and progressively ‘deepen’ their participation over time (for 
example, through agreement to increase the quantity of agri-environmental 
goods provided, at each periodic review).  So, for example, initially they 
may enter the basic tier of management in an ESA scheme, and move up the 
higher tiers over time as their conservation management knowledge 
increases.  Given that substantial investments are made in administrative 
assets at the level of the individual scheme participant, it may be possible to 
build on a basic conservation management agreement to develop the 
conservation output of the investment to improve value for money (i.e. 
vertical development) as well as through horizontal development too (i.e., 
expand management practices to cover other aspects of conservation).  
Once a land-owner has made an initial management agreement, the 
additional cost of entering into other management commitments should be 
substantially reduced, given factors such as  better conservation knowledge, 
experience and trust  on both sides.  
 
7.4 Joint Agricultural And Agri-Environmental Policy Administration 
 
Given the substantial, often fixed costs of some administrative 
requirements, such as farm mapping and the processing of payment claims, 
which many schemes have in common, joint agricultural and agri-
environmental scheme administration should also be considered.  Progress 
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is being made in member states such as Austria to merge the application 
process for agricultural support payments and agri-environmental 
payments.  The most important schemes in terms of the premiums paid 
(extensification of agricultural production) do not require much 
administration because most of the necessary data are collected through the 
implementation of the CAP support system (Sinabell 1997).  There are 
important questions relating to the duplication of administrative and control 
efforts for different types of schemes; it may be possible to streamline 
existing systems into a more integrated framework.  Besides the potential 
for payments for environmental conservation measures, farmers also 
receive a variety of other supports for arable production, animal husbandry, 
regional support and other environmental compensation. 
 
In the German region of Baden-Würrtemberg, two different application 
forms had to be completed prior to 1993 for farmers claiming payments 
under both MEKA and the agricultural support arrangements.  From 1993, 
the authorities were free to effect controls jointly with the supervision of 
other requirements under the ‘Common Task’: the application process was 
streamlined so both applications could be made simultaneously.  
Expenditure on control could thus be significantly reduced with regard to 
the preparation work and in situ controls.   In 1993, around 15% of MEKA 
controls were effected jointly with agricultural support control  procedures; 
all controls are now joint.  However, Röhm et al. (1998) observed that the 
expected synergistic effects and simplifications have failed to materialise.  
More investigation is needed to explain why this was the case. 
 
In the UK, NAO (1997) advocated closer integration (joint administration) 
of existing schemes to streamline their management and reduce 
organisational costs, for example, through the use of the Integrated 
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Administration and Control System (IACS) to monitor compliance, to the 
degree possible, as is also called for by Regulation 746/96.  However, there 
are limits to the potential for overlap in function of agricultural support and 
agri-environmental scheme organisational structures; for example, it is not 
possible to use IACS documents to check for stone wall maintenance, so it 
may be more appropriate for monitoring and administering some types of 
schemes than others.  Furthermore, the loss of focus and the need for extra 
co-ordination entail their own costs; transactions costs could even increase. 
 
7.5 Reducing Transactions Costs or Shifting the Burden? 
 
It may be possible to economise on the public administrative costs of policy 
by linking organisational activities to other bodies, and thus shifting 
expenditure, possibly away from the public sector agency implementing the 
scheme to the private sector (although this will not guarantee cost savings 
or greater efficiency).  For example, in the UK, it has been suggested that 
the involvement of local, non-agency advisors (such as those funded by the 
Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group) may have a beneficial effect in 
reducing the need for advisory visits by central-government agency staff.  
For example, under the Countryside Stewardship Scheme, regional staff are 
now being encouraged to act more as facilitators, rather than as professional 
advisors per se, with greater reliance being placed on non-agency staff who 
have greater local or specialised knowledge to assist land-owners in 
preparing their applications.  This approach may give a better chance of 
delivering high quality proposals to the scheme31.   
 
                                                
31
 A problem identified by LUC for the Countryside Stewardship Scheme was that rapid establishment of 
the scheme meant that partner organisations were often unable to play a major advisory role straight away. 
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However, if costs are not transferred to the private sector (and as noted 
above, there are significant constraints on achieving this), it may be that no 
savings in public administrative costs are in fact made; there may even be 
an increase in costs linked to the need to spend more on co-ordinating 
different agencies. The distribution of organisational activities and their 
costs is an important issue; questions relate to which body can execute 
particular activities at least cost.  However, as argued above, it is likely to 
be very difficult to pass the costs onto the private sector, unless they are 
compensated by additional payments, to maintain a particular level of land-
holder participation in schemes.   
 
7.6 Changing the Mix of Administrative Expenditures 
  
There are many other questions  arising from the exploratory work reported 
here, for example: is the present mix of organisational (administrative) 
activities the most appropriate one, or is there scope for improvement?  If 
there is scope for improvement, what changes might be made? Careful 
attention should be given to the mix of organisational activities executed by 
the implementing agency and their linkages. It may also be possible to 
utilise trade-offs between different components within the transactional 
system to reduce the overall magnitudes of transactions costs: for example, 
given greater promotional and advisory activities  less enforcement may be 
needed.  There may also be a useful trade-off between policy set-up and 
farmer negotiation costs: if more effort is put into fine-tuning schemes early 
on in their life to take particular regional or production concerns into 
account, while increasing the fixed costs of scheme development, it may be 
possible to reduce the variable costs of contracting and monitoring.  In 
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addition, economies might be made from taking advantage of trade-offs 
between short-term and longer-term costs: more careful design, perhaps 
through an experimental pilot scheme, may give rise to long-term 
economies despite higher set-up costs.  In every county in Sweden, a short-
term programme was prepared in 1990 to include measures that were to be 
carried out over a three-year period.  Evaluation of the results formed the 
basis for longer-term decisions on compensation for farmers under national 
programmes. Similarly, Egdell (1998) suggested that the efforts put into the 
policy consultation process may save costs overall through the scope to 
meet concerns as early as possible and permitting smoother implementation 
eventually. 
 
Greater efforts (farmer promotion and so on) to improve the popularity of 
schemes may also improve the cost-effectiveness of organisational resource 
inputs, where their economic values are to some extent inter-dependent; 
farmer educational efforts may assist scheme promotion and monitoring 
efforts.  Providing greater farmer information at the contract negotiation 
stage may avoid high costs related to enforcing compliance later on (land-
owners may fail to comply because they lack the necessary skills or 
understanding of what is required, rather than because of any opportunistic 
tendencies).  If misunderstanding and mistakes occur because not enough is 
being spent on information aspects of scheme promotion; administrative 
expenditure should perhaps even be increased32.  Well-trained 
administrators, close co-operation with conservationists and agricultural 
experts are essential pre-requisites for successful conservation schemes.  A 
survey in 1994 of the Countryside Stewardship Scheme in England & 
                                                
32
 In Sweden, Runqvist (1996) suggested that while the system of adoption of individual agreements 
places great demands on the information and extension services, the information provided in terms of 
agreement blue-prints is nevertheless too general to provide any real guidance to farmers in managing 
conservation areas. 
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Wales by Produce Studies Limited found a widespread lack of awareness of 
the scheme: 80% of respondents had little or no knowledge, suggesting 
inadequate scheme promotion at that stage. 
 
The trade-offs between compensation and administrative costs should also 
be taken into account: for example, if the site-specificity of the scheme’s 
application is increased, total compensation payments may be lower, as 
they are better targeted (and such schemes may be efficient in terms of the 
environmental benefits brought forward), but far more administration may 
well be needed to achieve this targeting. 
 
Thus, a number of recommendations might be made for administrative 
rationalisation: 
 
• reduce monitoring frequency but increase fines (according to their 
deterrent effect) to achieve acceptable compliance levels 
• increase scheme promotional and training activities, so participants have 
better understanding of the management requirements, possibly 
improved co-operation, less incorrect management and less need for 
correction. 
• shift some administrative activities such as farm mapping and reporting 
onto participants,  although this may have perverse effects on public-
administrative requirements 
• use the private sector more, by contracting out some routine 
administrative activities through competitive tendering to keep costs 
down 
• merge similar schemes to economise on fixed (overhead) costs 
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• consider the scope for the joint administration of agricultural support 
and agri-environmental schemes, to save duplication of effort 
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8.  DISCUSSION 
 
8.1. Summary and Limitations to the Research 
 
The aim of this research was to identify some key issues and concerns, to 
contribute to knowledge through the collection of new data, and to set an 
agenda for further work in the area of policy administration. The cost of 
policy implementation and administration is an important aspect of scheme 
design, requiring great attention to ensure that the overall environmental 
benefits brought forth are maximised per unit cost.  Scheme costs  will be 
significantly under-estimated in policy evaluation studies if there is a failure 
to consider the costs of State-farmer interactions explicitly.   
 
A unique data-set has been gathered which gives an idea of the orders of 
magnitude of the costs of implementation of almost forty agri-
environmental schemes in eight member states across the EU.  Diverse 
methodologies were applied to obtain information on administrative 
resource usage, including data from interviews, from published and 
unpublished official sources, and estimations by other researchers.  
Contrary to the availability for data relating to the premiums paid to 
farmers, there are virtually no reliable, rigorously determined official 
sources of administrative cost data.  The lack of administrative cost 
information is a result of a lack of transparency and standard control 
procedures in bureaucracies, largely due to under-recognition of their 
resource usage and the implications of this.  Exploring costs is also difficult 
given the numbers of agencies commonly involved in designing, 
implementing, and evaluating schemes. The empirical information that has 
been collected must be used and interpreted with great care (for example, 
with due attention to the assumptions made and the missing components).  
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Cost indicators should only be compared in very precisely-specified 
circumstances; a large number of conditions must be met for comparisons 
to be meaningful. 
 
It must be emphasised that the study was highly exploratory and faced by 
severe data constraints, including the problems which arise from relying on 
expenditure as indicators of organisational inputs; differences in wage 
costs; and differences in the quality of staff time inputs.  Administrative 
inputs are highly heterogeneous and their multi-dimensionality must be 
recognised.  Further efforts are needed to improve the comparability of 
estimates, to improve the consistency of the disparate methodologies.  
Significant problems were also experienced in disaggregating policy-level 
data down to individual schemes (see, for example, the approach taken in 
France), given the problems of ‘joint products’.  Consequently, estimates 
are likely to give an indication of the order of magnitude of administrative 
costs only.  For example, a challenge for scheme evaluation in terms of the 
dis-aggregated components of overall administrative costs is that different 
inputs (negotiation, compensation, advice and so on)  are not separable with 
regard to their benefits; administration inputs should be regarded as a 
package; for example, the type and extent of compliance monitoring 
undertaken should be linked to the advisory services offered.   
 
Policy evaluation is also premature, to varying degrees; many policies are 
simply too new for meaningful comparative assessment with others.  In 
some member states, agri-environmental schemes are still very much in 
their infancy.  For example, in Belgium, two of the four Regulation 2078/92 
programmes have not yet been implemented.  Greece has also introduced 
agri-environmental measures only very recently.  The experimental nature 
of many agri-environmental policies at present must also be taken into 
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account.  In the UK, for example, many schemes were introduced initially 
as pilot schemes (for example, the Nitrate Sensitive Areas scheme and the 
new Arable Stewardship Scheme introduced in 1998 were piloted in 
specific, de-limited areas). 
 
However, the development of administrative cost demands in the future is 
hard to assess as the factors that should be taken into account are many and 
complex: for example, 
• technological developments, such as improved and integrated databases 
for schemes based on payments to farmers 
• changes in the property rights assignments underlying scheme 
implementation and the implications of these changes for the differing 
administrative demands of voluntary, regulatory and incentive 
approaches 
• changes in attitudes of participants or regulated parties, perhaps to align 
more with social demands for agri-environmental goods provision 
• improvements in conservation management knowledge on the part of 
land-owners and farmers, reducing the advisory needs, streamlining 
negotiations where voluntary management agreement approaches are 
used, and reducing the need for compliance activity related to ignorance 
of uncertainty about the required actions or non-actions 
• changes in agricultural production conditions, for example, the present 
agricultural income crisis in Europe 
 
The transactions costs for any scheme in any member state probably reflect 
to some degree the hierarchy and structure of the administration, i.e., 
whether the member state is federal, centralised or decentralised.  In the 
UK, the CAP Reform Advisory Group of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries & Food (Anon 1999) considered that a greater degree of national, 
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and indeed, regional, discretion in the operation of the CAP would be a 
desirable outcome.  Questions relate now, therefore, to the transactional 
advantages or disadvantages to the application of subsidiarity to greater 
levels than at present (given the very high degree of EU competence in this 
area).  The MAFF Advisory Group (Anon 1999) recommended that the 
Government prepare the ground for the exercise of greater national and 
regional discretion in the framework of the new rural development 
regulation, for example, through the introduction of pilot schemes and 
approaches designed by way of national and local partnerships to target 
specific rural or local objectives.  Regional disparities may be important, 
but have been eclipsed here by focusing the comparative assessments at the 
level of the member-state. 
 
There is another potentially important EU perspective to administrative 
costs: they are the only component of costs that are borne almost entirely at 
the member state level.  Contrary to the provisions for agri-environmental 
compensatory payments, there is no scope at present for reimbursement of 
policy administration costs from the EU (see Article 9 of Regulation 
746/96).  Thus, member states are left with the majority of the 
administrative costs, and especially the responsibility of dealing with large 
numbers of farmer participants, even though the EU shares the costs of 
initiating such policies and some administrative burdens associated with 
ensuring payments to member states.   Problems may arise if poorer 
member states cannot implement policies effectively, resulting in the under-
provision of goods (perhaps of a trans-national nature, such as wilderness 
and scarce habitats of specific types).  This perspective on financing may 
lend support to the case for agri-environmental transactions costs to be 
supported from central EU funds (particularly where public goods of 
interest at an EU level are to be supplied); hence knowledge of the orders of 
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magnitudes of administrative costs now and, if possible, in the future, is 
needed.   
 
The treatment of transactions costs by the EU for Regulation 2078/92 
contrasts with the financial aid distributed to assist compliance by 
government agencies with the Natura 2000 network of sites throughout the 
EU.  The Natura 2000 costs, which differ from expenditures under the Agri-
Environment Regulation in that they contain substantial capital works 
undertaken in national and natural parks and entail relatively little 
compensation to farmers and land-users, are to be re-imbursed to the 
relevant member states under the LIFE instrument (Regulation 1973/92).  
The provision could provide a precedent for the greater coverage by EU co-
funding of scheme organisational costs in future.  In any case, it is evident 
that the EU is already picking up some transactions costs through the 
provisions to reimburse member states partly for the compensation 
payments made to farmers, to the extent that these costs also cover private 
transactions costs, as discussed above. 
 
Another fundamental question is why the costs of preparing aid applications 
incurred by participants should not be taken into account in determining the 
level of aid.  As argued below, these costs will be a relevant determinant of 
participation for the non-altruistic farmer and are, therefore, a highly 
relevant consideration in policy design. 
 
In addition, an important policy-making aspect relates to the trade-offs 
between administration and compensation costs, with a significant link 
between EU scheme funding issues and member state policy development.  
Agri-environmental schemes are highly variable in their structure: some are 
tailored to the specific conditions of individual farms (such as the 
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Countryside Stewardship Scheme in England or management agreements 
on Sites of Special Scientific Interest), while some have more general 
application (such as organic aid).  The issue is that it may be rational for 
member states to choose an ‘inefficient’ scheme in terms of overall 
expenditure as it costs less to them given reimbursement for compensation 
from the EU than would a more targeted (lower compensation-cost, higher 
administrative cost) scheme.  The policy design incentives generated by the 
existence of substantial transactions costs should be examined in more 
depth. 
 
Finally, public budgets, and constraints on the setting of these, mean that 
administrative inputs are unlikely to be optimal at any given time. There is 
an unavoidable link between efficiency and public budgeting, given the 
‘lumpiness’ of cost components such as staff, database systems and so on 
(see, for example, Danziger 1978).  Some inefficiencies would be expected 
as a result of rigidities in the system.  Budgets are not perfectly responsive 
to demands; lumpiness of resource costs (e.g. hiring and firing staff can 
have a significant impact on per-unit administrative costs; the possibility of 
such changes should be borne in mind in any empirical analysis as they will 
quite possibly give rise to discontinuities).   
 
Policy budgets should still be set with an eye to the organisational demands 
on resources.  However, administrative efficiency is likely to depend 
heavily on the predictive abilities of the agencies responsible for scheme 
implementation, in terms of start-of-year budgeting and staffing decisions.  
It is necessary to predict what levels of participation are expected and thus 
what work-loads are likely.  Inflexibility in administrative structures often 
means that it is only really possible to adjust staffing on a yearly basis, so 
gluts and shortages may arise, depending on the accuracy of predictions of 
 152 
need.  Prediction and budgeting are never perfect: for example, in 1995, in 
England, ESA expenditure forecasts had to be drastically revised (Hansard, 
6th February 1996).  If scheme participation rates are over-predicted, 
administrative expenditures will appear to be relatively high compared to 
scheme compensatory costs.  For example, in Sweden in 1996, 
compensation for the preservation of biological diversity in pastures was 
sought on 170,000 hectares of grazing land, which was only around half of 
what the authorities expected. 
 
8.2. Transactions Benefits: Assessing Administrative Efficiency 
 
The central message of this work is that transactions costs must be 
measured and acknowledged, in order to become part of policy analysis and 
evaluation.  Some importance lies in their size, but economic analysis 
should also include the value of their output, in order to go beyond a 
financial assessment. The positive role of administration should also be 
stressed; the aim should be to maximise conservation outputs per unit of 
expenditure rather than to minimise transactions costs per se.  
Administrative resource usage obviously has an opportunity cost, but at the 
same time, organisational activities can bring potentially substantial 
benefits.  The most obvious case for acceptance of some level of 
administrative resource use is that they permit some mechanism of conflict 
resolution mechanism to exist, where conflicts over resource use have not 
been satisfactorily resolved by private, market-place negotiations (as would 
be the case in the theoretical Coasian world of zero transactions costs).  
Furthermore, scheme implementation and organisation incurs costs related 
to a variety of activities necessary to the smooth running of schemes to 
provide environmental goods and services, such as information, awareness-
raising, farmer training and education and so on.  Longer-term, more 
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invisible benefits in terms of agri-environmental management might be 
expected to flow from expenditure on such activities, as well as expenditure 
on income transfers for lost agricultural production or materials for positive 
efforts such as stone-wall building or tree-planting. 
 
An important issue, therefore, is to what extent are farmers managing their 
land in ways better for conservation than they would have without an 
agreement?  The actual provision of environmental benefits resulting 
directly from scheme participation by farmers is difficult to ascertain, 
especially in the short-term; changes are more often of a gradual, long-term 
nature.  The link between policy implementation costs and environmental 
additionality is critical but poorly understood.  What environmental 
improvements are brought forward by the various schemes? Their raison-
d’être should be to achieve higher levels of environmental conservation 
than would have occurred in their absence, and their costs, including both 
compensation payments and transactions costs, must be justified in terms of 
the benefits achieved.  There are concerns of significant ‘dead-weight’ in 
terms of policy spending.  For example, a Swedish survey showed that the 
majority of the farmers managed their land in the same manner as they 
would without compensation (Svedsäter 1998); thus, given the 
organisational costs of implementing agri-environmental schemes, the 
dead-weight costs are even higher than would have been previously 
thought.     However, farmers’ knowledge of natural and cultural values as 
well as conservation methods was found to have improved.  In the UK, 
ESA participation is thought not to have led to significant changes in farm 
management for many agreement-holders. 
 
Clearly, administrative costs comprise significant, but generally hidden, 
components of public expenditure in the agri-environmental sphere.  
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However, it is too easy to be only critical, and fail to acknowledge the 
benefits (largely intangible) brought forth through the organisational 
activities of agencies in the agri-environmental field. There is ‘no gain 
without pain’: although both farmers and administrators have expressed a 
desire for simpler schemes, reduced complexity may not achieve the 
environmental goals set.  Of increasing importance in the public sector is 
the concept of ‘value for money’, which raises the question of optimal 
bureaucracy: the question is whether this can be assessed in practice.  A 
balance needs to be struck between the costs and benefits of organisation; 
the presence of administrative costs do not necessarily imply inefficiency, 
even where they are incurred at high levels but they must be assessed in 
relation to their expected benefits. An important implication of this 
research, given the substantial size of the administrative costs of agri-
environmental schemes, is that if we look at the full public costs of agri-
environmental policies, on a per-hectare basis, for example, benefits arising 
from the scheme must at least equal this figure, rather than just the lower, 
compensation-only figure. 
 
Value-for-money assessments must be made more stringent; if transactions 
costs are included in cost-benefit analyses, might some schemes fail?  
However, the problem is that we know very little still about the marginal 
value products, or even the physical impacts, of schemes.  Monetary 
estimates of environmental benefits so far are highly context-specific, and 
remain controversial.  More data is needed on the environmental output of 
schemes (in terms of physical indicators and perhaps linked to 
environmental values too)33. 
                                                
33
 Premiums under agri-environmental schemes are not intended to pay farmers for the social value of the 
environmental services they provide, but to compensate them for managing the land in a specific way.  
Thus, percentage ratios of administrative costs to compensation or to total policy costs are not equivalent 
to cost benefit ratios (and are even further removed from marginal cost to marginal benefit ratios). 
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Research is needed in this area to develop the notion of transactions 
benefits, given concerns of value for money, transparency and 
accountability in the public sector. As a first step, it may be possible to link 
scheme expenditure, including organisational costs, to physical indicators, 
although numerous analytical challenges must be overcome, given the 
heterogeneity, non-separability and multi-dimensionality of countryside 
goods as well as the time-lags in their appearance.  However, countryside 
stewardship policies are typically multiple objective policies.  Programmes 
have a large number of diverse goals, such as the conservation of species, 
their natural habitats, biotypes and ecologically valuable areas, in addition 
to farmer income support, reduction of food surpluses and landscape 
preservation.  In addition, the degree to which they reach their objectives 
depends very much on local circumstances.  Usually it is very difficult to 
quantify precisely the effect of a particular scheme on environmental 
indicators, and it is practically impossible to do this in a reliable way for all 
relevant environmental dimensions (at reasonable cost).  There are also 
conceptual economic problems with regard to the reference point (the 
choice of which has important distributive implications (see Bromley & 
Hodge, 1990, with regard to presumptive entitlements in rural policy).  So, 
for example, an issue is whether we should we take the current  situation as 
the baseline and view any improvement from this baseline as a benefit, or 
should we regard the baseline to which society is entitled as actually a 
lower level of physical environmental quality than the current level, so 
society is in fact receiving benefits from the continued maintenance of the 
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present level?  Consequently, at present, it is impossible to identify optimal 
policy in practice. 
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9.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this research was to assess the transactions costs associated 
with countryside stewardship schemes and to explore the transactional 
dimension of agri-environmental policy.  The focus here has been on the 
role of organisational activities in agri-environmental policy, how 
organisational costs vary over policies, how they vary over time, and why, 
particularly with regard to public-sector administrative expenditures for 
schemes.  A common assumption in policy evaluation studies is that the 
main exchequer cost of policies arises from the requirement to compensate 
participating farmers for any loss they may sustain as a result; however, 
analyses of the data which have been gathered through the STEWPOL 
project cast some doubt on this view. The case studies presented here show 
that organisational resource demands can be of sizeable importance in the 
agri-environmental sphere.  The overall costs of schemes are thus 
significantly under-estimated if they are equated to compensation costs 
only.  Under-estimation is typically by around 20-30%, but by well over 
100% in some cases.  Consequently, administrative costs should feature in 
any analysis of policy costs.  However, there are at present few published 
data and studies relating to policy transactions costs: it is hoped that the 
results presented in this study will trigger greater interest in the area of 
policy transactions costs, particularly given growing interest in the use of 
‘quasi-market’ instruments in agri-environmental policy. 
 
Policy budgets should be set with an eye to the organisational demands on 
resources; however, is necessary first to identify them, to be able to 
economise on them.  Transactions costs vary significantly across different  
measures, and vary across similar measures in different member states.  The 
relative importance of administrative costs in overall expenditure is closely 
 158 
linked to the stage of policy development and participation rates.  In 
addition, there appears to be some potential for economies of scale, given 
the substantial proportion of overall transactions costs accounted for by 
fixed costs of scheme set-up, evaluation and development.  Agri-
environmental schemes appear generally to be more costly to administer, 
relative to other types of policy such as the commodity regimes for farm 
income support, mainly because they involve more face-to-face dealings 
with farmers at all stages than other policy types.  It is relatively easy to 
transfer funds to land-owners, but much more difficult to ensure that 
environmental conditions are followed in return.  Furthermore, the 
implications of comparative transactions cost work for agricultural support 
and agri-environmental policy suggests that administrative transactions 
costs may become even more important in the future as policy objectives 
shift more towards conservation, and the use of direct payments and 
management agreements rather than market price support. 
 
Achievement of a high level of administrative efficiency is an implicit 
requirement of all schemes funded from the public purse, especially given 
the scarcity of financial resources.  However, it is virtually impossible to 
gauge and compare organisational efficiency across alternative policy 
systems; a large number of factors must be taken into account on both the 
cost and the benefit sides.  The empirical transactions cost analyses here 
were restricted, for most member states, to the organisational costs of 
implementing schemes directly incurred by the public sector; policy 
development costs (for example, as incurred in the consultation process) 
were not considered here.  Furthermore, the quantitative analysis assumed 
functioning, pre-existing administrative frameworks, rather than a 
requirement of establishing entirely new policy design and implementation 
frameworks for each extra agri-environmental policies (which could add 
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considerably to costs).  Thus the organisation cost estimates for case-study 
agri-environmental schemes are generally marginal in the sense that they 
add to existing policy organisational structures. 
 
The importance of transactions costs in terms of both public exchequer 
expenditure and economic impact in the agri-environmental sphere is 
beyond doubt.  Hence the importance of assessing the determinants of 
policy-related transactions costs.  The market effects of countryside 
stewardship policies will be a function, to some degree, of the structure of 
property rights, and  which party (the land-holder or the implementing 
agency, on behalf of society) initiates negotiations regarding changes in 
management for conservation practices.  The burden of transactional costs 
between farmers and the state agency will affect participation (farmers will 
participate at lower levels where they are not compensated for the 
transactions costs incurred in setting up management agreements and so 
on); the market effects are then a function of participation. 
 
This research is still in its relatively early stages, so it is timely now to 
indicate the directions in which it is expected to develop.  There appears to 
be a great deal of uncharted territory in the area of transactions costs and 
especially in the agri-environmental sphere.  So far just a few steps have 
been taken along a very long road.  A next step would be to use the 
STEWPOL administrative cost data in a cost-effectiveness analysis, using 
physical environmental indicators, or a cost-benefit analysis, using 
measures of environmental values.  The problem though is that there are 
many causal influences of environmental change in addition to the 
operation of agri-environmental schemes.  Once more is known about the 
benefits (effectiveness) of schemes, transactions costs can be set against 
them in policy decision-making.  At present, we have no idea really of the 
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opportunity costs of the bureaucratic resources allocated to countryside 
stewardship scheme development and running.  Assessment of the social 
costs of schemes would require assessing the removal of the CAP and so 
on, in addition to measurement of the transactions costs associated with 
scheme implementation and running.  Such assessment would be an 
extremely complex task, presenting great scope for further work. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Summary Tables   for the STEWPOL Member State 
Case Studies 
 
 
 
1. Austria 
2. Belgium 
3. France 
4. Germany 
5. Greece 
6. Italy 
7. Sweden 
8. U
 1 
 
Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in AUSTRIA 
 
 Ecologically Valuable Areas (‘WF’) Scheme, 
Niederösterreich 
 
Eco-Points Scheme, Niederösterreich Organic Aid scheme 
level of policies (national 
/ federal / local)  
federal (North-East Austria).  Part of the ÖPUL 
programme 
federal national .  Part of the ÖPUL 
programme 
main objectives extensification of production, maintenance of landscape. adoption and up-keep of extensive 
methods, provision of landscape elements 
promotion and support of 
organic farming 
target areas meadows and field strips; fruit production 
 
all farms all  farms 
year of introduction 1995 1995 re-launch under Regulation 2078/92 1991 
eligibility requirements all farmers; land is entered according to its ecological 
value (on the basis of mapping) 
farmers who wish to participate are 
excluded from ÖPUL payments 
all farms; monitoring for at 
least two years until certified 
as ‘organic’ 
basis for premia /ha. compensation based on gross margins for different 
soil classes; per tree payments 
points scale (field size, number of trees, 
use of herbicides....) 
per hectare 
duration of agreements 5+ years 
 
yearly? 5+ years 
scheme complexity e.g. 
number of management 
tiers available 
Two sub-schemes: for ‘meadows and strips’ and 
extensive fruit production 
‘à la carte’; premia for points vary each 
year 
standard payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
SCHEME PARTICIPATION  
 
  Ecologically Valuable Areas Scheme, Niederosterreich Eco-Points Scheme, Niederosterreich Organic Aid 
numbers of 
agreements made 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
5,565 
5,798 
5,881 
5,837 
319 
582 
985 
18,542 
19,433 
20,000 
hectares covered 1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
6,782 
7,816 
9,526 
10,160 
4,800 
9,921 
17,683 
259,588 
272,062 
280,000 
amount of 
compensation 
paid (ECU) 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
2,031,019 
2,382,236 
2,960,570 
3,181,858 
1,630,000 
3,560,000 
6,440,000 
55,727,029 
61,369,363 
64,666,230 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ANALYSIS 
 
  Ecologically Valuable Areas Scheme, 
Niederosterreich 
Eco-Points Scheme, Niederosterreich Organic Aid 
administration 
costs (ECU) 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
415,883 
250,343 
298,903 
306,255 
526,536 
708,317 
1,087,072 
4,436,667’ 
4,84,992’ 
5,117,502’ 
administration 
costs as of total 
known scheme 
costs 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
17.00 
9.50 
9.17 
8.78 
24.42 
16.59 
9.91 
7.37 
6.74 
7.33 
administration 
costs as a % of 
compensation 
paid 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
20.47 
10.51 
10.10 
9.62 
32.30 
19.90 
11.00 
7.96 
7.23 
7.91 
‘ = including the certification costs for farmers 
 4 
Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in BELGIUM 
 
 Organic Farming 
Aid 
Pollard-willows Flemish Land 
Consolidation Scheme  
Walloon 2078 
programme 
Le Bocage Ardennais Quality Labels 
level of policies 
(national / 
federal / local)  
national Regional (East 
Flanders) 
Flanders area: 2 local 
projects (Huise and 
Nazareth) 
Regional (Wallonia) Regional (Wallonia) Regional 
(Walloonia) 
main objectives promotion of 
organic farming 
small landscape 
elements 
conservation of crops, rural 
landscapes... 
 maintenance and 
planting of hedges 
support local 
production, 
especially 
where it is 
related to 
environmental 
stewardship 
target areas all nature development 
zone 
LCS areas horizontal measures 
apply generally; 
designated areas for 
vertical ones 
Objective 5b areas all (at different 
levels of the 
supply chain) 
year of 
introduction 
1994 1994 1992 and 1995 1995 1995 1993 
eligibility 
requirements 
any full-time 
farmer 
any full-time 
farmer 
any full-time farmer any full-time farmer farmer or environmental 
trust, Obj.5b area 
participants 
must follow  
production 
specifications 
basis for premia per hectare for landscape 
features e.g. km of 
willows 
per hectare, for landscape 
features e.g. km of willows 
per hectare, for 
landscape features e.g. 
km of willows 
not applicable not applicable 
duration of 
agreements 
5 years 7 years 5 years 5 years variable not applicable 
scheme 
complexity e.g. 
number of 
management 
tiers 
  different ‘packages’ 
available 
12 main options (17 
tiers total) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
SCHEME PARTICIPATION  
 
  Organic Farming 
Aid 
Pollard-
willows 
Huise Land 
Consolidation 
Scheme  
Nazareth Land 
Consolidation 
scheme 
Walloon 2078 
programme 
Le Bocage 
Ardennais 
Quality labels 
numbers of 
agreements 
made 
(cumulative) 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
- 
- 
- 
95 
109 
143 
 
 
 
154 
218 
271 
- 
22 
22 
22 
22 
22 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
123 
1014 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10 
- 
- 
- 
153 
294 
932 
hectares 
covered  
(cumulative)         
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
              - 
- 
- 
2,219 
2,690 
3,591 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
- 
- 
- 
- 
7.24 
7.24 
                  - 
- 
- 
- 
1,234 
11,542 
 
not applicable 
 
not applicable 
amount of 
compensation 
paid, BFr                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
0 
0 
0
19186854 
25865914 
33543237 
0 
0 
0 
0 
296030 
1451110 
- 
317,000 
317,000
317,000 
317,000 
317,000 
- 
- 
- 
- 
39,250 
39,250 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1,871,000 
17,245,300 
 
not applicable 
 
not applicable 
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ADMINISTRATIVE COST  ANALYSIS 
 
  Organic Farming 
Aid 
Pollard-
willows 
Huise Land 
Consolidation 
Scheme  
Nazareth Land 
Consolidation 
scheme 
Walloon 2078 
programme 
Le Bocage 
Ardennais 
Quality labels 
total  known 
administrative 
costs 
 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
500,000 
208,000 
687,000 
734,000 
922,220 
822,440 
 
 
 
836,000 
993,600 
963,600 
- 
1,041,600 
31,200 
31,200 
31,200 
31,200 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1,002,600 
2,600 
- 
- 
2,772,727 
1,946,968 
4,240,000 
12,357,490 
- 
- 
- 
259,158 
464,209 
1,281,417 
5,935,500 
5,004,250 
1,479,250 
8,630,587 
13,381,135 
14,434,762 
 
administrative 
costs as a % of 
total known 
scheme costs, 
 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
100 
100 
100 
3.68 
3.58 
2.39 
- 
- 
- 
100 
77.05 
39.91 
- 
76.7 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
96.2 
6.2 
- 
- 
100 
100 
69.38 
41.74 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
 
administrative 
costs as a % of 
compensation 
paid             
1991 
1992 
1993  
1994 
1995 
1996 
- 
- 
- 
3.83 
3.71 
2.45 
 
 
 
- 
335.64 
66.27 
- 
320.9 
9.8 
9.8 
9.8 
9.8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2536.9 
6.6 
- 
- 
- 
- 
226.62 
71.66 
 
 
not applicable 
 
 
not applicable 
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Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in FRANCE 
 
 Prime à l’Herbe RTA RLT PRM DCC CAB RIN OPL 
level of 
policies 
(national / 
federal / 
local)  
national Regionally implemented (applying only on identified areas defined at regional level), but within Regulation 
2078/92 
local 
main 
objectives 
low-density 
grassland 
preservation, 
extensification 
conversion of 
arable land to 
grass 
long-term 
land 
retirement 
maintain local 
species threatened 
with 
disappearance 
livestock 
extensific-ation  
conversion to 
organic 
farming 
reduction of 
nitrate 
emissions 
 
target areas all      water supply 
zones 
ESAs 
year of 
introduction 
1993 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
eligibility 
requirements 
holdings >3 ha. of 
usable agric. area,  
75% under grass, 
stocking rate <1.0 
LSU/ha. 
all land-
holders 
all land-
holders 
all land-holders all land-holders all land-
holders; the 
contractor 
must belong 
to an agreed 
certification 
body 
all land-holders  
basis for 
premia 
/ha. /ha /ha. / livestock unit / livestock unit /ha /ha /ha 
duration of 
agreements 
5 5 20 5 5 5 5 (experimental 
scheme) 
5 
scheme 
complexity 
e.g. number 
of 
management 
tiers 
available 
fixed premia payments 
vary with the 
nature of intia 
land cover 
locally 
variable tiers 
for biotype 
protection 
different payment 
levels, depending 
on the degree of 
local contribution 
to state aid 
 different 
payments for 
pasture, citrus 
and 
permanent 
crops etc. 
 locally-variable 
scheme 
requirements 
and payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
SCHEME PARTICIPATION  
 
  Prime à l’Herbe 
 
RTA RLT PRM DCC CAB RIN OPL 
cumulative 
numbers of 
agreements 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
117,461 
117,606 
107,568 
99,691 
- 
608 
656 
1520 
- 
34 
36 
54 
- 
734 
821 
1,445 
 
- 
574 
579 
975 
- 
732 
783 
1,520 
- 
771 
784 
1,797 
- 
5,886 
11,811 
19,596 
hectares 
covered 
 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
5,800,000 
5,854,200 
5,573,500 
5,393,500 
- 
3,411 
3,554 
8,524 
- 
141 
185 
225 
- 
6,087 
6,992 
10,223 
- 
9,614 
17,509 
25,281 
- 
18,850 
20,324 
32,331 
- 
19,739 
20,080 
44,639 
- 
135,226 
108,835 
157,873 
 
total 
compens-
ation paid 
year (FF) 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
967,000,000 
1,213,988,923 
1,383,649,647 
1,343,000,000 
- 
7,436,501 
7,872,000 
17,627,501 
- 
413,032 
546,230 
852,789 
- 
2,221,330 
2,842,000 
3,880,569 
- 
14,343,904 
14,518,000 
25,697,603 
- 
16,290,210 
17,421,000 
25,697,603 
- 
21,523,685 
21,876,000 
46,516,764 
- 
34,442,383 
114,417,900 
183,394,097 
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ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS 
 
  Prime à  
l’Herbe 
RTA RLT PRM DCC CAB RIN OPL 
total  known 
administrative 
costs  FF 
 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
61,75,600 ECU 
4,042,080 
4,178,400 
9,451,920 
225,600 
228,000 
336,000 
3,250,080 
3,470,880 
5,964,960 
5,850,720 
5,477,520 
8,920,080 
6,445,680 
6,643,200 
1,1736,240 
5,138,640 
4,994,400 
11,174,400 
69,770,440 
130,676,880 
208,908,960 
administrative 
costs as a 
percentage of 
total known 
scheme costs 
 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
1-3% 
35.21 
34.67 
34.90 
35.33 
29.44 
28.26 
59.41 
54.98 
60.59 
28.97 
27.39 
25.77 
28.35 
27.61 
29.79 
19.27 
18.59 
19.37 
66.95 
53.32 
53.25 
administrative 
costs as a 
percentage of 
compensation 
paid 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 54.35 
53.08 
53.62 
54.62 
41.73 
39.39 
146.31 
122.13 
153.71 
40.79 
37.73 
34.71 
39.57 
38.13 
42.42 
23.87 
22.83 
24.02 
202.57 
114.21 
113.91 
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 Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in GERMANY 
 
 FUL 
 
SchALVO MEKA 
level of policies (national 
/ federal / local)  
Federal (Rheinland-Pfalz) federal (Baden-Würrtemberg) federal (Baden-Würrtemberg) 
main objectives Conversion of arable land to extensive grazing, 
long-term set-aside, maintenance of steep-slope 
vineyards, integrated farm management, promotion 
of organic farming 
ground-water protection preservation of the landscape, 
reductions in the negative impacts 
of agriculture on the environment, 
supporting less-extensive 
production; income support for 
farmers in LFAs 
target areas whole farm (for FUL part I), plots selected on 
ecological criteria (FUL part II) 
water protection areas (610,00 hectares, 
or 17% of the area) and drinking water 
areas (4 zones) 
 
year of introduction 1992/3 
 
1988 1992 
eligibility requirements all farms all farms in the designated areas applicant must own an agricultural 
enterprise 
basis for premia per hectare, single payments for trees in orchards regulations and prohibitions with regard 
to arable cultivation in water protection 
areas; a lump-sum  payment per hectare 
per hectare 
duration of agreements up to 20 years continuous restrictions five years (twenty for long-term 
set-aside) 
scheme complexity e.g. 
number of management 
tiers available 
2 main parts, with 4 main options lump-sum payments, but farms suffering 
from higher losses in income due to the 
restrictions may apply for an 
individually-assessed compensation 
payment  
a variety of different management 
options from a ‘menu’ may be 
combined, on a site-specific basis; 
farmers decide how many options 
they wish to include in their 
application 
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SCHEME PARTICIPATION  
 
  FUL 
                           Part I                                   Part II 
SchALVO MEKA 
numbers of 
agreements made 
1988 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
 
 
197 
 
 
1,186 
 
 
 
747 
 
 
1,210 
22,748 
25,513 
 
27,617 
27,690 
27,933 
 
 
50,000 
55,500 
n/a 
n/a 
58,816 
hectares covered 1988 
1990
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
 
 
38,760 
 
 
61,073 
 
 
 
2,250 
 
 
3,647 
172,070 
219,802 
 
280,025 
289,933 
302,920 
 
 
1,061,000 
1,379,000 
1,147,000 
1,261,000 
1,404,000 
amount of 
compensation paid 
(DM m) 
1988 
1990
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
 
 
13.800 
 
 
21.740 
 
 
 
1.072 
 
 
1.737 
57.1 
70.5 
 
88.7 
94.8 
98.0 
 
 
100.463 
129.083 
133.559 
124.539 
176.370 
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TC ANALYSIS 
 
                                        FUL 
                        FUL I                                     FUL II 
SchALVO MEKA 
total  known 
administrative 
costs (DM m) 
1988
1990 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
 
 
1.1840 
 
 
0.8009 
 
 
 
2.0299 
 
 
2.0564 
15.42 
22.82 
 
20.91 
18.28 
17.63 
 
 
2.538 
2.397 
 
 
2.014 
administrative 
costs as a 
percentage of total 
known scheme 
costs 
1988 
1990
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
 
 
7.9 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
 
65.5 
 
 
45.8 
21.26 
24.45 
 
19.08 
16.17 
15.25 
 
 
2.46 
1.82 
 
 
1.13 
administrative 
costs as a 
percentage of 
compensation paid 
1988 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
 
 
 
8.58 
 
 
3.68 
 
 
 
189.36 
 
 
118.39 
27.01 
32.37 
 
23.57 
19.28 
18.04 
 
 
2.53 
1.86 
 
 
1.14 
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Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in GREECE 
 
 Reduction of Nitrates (Thessaly 
region) 
Organic Aid Long-Term Set-Aside 
level of policies (national / federal / 
local)  
regional national national 
main objectives reduction of nitrate emissions from 
agricultural land 
promotion of organic farming cessation of agriculture, protection of the 
environment in areas that are either highly 
degraded or of high ecological value 
 
target areas whole region  Priority to areas in the provisional list of 
NATURA 2000 sites, coastal areas, riparian 
zones, mountainous areas etc 
 
year of introduction 1995 1995 1995 
 
eligibility requirements cultivation of land with cotton any producer  
 
basis for premia / ha. /ha., higher  in ESAs  
 
duration of agreements 5 years  at  least 20 
  
scheme complexity e.g. number of 
management tiers available 
clear management restrictions (e.g. 
relating to nitrogen applications and 
irrigation technology) 
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SCHEME PARTICIPATION 
 
 Reduction of Nitrates (Thessaly) Organic Aid Long-Term Set-Aside 
 
numbers of agreements made,  
1996 -&1997 
 
1,360 
 
837 
 
26 
 
hectares covered 
1996 & 1997 
 
5,000 
 
almost 4,000  
 
almost ,8500 
 
amount of compensation paid, DR 
1996 & 1997 
 
1,744,513,000 
 
1,234,553,000 
 
719,937,000 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS 
 
 Reduction of Nitrates (Thessaly) Organic Aid Long-Term Set-Aside 
 
total  known administrative costs, Dr,  
1996 & 1997 
 
 
119,000,000 
 
146,400,000 
 
53,900,000 
administrative costs as a percentage of 
total known scheme costs,  
1996 & 1997 
 
6.39 (10.04 if include private sector 
transactions costs too) 
 
10.60 (12.56 if include private 
sector transactions costs too) 
 
6.97  
 
 
administrative costs as a percentage of 
compensation paid        
 1996 & 1997 
 
6.8 (11.15 if include private sector 
transactions costs too) 
 
11.8 (14.26 if include private 
sector transactions costs too) 
 
7.5 (>9 if include private sector transactions 
costs too) 
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Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in ITALY 
 
 2078/92 Programme, Emilia Romangna 2078/92 Programme, Trento 
 
level of policies (national 
/ federal / local)  
regional  regional 
main objectives reduced use of agro-chemicals; promotion of organic farming; conversion to 
extensive production, conservation and restoration of elements in the natural 
environment or rural landscape, rearing of endangered breeds, maintenance 
of coppice woodland, development of footpaths and other recreational / 
tourist features 
financial support to meadows and mountain grazing, to 
prevent soil erosion and maintain the traditional 
landscape 
target areas zonal: the plains, the hills and the mountainous zone; also some particularly 
sensitive areas for hydrology or ecology 
mountainous zones (valley bottom production is 
excluded) 
year of introduction 1993/4 
 
1994 
eligibility requirements all farmers 
 
 
basis for premia higher compensation is available in particularly sensitive areas, per hectare 
and per grazing unit 
per hectare and per grazing unit 
duration of agreements five years plus? 
 
five years??? 
scheme complexity e.g. 
number of management 
tiers available 
18 measures (grouped into 7 bands) 6 measures 
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SCHEME PARTICIPATION 
 
  2078/92 Programme, Emilia Romangna 
 
2078/92 Programme, Trento 
numbers of 
agreements 
made 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1,233 
3,154 
4,645 
2,571 
2,844 
2,885 
hectares 
covered 
 
1994 
1995 
1996 
4,675 
29,649 
48,988 
17,467 
46,538 
38,635 
amount of 
compensation 
paid (ITL m) 
1994 
1995 
1996 
4,509 
20,832 
14,848 
8,526 
12,068 
13,689 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS 
 
 2078/92 Programme, Emilia Romangna 2078/92 Programme, Trento 
 
total  known 
administrative costs  
(ITL m), for the period 
1993-1996 
 
 
 
2,455 
 
 
2,390 
administrative costs as a 
percentage of total known 
scheme costs, for the 
period 1993-1996 
 
 
 
5.78 
 
6.53 
administrative costs as a 
percentage of 
compensation paid, for 
the period 1993-1996 
 
 
61.09 
 
6.99 
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Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in SWEDEN 
 policies for an open landscape bio-diversity in pastures valuable nature and cultural environments 
level of policies (national / 
federal / local)  
national national national 
main objectives To reduce the adverse effects of land 
abandonment; stimulate the use of 
agricultural land to improve 
landscape values; secure the extensive 
use of semi-natural grazing lands.  
Partly replaces an earlier regional 
support scheme for Northern Sweden 
(so a redistributive aim too) 
To encourage pasture management 
(through mowing) to preserve and 
strengthen the frequency and diversity 
of species.  Preserve archaeological 
remains too (cultural heritage) 
To preserve cultural heritage and biologically rich 
biotopes in cultivated land, especially regionally 
typical elements.  Maintenance of the frequency 
and diversity of species too. 
target areas Pasture (defined as grazed grassland 
on cultivate land) temporary pasture 
and semi-natural grazing land.  The 
scheme is applied now in 3 well-
defined geographical zones (2 areas in 
Northern Sweden and forest regions 
in the South and central Sweden. 
Semi-natural grazing land (permanent 
pasture that has not been ploughed or 
fertilised), and mown meadows 
anywhere in Sweden. 
Important elements on or adjacent to cultivated 
land anywhere in Sweden.  Buildings must have a 
traditional architectural style to be eligible for 
support. 
year of introduction 1995 1996 1996 (closed for new entrants in 1997) 
eligibility requirements any farmers any farmers The whole country is divided into 3 zones on the 
basis of regional variations in the existence of 
cultural heritage elements (27 identified types), 
and each zone has a fixed qualification level in 
terms of points.  If a farm reaches this 
qualification level, it is entitled to apply for 
supply. 
basis for premia per hectare.  Compensation is 
determined by the grassland stocking 
density.  A coefficient determines the 
number of hectares of grassland per 
livestock unit which are eligible for 
compensation 
per hectare, for agreeing to 
maintenance activities, prohibitions 
and compulsory activities.  In addition, 
for at least one day during the five-year 
period, farmers are obliged to attend 
and education day or an individual 
counselling session on conservation 
management (arranged by the CAB). 
per hectare, calculated according to points 
awarded on the basis of the presence of valued 
landscape elements.  Each point corresponds to 
compensation for a specified amount of working 
time including material costs for each type of 
landscape element..  farmers are also obliged to 
attend and education day or an individual 
counselling session on conservation management 
(arranged by the CAB). 
duration of agreements five years five years five years 
scheme complexity e.g. number 
of management tiers available 
Farmer must specify to what type of 
land an application relates; both semi-
-natural grazing land and permanent 
and temporary pasture are eligible, 
with different premia available. 
Farmers themselves classify their land 
into different value-classes according 
to criteria such as the existence of 
threatened species, the proportion of 
land covered by grass etc.  Grazing 
lands are classified according to their 
biological values to allow targeting of 
Fairly complex as based on a points calculation so 
careful  attention to individual applications is 
needed 
 2 
scheme resources (since grazing lands 
with high preservation values normally 
demand more careful and costly 
management, compensation premiums 
are typically higher.  At the start, there 
were 4 main grazing land classes and 3 
sub-classes; post-1997 there were 3 
main classes and 1 sub-class.  
Meadows are divided into 2 classes 
 
 
 
 
SCHEME PARTICIPATION  
 
 Year policies for an open landscape bio-diversity in pastures valuable nature and cultural environments 
numbers of 
agreements 
made 
1995 
1996 
1997 
25,416 
39,678 
45,238 
- 
13,984 
16,119 
- 
- 
12,109 
hectares covered 1995 
1996 
1997 
481,699 
695,992 
731,551 
- 
164,528 
180,993 
- 
- 
618,585 
amount of 
compensation 
paid, SEK m 
1995 
1996 
1997 
529.3 
562.8 
543.3 
- 
216.3 
182.4 
- 
245.4 
143.4 
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ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS (1997) 
 
 policies for an open landscape bio-diversity in pastures valuable nature and cultural environments 
total  known administrative 
costs, SEK m 
 
 
49.295 
 
29.225 
 
40.552 
 
administrative costs as a 
percentage of total known 
scheme costs 
 
8.3 
 
13.8 
 
22.0 
total administrative costs as a 
percentage of compensatory 
costs 
 
9.1 
 
16.0 
 
28.2 
 4 
Summary Tables for Case Study Schemes in the UK 
  
 ESAs CSS NSAs Habitat scheme Moorland Scheme Organic 
Aid 
Scheme 
Countryside 
Access 
level of 
policies 
(national / 
federal / local)  
national national national national national national national 
main 
objectives 
Preservation of 
landscape, 
encouragement of 
traditional, 
extensive farming 
practices.  Public 
access; 
archaeology. 
A broad range of 
environmental 
objectives 
through a single 
integrated scheme 
Reduction of 
contamination of 
groundwater sources 
by nitrates; reduction 
in artificial fertiliser 
applications to 
farmland 
Creation and/or 
management of 
valuable wildlife 
habitats 
Protection and 
improvement of 
moorland 
environments, 
reduction in grazing 
densities 
Promotion 
of organic 
production 
Promotion of 
public access 
to the 
countryside  
target areas ESAs all land outside 
ESAs; entry into 
the scheme is 
competitive 
sensitive water supply 
areas; 32 in 1995 
land under the 
former  voluntary 
set-aside scheme, 
land for 
conversion to 
salt-marsh and 
water-margins. 
moorlands all set-aside land; 
but to ensure 
value for 
money, the 
scheme is 
targeted on 
land that the 
public is likely 
to want to use 
year of 
introduction 
1987 1991  (pilot) 1990 1994 (6 pilot 
areas) 
1995 1994 1994 (pilot) 
eligibility 
requirements 
all farmers within 
eligible ESA-
designated areas 
all farmers all farmers in NSAs 
(now superceded by 
NVZs) 
all farmers all farmers with 
moorland 
all; two-
year 
conversion 
period 
all farmers 
basis for 
premia 
/ha, and        
/ feature; 
payments vary 
over tiers and 
ESAs 
/ha, and   
/ feature; uniform 
payments 
/ha /ha payments for each 
ewe removed from 
flock 
/ha /ha 
duration 10 10 5 10 or 20 5 5 5 
scheme 
complexity  
tiers and 
management 
prescriptions vary 
over ESAs 
Farmers select 
options from a 
‘menu’ on an 
individual basis 
standard payments standard 
payments for 
different habitats 
standard payments standard 
payments 
standard 
payments 
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SCHEME PARTICIPATION  
 
  ESAs CSS NSAs Habitat scheme Moorland 
Scheme 
Organic Aid 
Scheme 
Countryside Access 
numbers of 
agreements 
made 
(cumulative) 
 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/6 
3,265 
4,514 
6,141 
7,463 
2,358 
3,647 
4,752 
5,284 
- 
- 
241 
359 
- 
0 
192 
301 
- 
- 
- 
15 
- 
- 
- 
101 
- 
- 
77 
hectares 
covered 
 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/6 
129,358 
266,458 
346,391 
409,962 
56,248 
75,675 
87,319 
92,585 
- 
- 
13,194 
19,611 
0 
3,700 
5,100 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
4,673 
- 
- 
993 
amount of 
compensation 
paid, £ 
 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/6 
1996/7 
10,900,000 
16,500,000 
20,100,000 
29,100,000 
32,456,000 
3,950,000 
8,650,000 
n/a 
n/a 
12,255,000 
- 
- 
1,528,000 
3,625,000 
5,585,000 
- 
- 
0 
950,000 
1,438,000 
- 
- 
0 
150,000 
780,000 
- 
- 
26,000 
270,000 
455,000 
- 
- 
0 
50,000 
75,000 
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ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS 
 
  ESAs CSS NSAs Habitat scheme Moorland 
Scheme 
Organic Aid 
Scheme 
Countryside Access 
total  known 
administrative 
costs 
 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/6 
1996/7 
11,608,000 
12,212,000 
9,995,000 
10,410,000 
7,995,000 
2,100,000 
2,100,000 
n/a 
n/a 
4,647,000 
- 
- 
2,054,000 
1,771,000 
1,324,000 
- 
- 
784,000 
774,000 
719,000 
- 
- 
- 
419,000 
547,000 
- 
- 
267,000 
200,000 
197,000 
- 
- 
- 
248,000 
265,000 
administrative 
costs as a 
percentage of 
total known 
scheme costs 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
19956/ 
1996/7 
51.57 
42.53 
33.21 
26.34 
19.76 
34.71 
19.53 
n/a 
n/a 
27.56 
- 
- 
57.34 
32.82 
19.16 
- 
- 
100.00 
44.90 
33.33 
- 
- 
 
100.00 
78.48 
- 
- 
91.13 
42.55 
30.21 
- 
- 
100.00 
83.22 
77.94 
administrative 
costs as a 
percentage of 
compensation 
paid 
1992/3 
1993/4 
1994/5 
1995/6 
1996/7 
106.50 
74.01 
49.73 
35.77 
24.63 
53.16 
24.28 
n/a 
n/a 
38.01 
- 
- 
134.42 
48.86 
23.71 
- 
- 
- 
81.47 
50.00 
- 
- 
- 
- 
364.67 
- 
- 
1026.92 
74.07 
43.30 
- 
- 
- 
496.00 
353.33 
 
 
